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PRÉCIS AND REPLIES TO CONTRIBUTORS FOR BOOK SYMPOSIUM ON ACCURACY AND THE LAWS OF CREDENCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 March 2017

Abstract

This book symposium on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence consists of an overview of the book’s argument by the author, Richard Pettigrew, together with four commentaries on different aspects of that argument. Ben Levinstein challenges the characterisation of the legitimate measures of inaccuracy that plays a central role in the arguments of the book. Julia Staffel asks whether the arguments of the book are compatible with an ontology of doxastic states that includes full beliefs as well as credences. Fabrizio Cariani raises concerns about the argument offered in the book for various chance-credence principles. And Sophie Horowitz questions the assumptions at play in the book’s argument for the Principle of Indifference, as well as asking how the various laws of credence considered in the book relate to one another.

Type
Symposium: Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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PRÉCIS AND REPLIES TO CONTRIBUTORS FOR BOOK SYMPOSIUM ON ACCURACY AND THE LAWS OF CREDENCE
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