Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-544b6db54f-lmg95 Total loading time: 0.257 Render date: 2021-10-16T00:17:16.291Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

Article contents

ENTITLEMENT AND MUTUALLY RECOGNIZED REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2013

Abstract

Most people not only think that it is possible for reasonable people to disagree, but that it is possible for people to recognize that they are parties to a reasonable disagreement. The aim of this paper is to explain how such mutually recognized reasonable disagreements are possible. I appeal to an “entitlement claim” which implies a form of relativism about reasonable belief, based on the idea that whether a belief is reasonable for a person can depend on the fact that she has inherited a particular worldview from her community.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bergmann, M. 2009. ‘Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure.’ Episteme, 6: 336–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boghossian, P. 2006. Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brueckner, A. 2007. ‘Hinge Propositions and Epistemic Justification.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 88: 285–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, D. 2007. ‘Epistemology of Disagreement: The Goods News.’ Philosophical Review, 116: 187217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, D. 2009a. ‘Introduction: The Epistemology of Disagreement.’ Episteme, 6: 231–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christensen, D. 2009b. ‘Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy.’ Philosophy Compass, 4: 756–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, S. 1984. ‘Justification and Truth.’ Philosophical Studies, 46: 279–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, S. 2002. ‘Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 309–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, S. and Lehrer, K. 1983. ‘Justification, Truth, and Knowledge.’ Synthese, 55: 191207.Google Scholar
Comesaña, J. 2002. ‘The Diagonal and the Demon.’ Philosophical Studies, 110: 249–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elga, A. 2007. ‘Reflection and Disagreement.’ Noûs, 41: 478502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feldman, R. 2004. ‘Having Evidence.’ In Feldman, R. and Conee, E. (eds), Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, pp. 219–41. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feldman, R. 2006. ‘Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement.’ In Hetherington, S. (ed.), Epistemology Futures, pp. 126–36. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Feldman, R. 2007. ‘Reasonable Religious Disagreements.’ In Antony, L. (ed.), Philosophers without Gods, pp. 194214. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Feldman, R. 2009. ‘Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.’ Episteme, 6: 294312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foley, R. 1987. The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, A. 1979. ‘What Is Justified Belief?’ In Pappas, G. (ed.), Justification and Knowledge, pp. 123. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. 2010. ‘Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement.’ In Feldman, R. and Warfield, T. A. (eds), Disagreement, pp. 187215. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gutting, G. 1982. Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism. South Bend, IN: Notre Dame University Press.Google Scholar
Hazlett, A. 2012. ‘Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility.’ Episteme 9: 205–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jenkins, C. S. 2007. ‘Entitlement and Rationality.’ Synthese, 157: 2545.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, T. 2005. ‘The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.’ Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1: 167–96.Google Scholar
Kelly, T. 2010. ‘Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.’ In Feldman, R. and Warfield, T. A. (eds), Disagreement, pp. 111–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacFarlane, J. 2005. ‘The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.’ Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1: 197233.Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2000. ‘Is ‘God Exists’ a ‘Hinge Proposition’ of Religious Belief?International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, 47: 129–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pryor, J. 2004. ‘What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?Philosophical Issues, 14: 349–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reid, T. 1983. Inquiry and Essays. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.Google Scholar
Riggs, W. 2008. ‘Epistemic Risk and Relativism.’ Acta Analytica, 23: 18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, E. 2001. ‘Goldman's Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology.’ Philosophical Topics, 29: 383400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Inwagen, P. 1996. ‘Is It Wrong Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe Anything on Insufficient Evidence?’ In Jordan, J. and Howard-Snyder, D. (eds), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, pp. 136–53. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Weisberg, J. 2010. ‘Bootstrapping in General.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81: 525–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
White, R. 2005. ‘Epistemic Permissiveness.’ Philosophical Perspectives, 19: 445–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
White, R. 2007. ‘Epistemic Subjectivism.’ Episteme, 4: 115–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
White, R. 2009. ‘On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.’ Episteme, 6: 233–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, M. 1996. Unnatural Doubts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L. 1969. On Certainty. New York, NY: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 2004a. ‘Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement, 78: 167212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, C. 2004b. ‘Wittgensteinian Certainties.’ In McManus, D. (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism, pp. 2255. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
12
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

ENTITLEMENT AND MUTUALLY RECOGNIZED REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

ENTITLEMENT AND MUTUALLY RECOGNIZED REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

ENTITLEMENT AND MUTUALLY RECOGNIZED REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *