In the eighteenth century subcontracting was an important way of organising production in sectors producing as different commodities as clocks, coaches, footwear, furniture and scientific instruments. This article argues that subcontracting was not simply a form of cost reduction in labour-intensive and technologically unsophisticated sectors. Subcontracting could be seen as a way to respond to profound changes in the way commodities were produced, exchanged and consumed in an eighteenth-century metropolis like London. The expansion in size and complexity of the metropolitan market, the appearance of new commodities classified as semi-luxuries and fashion items, and the consequent re-assessment of traditional social structures and norms of production, made subcontracting a tool of organisational flexibility.

Last year, Will Hausman gave us a splendid overview of business history's development for his presidential address. Despite his modesty, he treated us to a review of the parallels between his career and the field's progress, which owes much to his dedication to the Business History Conference (BHC) and its various constituencies. What we have within the BHC now, thanks to Will and many others, are multiple opportunities for exciting interactions based on ideas. As we share, exchange, and rearrange our ideas, they grow, as do our pleasure in and appreciation for them. The BHC offers us a wonderful arena for advancing the life of our minds—while advancing our ideas.

This article utilizes the local banknote circulation volumes of HSBC, the largest foreign bank in China, as a gauge with which to explore political stability and state-building during the Republican era (1912–1935). It will challenge the prevailing view that British banks faced little resistance in China through the 1920s–1930s, and expose new archival evidence on the perception of, and mobilization against, foreign banks.

This dissertation summary introduces a new perspective on the legal and economic history of patents in the late nineteenth century. Through a case study of the early telephone industry in Britain and the United States, the dissertation explores interactions between business strategies and national legal regimes, and proposes a revised view of the multi-layered relationship between patents and industrial organization.

This article evaluates efforts to standardize quantities in the London coal trade c1830, and traces the end of the public measurement system first introduced in the fourteenth century. Increasing traffic in coal, reduction of taxes on the commodity, inefficient public meters, etc., contributed to the demise of public measurements. This outcome was the result of extensive negotiations between merchants, the various levels of state bureaucracy, and the parliament. Switching measurement standards was difficult, if not costly, to coordinate. Abolishing public measurements and switching from volume to weight measurements was part of the efforts to strengthen governance along the commodity chain, secure property rights by making quantities predictable and alter a mechanism that powerful merchants considered had become inappropriate.

Both business executives and management scholars have, in recent years, focused a great deal of attention on the theme of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Calls for business leaders to expend resources on behalf of “social good” tend to downplay, if not ignore, what is fundamentally an ideological question: just what is a “good” society and who defines “goodness”? The ideological underpinnings of social responsibility and its relationship to the “good” society can be explored through an historical perspective. The roots of the CSR movement trace back to the early years of the Cold War. Led by Donald K David, Dean of the Harvard Business School and supported by other academics and executives given voice on the pages of the Harvard Business Review, advocates urged expanded business social responsibility as a means of aligning business interests with the defense of free-market capitalism against what was depicted as the clear-and-present danger of Soviet Communism. Today's enthusiastic calls for business to “do well by doing good” could benefit from a similar critical analysis not just of the goals of CSR but also the ideological assumptions, often unacknowledged, that underlie those goals.

Contemporary sub-Saharan Africa presents a puzzle to many observers, and has generally been perceived as a hostile environment to modern business. It is indeed difficult to make sense of politics and business on the continent without understanding how African colonies turned into independent countries since the late 1950s, and how they evolved into postcolonial states from the 1970s onwards. Imperial business was witness to these fundamental changes in African societies and deeply affected by it. Although some economic indicators in the 1970s were relatively favorable (many commodity prices were high), this was the decade when the severe decline of Africa, both in relative and absolute terms, began.

I met Al Chandler in late 1962 (or early 1963), when he visited the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, as a guest of Associate Dean Clarence Walton. Chandler gave a seminar, based on his new book Strategy and Structure. I was then at Columbia Business School, completing my (and Frank Ernest Hill's) archive-based history of Ford Motor Company's international operations, which was my first book. As my next project, I was seeking to write an overall history of US business abroad. I wanted to figure out whether patterns I had found in my research on Ford abroad were typical (or atypical) of US corporations, in general, as the latter expanded worldwide.

We use the tools of transaction cost politics (TCP) developed from transaction cost economics and economic analysis, to analyze the business relationship building between the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), the largest and most successful foreign bank in China, and the Chinese government between 1949 and 1978. We demonstrate the value of the TCP-based approach to evaluating the specialized governance structure of commitment built on mutual dependency. In particular, we identify several transaction attributes that give rise to hazards: transaction uncertainty, the role of the government in the economy, and the strength of the supporting coalition. Our analysis also confirms that commitment built on the mutual dependency between the international company and the local authorities and between the international company's home country authorities and the local authorities did reduce the company's transaction costs by guarding against the local authorities' opportunism.

During the 1980s, the fertilizer industry in Western Europe underwent some radical changes. Reduced profitability and overcapacity forced a number of smaller producers to close down, and most of the major firms in the business either withdrew from the market or reduced their capacity. The exception was the Norwegian industrial conglomerate Norsk Hydro, which expanded rapidly and established itself as the largest producer in Europe and later globally.

The article discusses the strategy behind Hydro's expansion in relation to the changing structure of the fertilizer market, which historically was characterized by tacit and explicit agreements on prices and market shares between the major producers. Hydro's strategy and growth are analyzed in relation to some theoretical contributions from the study of transnationalisation of enterprises. A main argument is that Hydro's expansion was not driven by advantages in cost structure or organizational capabilities, nor did the expansion create such advantages. The Norwegian company expanded in foreignmarkets partly because it had less to lose from a counterattack than competitors in largermarkets and partly because of strategic disadvantages. Contrary to most of its large European competitors, Hydro failed to identify the long term threats to the stability and profitability of the Western European market.

Once, long ago, I was teaching business and economic history at Rice University in Houston, Texas. Alas,my academic career was stalled in the early 1960s. A distinguished Yale professor had kept the revised manuscript of my dissertation sitting on his desk for a year without reading it or submitting a report to the press. Meanwhile, I had just learned that editors do not want to publish fifty-page academic articles. I was having a wonderful time teaching the talented students at Rice, but it was not at all clear that I was not soon going to be looking for a different job and maybe a different profession.

This article looks at the early development of the temporary help industry in Britain. It focuses on the activities of one of the largest suppliers of temporary workers, Manpower, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Drawing on material from The UK National Archives, the article examines Manpower's efforts to gain access as a genuine employer to the state employment exchange network to advertise their temporary vacancies. The article reveals the incremental changes in attitude within the government towards Manpower's activities and argues that this gave the company a competitive advantage over other employment agencies, facilitating their development of relations with the government and the trade unions in Britain over the 1970s and 1980s. The main conclusion of the article is that explicit attention needs to be paid to the actions and strategies of agencies themselves in order to develop an adequate understanding of the growth and development of the temporary help industry.

It is difficult to consider debt as having a history, because it seems like debt might be, as one popular historian of money in 1917 described it, a “semi-slavery . . . [which] existed before the dawn of history, and it exists to-day.” People, in a certain sense, have always lent money to one another: to a wayward brother, across a saloon bar, to a coworker. But even by 1917, as that popular history was written in the midst of world war, the ancient personal relationship of personal debt was changing into a modern impersonal one. My dissertation is about how what we call personal debt, that is debt incurred by individuals and not by businesses, went from being owed to other people to being owed to institutions, and what this has meant at the largest level about American capitalism.

This study evaluates the Bell System's role in the revival of Japanese telecommunications during the post-World War II occupation. Civilian and military personnel who had worked for the firm and who served in the Civil Communications Service (CCS) of the Supreme Command Allied Powers represented the primary agents for knowledge transfer to Japan's Ministry of Communications (MOC) and its supporting independent equipment manufacturers. The MOC became a channel for communicating ideas about management practices at the Bell System to the local telecommunications industry. The CCS's actions in Japan represent what Alfred D. Chandler has termed the “integrated learning base” in action in the public sector. The CCS's role in knowledge transfer has been underestimated by many scholars who have focused primarily on its contributions to promoting production and quality engineering in telecommunications manufacturing. Its central achievement was laying the managerial groundwork for the establishment in 1952 of the governmental enterprise Nippon Telegraph and Telephone.

“When Wall Street met Main Street” recovers the lost history of the American investor and locates the origins of conservative belief in the ability of laissez-faire financialmarkets to provide economic security and justice for all. Bond and stock marketing by the federal government, corporations, and the financial industry is analyzed alongside emerging investor-centered theories of political economy and the relevant debates over economic reform. As early twentieth century securities marketers and their ideological allies promoted investment, they wrestled with the meaning of citizenship and democracy under industrial corporate capitalism. The ideas and institutions examined in this study endured the Crash of 1929, shaping the parameters of New Deal securities market regulation and sustaining opposition to modern liberalism until the present day.

Alfred D. Chandler entered my professional life incrementally rather than dramatically.As a student of economic history at CambridgeUniversity in Britain in the early 1970s, I barely encountered his name. British universities had their own long traditions in business and economic history, including a strong interest in entrepreneurship and in government policies toward industry. Most British scholars were not especially enthusiastic about ideas from across the Atlantic, whether the methodological approach of the new economic history of Robert Fogel, or Chandler's organizational synthesis. Cambridge was an especially closed academic world, with a strong assumption that little that happened outside its delightful campus could be really important. It was not until 1979, when I was recruited by the Business History Unit at the London School of Economics (LSE), headed by Chandler's (then) acolyte Leslie Hannah, that I read Strategy and Structure, nearly two decades after it was published.