To save this undefined to your undefined account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your undefined account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This article considers the litigation in Ghai v Newcastle City Council in which the legality of open air funeral pyres under the Cremation Act 1902, and under the right to freedom of religion and belief in article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, was considered. Ultimately the Court of Appeal held that open air funeral pyres within a walled enclosure were not unlawful. But at first instance the Administrative Court, which had assumed that domestic law prohibited such pyres, held that such a ban would not breach article 9 since it was legitimate to prevent causing offence to the majority of the population. It is the approach of the Administrative Court to article 9 (which was not considered by the Court of Appeal) that forms the basis of the critical analysis in this article. In particular it is argued that the Administrative Court undervalued the right to freedom of religion and belief, as against the need to prevent offence to others, and adopted a stance which was overly deferential to Government and Parliament.1
This article analyses recent trends in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerned with the right to freedom of thought, belief and religion (Article 9, European Convention on Human Rights) and the right of parents to respect by the state for their religious and philosophical views in the education of their children (Article 2, Protocol 1).1 These developments include notable decisions concerned with protection from religious persecution in Georgia, with religious education in Norway and Turkey and with the display of crucifixes in state schools in Italy. It is apparent that the European Convention religious liberty jurisprudence increasingly stresses the role of the state as a neutral protector of religious freedom. For individuals religious freedom is now also recognised to include not only the right to manifest their religious belief but also freedom from having to declare their religious affiliation. As the religious liberty jurisprudence comes of age, other significant developments, for example in relation to conscientious objection to military service, can be anticipated.
This article considers two recent high-profile employment cases to investigate the peculiar dilemma faced by certain public officials who are called upon to implement public policy in situations where their consciences are made uneasy due to their faith-based convictions. Such officials face, among other options, the dilemma of choosing between an appeal to rational objections, based on ‘public reasons’ that are non-religious in character, or citing their own faith-based conscientious objections. In McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs, by initially basing his objections on a form of public reason, McClintock arguably muddied the waters for his subsequent unsuccessful claim of religious discrimination. In Ladele v Islington Borough Council, however, the appeal to conscience alone also failed as religious convictions were ‘trumped’ by the superior claims of particular policy objectives. This article thus concludes that the ‘religious’ public official may, ultimately, have nowhere to turn except either to silence conscience and acquiesce or to exercise that ‘minimum’ employment right under ECHR case law – the right to resign.
The Church of Sweden, being the national Lutheran Church, was disestablished in 2000 and former state obligations were transferred to the church. Major changes were effected in the oversight of the clergy and all complaints were thereafter to be handled by the church itself. This article considers empirical data concerning those complaints and makes an evaluative comparison with the previous system.
This piece offers an account of the law relating to immigration and asylum, especially as it affects ministers of religion and those who give religious reasons for seeking asylum. Beside Nicholas Coulton's passionate advocacy,1 this paper must seem bloodless and even unfeeling. It is a revised version of part of a paper for the European Consortium on Church and State Research, an essentially ‘black-letter’ account of one country's national law constructed to a template that enabled comparisons to be drawn. It began with the observation that United Kingdom immigration law is of daunting complexity; only some limited aspects can be addressed here.
This article considers some of the more high profile cases decided under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, to assess whether courts are developing case law which adequately protects religion and belief at work. First, it considers the meaning of religion with particular reference to Nicholson v Grainger PLC and suggests that this may represent a step in the wrong direction in defining ‘belief’. It then looks at cases which have involved religious individuals seeking to manifest religion at work in terms of religious dress. It critically examines the way the concept of proportionality has been used to decide these cases, and suggests that at times courts are stepping beyond their usual boundaries in determining religious issues, with particular reference to comments by the courts on issues such whether particular beliefs are ‘core beliefs’. The third area of discussion is the question of whether discrimination by religious individuals on grounds of sexual orientation should be tolerated. The case law (Ladele v Islington Borough Council) is considered in detail. In conclusion, the article assesses whether a hierarchy is developing between different grounds of discrimination protection.
The Apostolic Constitution Anglicanorum Coetibus represents the latest, and perhaps one of the most controversial, developments in Anglican and Roman Catholic relations. The Apostolic Constitution is the juridical means by which Anglicans dissatisfied with recent initiatives in the Anglican Communion may enter as groups into full communion with Rome. It provides for the erection of ordinariates, a category equivalent to dioceses but one which is not elaborated in the Latin Code of Canon Law 1983. This article describes responses to the Apostolic Constitution, from the hostile to the welcoming, evaluates the provisions of the Apostolic Constitution, particularly those which effect integration of the faithful into the Latin church and those which allow for the continuation of elements of their former traditions, and evaluates the ways in which the laws of Anglican churches may be employed either to hinder or to help the departure of those seeking entry to an ordinariate.
Alienation of church property is governed by both canon law and civil law, which may give rise to conflict. This paper addresses issues surrounding the Roman Catholic canonical requirements for alienation including the need to consult experts. Failure to consult, itself may give rise to concerns over the validity of the diocesan bishop's permission to alienate and, in turn, the lawfulness of the sale. This is not merely academic. Churches in the United States find themselves in the position where ownership of temporal goods is of increasing interest to the civil courts in the pursuit of compensation for successful litigants in the current wave of abuse cases.
I first came to know asylum seekers in 2000 when working at Newcastle Cathedral. First a Rwandan joined our worship, and later an Iranian. I never asked if the Rwandan was Hutu or Tutsi since the massacres there were too complex for labelling. We knew his family were prominent French-speaking Anglicans, and that in the camps he had become separated from his wife and children. A year or so later my wife recognised his wife's name in an account by a senior Mothers' Union lady of her visit to Africa and to a refugee camp in which his wife had formed an MU branch. Eventually his wife and children were able to join him on Tyneside.
This article considers the question whether ministry in the Anglican Church of Australia is a profession as well as a vocation. After considering the context of child sexual abuse in the Church, and the contemporary practice of ministry, it examines whether it exhibits the four commonly recognised sociological marks of a profession: (1) specialised knowledge and skills; (2) service of fundamental human needs; (3) commitment to the other's best interest; and (4) structures for accountability.
Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects manifestations of religion or conscience from interference under Article 9(1) except insofar as such interferences can be justified under Article 9(2). This analysis asks when Article 9 will protect believers who are forced to choose between religious observance and pursuit of secular ‘goods’ and offers some conclusions about how the protection of believers from forced choices compares with the protection of manifestations of religious belief. It also considers whether cases where believers are asked to choose between religious obligations and protected goods raise particular issues under 9(2). Finally, the conclusions arrived at are applied to an illustrative hypothetical example. The objective is to demonstrate the potential reach of 9(1), and to explore the 9(2) analysis specific to protected-good cases.2
Rastafari cannabis use presents a challenge in reconciling the doctrines of freedom of religion and the criminal law. Hitherto, the domestic courts have not resolved this clash in favour of religion, displaying reluctance to explore the doctrinal limits of religious freedom. This has occurred at a time of increasing Rastafari numbers across the United Kingdom, forcing some followers to choose between adherence to either their religion or generally applicable criminal laws. Such ‘choice’ inhibits the development of domestic religious freedoms where they conflict with criminal laws protecting wider societal and communitarian interests. This dilemma could be addressed through a statutory exemption in England and Wales from domestic anti-drugs legislation for purposes of religious manifestation. This paper examines the difficult balance between the criminal law and Rastafari cannabis claims in the relevant jurisprudence. A comparative analysis highlights that treatment of religious freedom in Rastafari cannabis case law outlines not only doctrinal scope for a domestic religious drug-use exemption, but also some ways in which regulation could be practically framed. Other jurisdictions' attitudes to non-religious recreational drug use are also instructive in this task.1
This article considers the Church Buildings Council (CBC) and its role within the faculty system, emphasising that the whole system, and the CBC in particular, works best through effective and meaningful collaboration. Pivotal to this collaboration are the 42 Diocesan Advisory Committees on the Care of Churches (DACs). Specifically, it is argued that greater clarity about the CBC, its expectations and what it aims to deliver will benefit all concerned in the great collective enterprise of maintaining sacred heritage buildings mindful of their continuing purpose to serve the mission of the Church.1
When Theseus returned from Crete, his ship was long preserved in Athens. Over time, individual planks rotted and were replaced, until eventually all the planks had been renewed. Was the Athenian ship still the original one of Theseus? The problem that vexed Greek philosophers can be made more acute if one imagines that the rotten planks had been preserved, restored and eventually reconstructed into another ship. Which is now Theseus' ship? This was the problem facing Blackburne J in the High Court in the case of Dean v Burne. In effect, he decided that the ship of new planks is still the original one.
Questions have arisen as to the manner of the publication on 9 November 2009 of Anglicanorum coetibus, the Apostolic Constitution Providing for Personal Ordinariates for Anglicans Entering into Full Communion with the Catholic Church. What is clear is that the views of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, under Cardinal Walter Kasper, were given less weight than ought to be expected and that both the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of Westminster were informed at only a late stage. More assuring for the long term, Cardinal Kasper has stated that this provision is not a new form of ecumenism. Significantly, the Vatican statement following the meeting between the Archbishop of Canterbury and Pope Benedict XVI in Rome on 21 November reiterated ‘the shared will to continue and consolidate’ the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Churches of the Anglican Communion and noted approvingly that the details of the third phase of ARCIC would be discussed at informal talks with Anglican representatives in the days following the Archbishop's visit to the Pope. Whatever else the Ordinariate may be, it is not a substitute for that ‘serious dialogue’ established by Archbishop Michael Ramsey and Pope Paul VI which has as its continued goal, despite obstacles ancient and modern, the restoration of ‘complete communion of faith and sacramental life’ between us.
In 1974, the province of Alberta began to issue drivers' licences with photographs of the licence holder but exempted persons who objected to having their photographs taken for religious reasons from the photograph requirement. At that time the Muslim population of Canada was tiny and it was an unspoken assumption that the exemption was created for the Hutterian Brethren who have long had a number of colonies throughout the Prairies. In 2003, the province made photographs mandatory for all licence holders and created a provincial facial recognition data bank for the photographs. The Wilson colony of Hutterites objected to having their photographs taken on the ground that photographs constitute an infringement of the second commandment concerning idols (Exodus 20.4) as they understand it. Without drivers' licences, the colony is unable to make off colony trips to take their produce to market, or their ill members for medical treatment, or to be volunteer firefighters in their surrounding area, that is, the absence of licensed drivers makes it much more difficult for them to sustain their largely self-sufficient agrarian communal way of life which is also a matter of belief (Acts 2.44) without the expense of hiring taxis or outside drivers on an as-needed basis. The province offered a compromise that Hutterite drivers be issued with photograph-free licences but that photographs would still be required for the data base. The colony suggested a photograph-free licence bearing the words, ‘Not to be used for identification purposes’. Neither side accepted the other's proposal and the colony initiated litigation on the ground that the freedom of religion of the Hutterites pursuant to section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the ‘Charter’) had been infringed. The colony succeeded at trial and by a 2–1 decision in the Alberta Court of Appeal but lost in a 4–3 decision in the Supreme Court of Canada because in the view of the majority, written by McLachlin CJC, the photograph requirement was a ‘reasonable limit’ on religious freedom and ‘demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society’ under section 1 of the Charter.
The Revd Allan Macdonald was inducted as Free Presbyterian Minister at Daviot, Tomatin and Stratherrick in 2001. He received neither a written contract of employment nor a statement of terms and conditions. In 2006 he wrote book, Veritatem Eme, that was highly critical of some aspects of the life of the Church and was ordered to apologise. He refused to comply, was temporarily suspended in January 2007 and suspended from the ministry sine die – in effect, dismissed – in May 2008.