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Public Health Implementation Considerations for State-Level Ebola Monitoring and Movement Restrictions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2020

Tara Kirk Sell*
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; Assistant Professor, Department of Environmental Health and Engineering, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Matthew P. Shearer
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; Assistant Professor, Department of Environmental Health and Engineering, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Diane Meyer
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security; Assistant Professor, Department of Environmental Health and Engineering, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Mary Leinhos
Affiliation:
Office of Applied Research, Center for Preparedness and Response, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Erin Thomas
Affiliation:
Public Health Preparedness Oak Ridge Institute for Science Fellowship, Office of Applied Research, Center for Preparedness and Response, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Eric G. Carbone
Affiliation:
Office of Applied Research, Center for Preparedness and Response, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
*
Correspondence and reprint requests to Tara Kirk Sell, Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, 621 E. Pratt St., Suite 210, Baltimore, MD21230 (e-mail: tksell@jhu.edu).

Abstract

Objective:

This article describes implementation considerations for Ebola-related monitoring and movement restriction policies in the United States during the 2013–2016 West Africa Ebola epidemic.

Methods:

Semi-structured interviews were conducted between January and May 2017 with 30 individuals with direct knowledge of state-level Ebola policy development and implementation processes. Individuals represented 17 jurisdictions with variation in adherence to US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines, census region, predominant state political affiliation, and public health governance structures, as well as the CDC.

Results:

Interviewees reported substantial resource commitments required to implement Ebola monitoring and movement restriction policies. Movement restriction policies, including for quarantine, varied from voluntary to mandatory programs, and, occasionally, quarantine enforcement procedures lacked clarity.

Conclusions:

Efforts to improve future monitoring and movement restriction policies may include addressing surge capacity to implement these programs, protocols for providing support to affected individuals, coordination with law enforcement, and guidance on varying approaches to movement restrictions.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2020 Society for Disaster Medicine and Public Health, Inc.

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References

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