Science is at present passing through a credibility crisis*. One could almost say a moral crisis. As a matter of fact we are standing at a turning point in the relationship between science and society, a turning point marked by the change from a social evolution characterized by high productivity and growth, into an evolution which might lead humanity to a new balance between individuality and collectivity.

At the beginning of the 20th century and during its second half the scientific world had suffered the impact of two significant revolutions: first of physics and then of biology. The basic discoveries in the field of physics led to applications in realms of energy, transportation, communication, electricity, electronics, and data processing.

Many obscure aspects of the growth of civilization in its early phase are illuminated when the traditional Iranian lore contained in the Zend-Avesta and the Pahlavi texts is analysed side by side with the Vedas and Brahmanical literature. Simultaneous study of the tradition of the two branches of the Aryans fills many gaps that would inevitably remain if we were to confine ourselves only to the Indian tradition.

“There is, in addition, a second reason for doubting that scientists reject paradigms because confronted with anomalies or counterinstances. In developing it my argument will itself foreshadow another of this essay's main theses. The reasons for doubt sketched above were purely factual; they were, that is, themselves counterinstances to a prevalent epistemological theory. As such, if my present point is correct, they can at best help to create a crisis or, more accurately, to reinforce one that is already very much in existence. By themselves they cannot and will not falsify that philosophical theory, for its defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing when confronted by anomaly. They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict. Many of the relevant modifications and qualifications are, in fact, already in the literature. If, therefore, these epistemological counterinstances are to constitute more than a minor irritant, that will be because they help to permit the emergence of a new and different analysis of science within which they are no longer a source of trouble. Furthermore, if a typical pattern, which we shall later observe in scientific revolutions, is applicable here, these anomalies will then no longer seem to be simply facts. From within a new theory of scientific knowledge, they may instead seem very much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been otherwise.”

The myths and tales relative to the Raven are among the most evident cultural elements which unite the peoples of Northeast Asia and those of Northwest America. In Asia as in America, the Raven appears in the role of civilizing hero and also in that of trickster and mythological rascal; moreover, a good number of subjects have a resonance on both sides of the Bering Sea. To identify these subjects, an attentive analysis of the folklore is often necessary, but the results are quite clear. Legends of the Raven are to be found in all the tribes of Kamchatka, of the peninsula of the Chukchees and of Alaska: among the Itelmenes, the Koriaks, and the Chukchees, among the Athabascans of the North, the Eyaks, the Tlingits, the Haïdas, the Tsimshians, the Kwakiutls and other Indians of the northwest coast, and finally among the Eskimos and the Aleuts. These legends create a well-defined folklore region beyond whose limits we find either echoes of the different themes of the Raven (a result of the direct influence of Chukchee folklore or of the Indians of the Northwest) or very primitive tales in which the Raven does not appear as the civilizing hero, and is presented minus his religious-mythological halo primarily in a negative aspect. We find these kinds of stories not only on the periphery of the area of diffusion of the Raven epic but also in other folklore areas, often quite distant.

Fifteen years ago, at the XII International Congress of Historic Sciences (Vienna, 1965), when historians finally decided to address the problem of “acculturation” (a concept and term first formulated and defined by sociologists), their reaction, with few exceptions, proved to be rather hesitant.

The foundation of methodical development of literary hermeneutics represents an altogether new proposition. There existed for centuries an old tradition of philological hermeneutics. It can glory in its venerable origins: the interpretation of ecclesiastical canonical writing, an art which ever since the period of Humanism has been erecting for itself a proud monument of re-edited and corrected texts and commentaries of ancient authors. It can also show just as impressive a result of historical interpretation of the texts of the world's literary past which had served the ideal of an “objective” and therefore scholarly knowledge. However we know that these achievements were not a monopoly of the traditional philological hermeneutics, but were shared with the theological, juridical, philosophical and distorical hermeneutics: in short, with all branches of study concerned with editing, critical study of sources and historical interpretation of the writings of the past. The merits of the traditional hermeneutics of literary texts are so unexceptional, its history so difficult to distinguish from other regional hermeneutics that the epistemologist can speak of a common philological basis and pose the following fundamental question: where does the independence of literary hermeneutics really begin? How has it operated and how does it operate today in order to render justice to the aesthetic character of its texts?