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Surplus Value, Profit, and Exploitation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2024

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Extract

The theoretic structure of Marxian economy was elaborated to provide an understanding of the laws of the motion of capitalism. The motion of capitalism, however, is nothing but the process of economic development under conditions of multiple centers of investment-decisions. It becomes, then, an interesting question to ask how much of the theoretic structure of Marx applies to the problems of economic development in general and how much is limited to those aspects alone which follow from the theoretically contingent condition of decentralized investment-decisions. It will not, therefore, be the primary purpose of this paper to examine the adequacy of the conceptual structure of Marxian economic thought, or even its relative advantages or disadvantages over the more widely accepted school, following the inquiries of Walras, Menger, Jevons, and others; but, rather, to assume the general framework of Marxian theory and attempt to seek an answer within its limits.

Type
Research Article
Information
Diogenes , Volume 4 , Issue 14 , June 1956 , pp. 63 - 82
Copyright
Copyright © 1956 Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies (FISP)

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References

1. Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value. Selections (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1951), p. 329.

2. The cultural factors influencing such a decision are not mentioned here as they are out side the conceptual framework of Marxian economy.

3. Leaving aside the limiting case when the whole of surplus is reinvested and no portion of it is consumed.

4. This "justification," of course, has nothing to do with economics.

5. Political Economy and Capitalism (London, Routledge & Sons, 1937), p. 13.

6. Theories of Surplus Value, p. 181. (Italics author's.)

7. If by some reinterpretation "political labor" is considered to create "economic value," it would do so in every society, including the capitalistic.

8. Joseph Schumpeter noted it in his well-known article on Karl Marx, Ten Great Econo mists (London, Allen & Unwin, 1952), p. 8. Paul Sweezy has also mentioned it in his Socialism (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1949), pp. 111-12.

9. We are not interested here in considering how far the introduction of such a law is con sistent with the theoretic structure of Marxian sociology and philosophy of history.

10. "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective," Alexander Gerschenkron in The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas, ed. Bert F. Hoselitz (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 12.

11. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

12. Ibid., p. 19.

13. "State Control and Free Enterprise in Their Impact on Economic Growth," The Prog ress of Under-developed Areas, p. 63.

14. Ibid., p. 19.

15. Some Aspects of Economic Development (Delhi, Ranjit, 1951), p. 16.

16. Ibid., p. 69.

17. Ibid., p. 75. (Italics author's.) It should be noted that Mr. Dobb has merely written that the fall in the relative share did not require a fall in the absolute share—which is logically unimpeachable. He does not say, however, that it did not fall. As for the "special reasons" and their intimate relation to the enforced proletarianization of the peasantry as well as the related problem of de-kulakization, the reader is referred to the recent study of the whole question, Communism and Peasantry, Ramswarup-Prachi Prakashan, Calcutta, 1954.

18. Political Economy and Capitalism, p. 283.

19. Ibid., p. 283. The similarity to Schumpeter's concept of "innovation" and its relation to economic development and profit should be noted.

20. Theories of Surplus Value, p. 369.

21. The case of adult women who would not be doing any wage-work in a society would be peculiar. Will they have to be classed with pure consumers or as productive laborers in the field of reproduction?

22. Political Economy and Capitalism, p. 228. (Italics author's.)

23. The changes mentioned are the following: (i) Population is increasing; (ii) Capital is increasing; (iii) Methods of production are improving; (iv) The forms of industrial establish ment are changing; (v) The wants of consumers are multiplying. Quoted from "The Distribu tion of Wealth," p. 56 in F. H. Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Boston & New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1921), p. 33.

24. Political Economy and Capitalism, p. 322.

25. Op. cit., p. 332.

26. Ibid., p. 334. This statement is extremely ambiguous. It leaves the possibility open that profit occurs in a socialist economy but does not play a decisive part since it does not form a part of private revenue. As public revenue, perhaps, it does not matter much for the system.

27. Ibid., p. 283. (Italics author's.)

28. Theories of Surplus Value, p. 45.

29. We are ignoring here the lack of perfect knowledge and perfect mobility without which, perhaps, even such a profit would not occur.

30. Op. cit., p. 334.

31. Op. cit., p. 77.

32. The Kulaks are regarded generally as rich peasants. But "in the south, in the ‘thirties, a peasant was a Kulak, if he owned more than a horse, one cow, and more than five hectares of land," Communism and Peasantry, Ramswarup, p. 45. Also Chapter IV, passim.