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McCall's Branched-Tree Model of the Universe*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

David MacCallum
Affiliation:
Carleton College

Extract

Imagine a model of the universe that, if true and known to be true, would solve the following philosophical problems: the direction and flow of time, an ontology for laws of nature, the interpretation of quantum mechanics, the interpretation of probability, a semantics for counterfactuals, trans-world and trans-temporal identity, essentialism and natural kinds, and free will and responsibility. The successful solution to these problems would convince most of us that we should, at the very least, give this model serious consideration. This is the argument of Storrs McCall's A Model of the Universe: Space-Time, Probability, and Decision. Assume that the branched-tree model of the universe is true, and all these problems are solved. Thus, the branched-tree model should at least be a plausible candidate for the true model of the universe.

Type
Critical Notices/Études Critiques
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1997

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References

Notes

1 This section is a summary of much of McCall's Chapter 1.

2 Gleason, A. M., “Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a Hilbert Space,Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics, 6 (1957): 885–93.Google Scholar

3 Kochen, S. and Specker, E. P., “The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics,Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics, 17(1967): 5987.Google Scholar

4 Hughes, R. I. G., The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 220.Google Scholar

5 Bub, J., “The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40 (1989): 194.CrossRefGoogle Scholar