When Hume observed that there is no apparent logical relationship between ‘is'-type and ‘ought'-type statements he of course posed one of the fundamental problems in modern philosophy; and the various approaches to his challenge serve in large part to distinguish various ‘camps’ of contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper I shall be concerned only with one such approach, that of Nowell-Smith in his Ethics in which he tries to make the point that what he terms “Hume's gap” is not really there at all. (pp. 82-83) In his attempt to eliminate “Hume's gap” Nowell-Smith introduces a “new logical apparatus” (p. 61) the special features of which are the related doctrines of “logical oddness” and “contextual implication”. I shall argue that there are serious short-comings in this ‘new logical apparatus', and that, in fact, he fails in his attempt to eliminate ‘Hume's gap'.