Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-r6qrq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T07:23:03.467Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Assimilative Moral Realism and Supervenience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Ken Yasenchuk
Ken Yasenchuk
Affiliation:
McMaster University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

David Brink has recently argued for the “parity” of ethics and the sciences. While the parity claim alone might be metaphysically neutral, Brink favours a form of ethical naturalism on which moral properties “are” natural properties, just as non-moral macrophysical properties “are” the microphysical states that compose them. Brink supports this claim by showing that both types of properties share certain important features: specifically, that both may be (and typically are) constituted, supervening and synthetically necessitated. I shall argue that notwithstanding these common features, there remain significant modal differences in the way the two types of properties are assigned to the world. These differences represent an important respect in which moral properties are not on par with their scientific counterparts.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , Winter 1995 , pp. 75 - 98
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bambrough, Renford 1979 Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, Simon 1971 “Moral Realism.” In Morality and Moral Reasoning. Edited by Casey, J.. London: Methuen, pp. 101–24.Google Scholar
Blackburn, Simon 1984 Spreading the Word. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Blackburn, Simon 1988 “Supervenience Revisited.” 1985. Rpt. In Essays on Moral Realism. Edited by Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 59–75.Google Scholar
Block, Ned 1978 “Troubles with Functionalism.” In Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9. Edited by Savage, C. W.. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 261–325.Google Scholar
Block, Ned 1980 “Introduction: What is Functionalism?” In Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Edited by Block, N.. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, vol. l, pp. 171–84.Google Scholar
Block, Ned 1990 “Can the Mind Change the World?” In Meaning and Method: Essays in Honour of Hilary Putnam. Edited by Boolos, George. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 137–70.Google Scholar
Block, N., and Fodor, J. 1972 “What Psychological States Are Not.” The Philosophical Review, 81, 2 (04): 159–81.Google Scholar
Brink, David 1984 “Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62, 2 (06): 111–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brink, David 1989 Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Dreier, James 1992 “The Supervenience Argument against Moral Realism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 30, 3 (Fall): 13–38.Google Scholar
Hare, R.M. 1984 “Supervenience.” In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 58 (Supplement): 1–16.Google Scholar
Harman, Gilbert 1977 The Nature of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Horgan, T., and Timmons, M. 1992 “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.” Syn-these, 92, 2 (08): 221–60.Google Scholar
Jobe, Evan K. 1990 “Sturgeon's Defence of Moral Realism.” Dialogue, 29, 2: 267–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, Jaegwon 1972 “Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory.” The Monist, 56, 2 (04): 177–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, Jaegwon 1992 “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, 1 (03): 1–19.Google Scholar
Klagge, James 1987 “Supervenience: Perspectives vs. Possible Worlds.” Philosophical Quarterly, 37 (07): 312–15.Google Scholar
Kripke, Saul 1980 Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Lepore, E., and Loerer, B. 1989 “More on Making Mind Matter.” Philosophical Topics, 17, 1 (Spring): 175–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1966 “An Argument for the Identity Theory.” 1971. Rpt. In Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Edited by D. Rosenthal. Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 162–71.Google Scholar
McFetridge, I. G. 1985 “Supervenience, Realism, Necessity.” Philosophical Quarterly, 35 (07): 245–58.Google Scholar
McGinn, C. 1981 “Modal Reality.” In Reduction, Time and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Edited by Healey, R.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 143–88.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. 1903 Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Postow, B. C. 1985 “Werner's Ethical Realism.” Ethics, 95 (01): 285–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, Hilary 1967 “Psychological Predicates.” In Art, Mind, and Religion. Edited by Capitan, W. H. and Merrill, D. D.. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 37–48.Google Scholar
Rabinowicz, W. 1979 Universalizability. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shoemaker, S. 1984 Identity, Cause and Mind. Cambridge, MA: University of Cambridge Press.Google Scholar
Sturgeon, Nicholas 1984 “Moral Explanations.” In Morality, Reason, and Truth. Edited by Copp, D. and Zimmerman, M.. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, pp. 49–78.Google Scholar
Sturgeon, Nicholas 1986 “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24 (Supplement): 69–78.Google Scholar
Werner, Richard 1983 “Ethical Realism.” Ethics, 93 (07): 653–79.Google Scholar
Werner, Richard 1985 “Ethical Realism Defended.” Ethics, 95 (01): 292–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yasenchuk, Ken 1994 “Sturgeon and Brink on Moral Explanations.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 32, 4 (Winter): 483–502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar