¹ Brian White contrasts the ‘official’ American and British concepts of containment. Initially, both London and Washington conceived containment as a strategy designed to modify Soviet behaviour through positive and negative measures. Although British policy prior to 1950 did much to help the Americans construct the Cold War structures, the British could neither accept the NSC-68 definition of the Soviet threat, ie the all-out (political-ideological, economic, and military-strategic) warfare between two power blocs, nor the prescribed policy responses, ie the doctrine of the indivisibilty of the East–West conflict in Europe and in the Far East. White, Britain, Detente, 35 ff., 48.

² One has to bear in mind that it was the same instruments, the tanks, which were used in the ‘East’ to maintain repressive governments in power while also being deployed to frighten the powers-that-be in the ‘West’ and persuade them to renounce the option of rescuing liberation movements within the realm of international socialism.

³ Cited in Dockrill, , Britain's Policy, 153.Google Scholar

⁴ Buffet, Cyril, ‘The Berlin Crises, France, and the Atlantic Alliance, 1947–1961: From Integration to Disintegration’, in Heuser and O'Neill, Securing Peace, 86.Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., 86 ff.; Schake, Kori, ‘The Berlin Crises of 1948–49 and 1958–62’, in Heuser and O'Neill, Securing Peace, 66 ff.Google Scholar

⁶ Ibid., 67 f.

⁷ Ibid., 70 ff.; Wampler, Robert A., ’Die USA, Adenauer und die atomare Strategic der NATO’, in Steininger, Rolf et al., eds, Die doppelte Eindämmung. Europäische Sicherheit und deutsche Frage in den Fünfzigern (thereafter Steininger et al., Die doppelte Eindämmung) (Munich: v Hase & Koehler, 1993), 277 f.Google Scholar

⁸ Schake, ‘Berlin Crises’, 71.

⁹ Wampler, , ‘Die USA’, 278;Google ScholarO'Neill, , in Heuser and O'Neill, Securing Peace, 323.Google Scholar

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¹⁵ The ‘Carte Blanche’ exercise provided evidence to support the thesis: Schraut, 179.

¹⁶ Kirchner, and Sperling, , Federal Republic, 10 f.;Google ScholarHanrieder, , ‘FRG and NATO’, 195 ff., 207 ff.Google Scholar

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¹⁸ Ulam, A., affirmatively quoted by White, Britain, Detente, 35 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Heller, In and Gillingham, , NATO, 370 ff.;Google Scholar and idem, ‘Die USA’, 265 f., 269 ff.

²⁰ Ibid., 276 ff.

²¹ Rupieper, Herman-Josef, ‘Gipfeldiplomatie 1955 – Dwight D. Eisenhower and Georgij Schukow über europäische Sicherheit und deutsche Frage’, in Steininger et al., Die doppelte Eindämmung, 218 ff.Google Scholar

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²³ O'Neill, 313.

²⁴ Schwarz, Hans-Peter, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann: 1952–1967 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), 130.Google Scholar Schwarz comments that Adenauer used the argument as an alibi; he disputed the idea that Stalin's successors introduced a ‘new look’ in Soviet foreign policy.

²⁵ Allen, W.D., head of the German political department at the FO, quoted in Dockrill, Britain's Policy, 47.Google Scholar

²⁶ Schwabe, Klaus, ‘The Origins of the United States' Engagement in Europe, 1946–52’, in Heller, and Gillingham, , NATO, 162.Google Scholar

²⁷ The British were first in asserting that the lesson of the abortive four-power conferences was the need to work without Moscow and for making arrangements with the French after Anglo-American collaboration established a platform. Since the US – in 1946/7 – hesitated to move towards confrontation with the USSR, the British also sought collaboration with the French.

²⁸ John McCloy to Deputy-Defense Secretary Gilpatric, 8 Jan. 1965, L.B. Johnson Presidential Library, NSF, Committee files, Box 5, Chronological File 2.

²⁹ John McCloy to President Johnson, 9 Feb. 1967, NSF, NSC Histories (Trilateral), Box 50, Book 2.

³⁰ J.F. Dulles, 27 Jan. 1953, cf. Dockrill, , Britain's Policy, 113.Google Scholar

³¹ Heller, and Gillingham, , NATO, 110.Google Scholar

³² Ibid., 110.

³³ Schraut, 172–3.

³⁴ 17–18 Dec. 1947 and 26 June 1948; Krieger, 111, 115; Buffet, , ‘Berlin Crises’, 87 ff.Google Scholar

³⁵ Krieger, 114.

³⁶ Wall, , ‘France’, 52–4.Google Scholar

³⁷ Dockrill, , Britain's Policy, 49 f., 155.Google Scholar

³⁸ Forrestal, , Diary, 3 Oct. 1948Google Scholar, quoted by Simon Duke, in Duke, and Krieger, , U.S. Military Forces, 128;Google Scholar cf. idem, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

³⁹ Duke, 150.

⁴⁰ Milward, A., ‘NATO, OEEC, and the Integration of Europe’, in Heller and Gillingham, NATO, 248 ff.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Ibid., 249 f.

⁴² Buffet, , ‘Berlin Crises’, 87 ff.Google Scholar

⁴³ Ibid., and Bossuat, in Heuser and O'Neill Securing Peace; Dockrill, , Britain's Policy, 66 ff., 76 ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Bossuat, 90 ff., 110 ff., 117.

⁴⁵ Dockrill, , Britain's Policy, 138 f., 142, 148 ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Dockrill quotes the by now famous note which Selwyn Lloyd submitted to Churchill on 22 June 1953: ‘Germany is the key to the peace of Europe. A divided Europe has meant a divided Germany. To unite Germany while Europe is divided, if practicable, is fraught with danger for all.… A divided Germany is safer for the time being…’. Ibid., 128 f.

⁴⁷ Schmidt, ‘Test of Strength’.

⁴⁸ On this see the forthcoming publication of M. Dickhaus's dissertation (Florenz/Bielefeld) on the Währungspolitik der Deutschen Bundesbank in its European and international contexts.

⁴⁹ Milward, 247.

⁵⁰ Bossuat, 107 f.

⁵¹ Jan van der Harst, ‘U.S. Forces in the Netherlands, 1950–1960’, in Duke, and Krieger, , U.S. Military Forces, 224, 230 ff.;Google Scholar Ine Megens, ‘Problems of Military Production Co-ordination’, in Heuser, and O'Neill, , Securing Peace, 279 ff.Google Scholar

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⁵³ A revival of the ‘Little Entente’ ideas was ruled out by the USSR's upholding of the division of Europe; the co-operation with Russia was an instrument of ‘Gaullist’ policy whenever other options were frustrated; cf. the contributions of F. Manfraß-Sirjaques and G.-H. Soutou, in Schmidt, Gustav, ed., Ost-West-Beziehumgen: Konfrontation und Détente, 1945–1989 (Bochum: Universitatsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1993, 1995), ii. 273–85; iii. 77–88, 135–87.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Marc Trachtenberg, ‘The Nuclearisation of NATO’, in Heller, and Gillingham, , NATO, 420 ff.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Ibid., 421.

⁵⁶ Dockrill, , Britain's Policy, 135, 139, 148.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ On this, see Wampler and Maier; and Bluth, in Heuser and O'Neill, Securing Peace.

⁵⁸ Bluth, 147. ff.

⁵⁹ In a previous phase, the Wilson Government had liked ‘to line up with the Soviet Union more overtly and press the U.S. more strongly to drop the MLF’ – White, Britain, Detente, 119–20– in order to restrain the presumed nuclear ambitions of the FRG and to reduce Soviet fears of a revanchist Germany, Ibid., 114. However, the UK could not push too hard on the MLF as this would have alienated both Washington and Bonn, whose support was thought essential for the Labour Government's EC application.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 131.

⁶¹ Ibid., 122 ff.

⁶² Britain objected to American willingness to concede the banning of the first use of nuclear weapons rather than insist on the banning of the first use of any weapon; Ibid., 122 ff.

⁶³ Ullmann, , Securing Europe, 79–81.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ White, Britain, Detente, 44: ‘The British … appear to believe that the immediate dangers of provocation overbalance the long-range deterrent results of political warfare carried on within Moscow's own orbit.’ 6 Jan. 1952, Steering Group Negotiating Papers, TCT D-1/5a.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 56 f.

⁶⁶ Dockrill, , Britain's Policy, 135 ff.;Google ScholarBariéty,, J. ‘Frankreich und das Scheitern der EVG’, in Steininger et al., Die doppelter Eindämmung, 105 ff.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Bossuat, 115 ff.; P. Fischer, in Heller, and Gillingham, , NATO, 393 ff.;Google ScholarBuffet, , ‘Berlin Crises’, 90 ff., 96 f.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Bossuat, 113.