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HOW TO ADDRESS THE ATHENIAN ASSEMBLY: RHETORIC AND POLITICAL TACTICS IN THE DEBATE ABOUT MYTILENE (THUC. 3.37–50)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2013

Edward M. Harris*
Affiliation:
Durham University

Extract

In 428 b.c.e. the city of Mytilene launched a revolt against the Athenians and invited the Spartans to send them assistance. The plans for the revolt were reported to the Athenians (3.2), who sent a force against the city (3.3). The Mytilenians asked for help from the Spartans (3.4.5–6), but the fleet they sent arrived too late to help the city (3.26.4). The revolt appears to have been the initiative of the city's wealthier citizens: Thucydides reports (3.27–8) that heavy armour was not distributed to the people until Salaethus, the leader of the rebellion, realized that Spartan help would not arrive in time. Once the people received this armour, they refused to take orders from officials and held meetings, insisting that the government should distribute all available grain. If they did not, they threatened to negotiate on their own with the Athenians about surrender. The government was powerless to stop them and decided it was best to come to terms with the Athenians. It was agreed that the Athenians would have the power to act as they wished with the city and that the Mytilenians would have the right to send envoys to Athens to plead their case before the Assembly.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 2013

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References

1 Textual references are to Thucydides, unless otherwise specified.

2 e.g. de Romilly, J., Thucydide et l'impérialisme athénien: La pensée de l'historien et la genèse de l'oeuvre (Paris, 1947), 138Google Scholar, who examines the differences between Cleon and Diodotus concerning their attitudes toward Athenian imperialism: ‘l'un est pour la sévérité, l'autre est pour l'indulgence. L'un veut, en général, faire peur, l'autre donner confiance’. Kagan, D., ‘The speeches in Thucydides and the Mytilene debate’, YClS 24 (1975), 7194Google Scholar also analyses the pair of speeches in terms of different imperial policies.

3 Gomme, A.W., Commentary on Thucydides II (Oxford, 1956), 315Google Scholar, who does not however analyse the different rhetorical styles of the speakers and Cleon's political tactics. Cf. Andrewes, A., ‘The Mytilene debate: Thucydides 3.36–49’, Phoenix 16 (1962), 6485CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 75: ‘Thucydides through these speeches was trying to say something that he himself thought important about the assembly and its leaders.’

4 e.g. Moraux, P., ‘Thucydide et la rhétorique: Étude sur la structure de deux discours (III, 37–48)’, LEC 22 (1954), 322Google Scholar, who analyses the rhetorical structure of the speeches, Yunis, H., Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens (Ithaca, NY and London, 1996), 87101Google Scholar, who analyses the pair of speeches in terms of the rhetoric of instruction, and Gärtner, T., ‘Das Mytilene-Debatte im thukydideischen Geschichtswerk’, Gymnasium 111 (2004), 225–45Google Scholar, who examines the speeches from the perspective of rhetorical theory.

5 On the authorship of this work see Chiron, P., Ps.-Aristote, Rhétorique à Alexandre (Paris, 2002), xlcviiGoogle Scholar.

6 Quintilian (Inst. 3.4.16) criticizes Aristotle's categories as too simplistic because ‘all three genres to some extent rely on the mutual help of the others’ (stant enim quodam modo mutuis auxiliis omnia), but follows the basic division. In fact, Diodotus does use an argument from justice even though he mainly appeals to expedience.

7 See Carey, C., ‘Epideictic oratory’, in Worthington, I. (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric (Malden, MA, 2007), 236–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 236: ‘Fourth century rhetoric codified but did not create the categories. The recognition that different modes of argument suit different spheres is already visible in Thucydides' account of the debate about the fate of the rebel city of Mytilene …’ Carey further notes that in Pericles' funeral oration one can ‘detect inherent principles of form and overt trends in content which are clearly understood by speaker and audience, if nowhere articulated – or perceived – as a set of rules’. Kennedy, G., ‘Focusing of arguments in Greek deliberative oratory’, TAPhA 90 (1959), 131–8Google Scholar claims that rhetorical practice changed between the fifth and fourth centuries b.c.e., but see Heath, M., ‘Justice in Thucydides' Athenian speeches’, Historia 39 (1990), 385400Google Scholar, who shows that there was a high degree of continuity.

8 Cf. Dem. 18.192: the role of the sumboulos is to discuss the present and future.

9 Finances: 2.13; war and peace: 1.140–4. On the importance of financial considerations in Thucydides see Kallet-Marx, L., Money, Expense, and Naval Power in Thucydides' History 1–5.24 (Berkeley, 1993)Google Scholar and Kallet-Marx, L., Money and the Corrosion of Power in Thucydides: The Sicilian Expedition and its Aftermath (Berkeley, 2001)Google Scholar. Speakers in Thucydides do not discuss imports and exports in speeches to the Assembly, but this is because during the empire they were less significant sources of revenue than tribute. On this topic see Bresson, A., La cité marchande (Bordeaux, 2000), 109–30Google Scholar. The topic of legislation comes to the fore only during the events of 411.

10 See Heath (n. 7).

11 See below for these types of arguments.

12 Cf. Isoc. 5.25 (contrast between speeches written for display and those dealing with important matters).

13 Cf. Macleod, C., ‘Reason and necessity: Thucydides III 9–14, 37–48’, JHS 98 (1978), 6478CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 71; Yunis (n. 4), 90–1.

14 As the referee rightly observes, these kinds of sophistic arguments would be out of place in a funeral oration, one type of epideictic oratory.

15 See Gorgias, Helen 8 (ὁ πείσας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπατήσας) and 10 (ἀπατήματα δόξης) with Verdenius, W. J., ‘Gorgias' doctrine of deception’, in Kerferd, G.B. (ed.), The Sophists and their Legacy. Hermes Einzelschriften 44 (Wiesbaden, 1981), 116–28Google Scholar. Is it a coincidence that the debate about Mytilene took place in the same year that Gorgias is reported to have come to Athens? See Diod. Sic. 12.53.1–2. But Cleon's charge that his opponents attempt to mislead the audience is a standard accusation in forensic oratory. See below.

16 The other pair of speeches in which the terms are found is the ‘trial’ of the Plataeans (3.63.1, 67.2). The only other speaker to use the noun is Sthenelaidas, who accuses the Athenians of violating the Thirty Years' Peace and uses the language of justice (1.86.1). The verb is also found in a pre-battle speech by Spartan generals who remind their troops about the penalties for cowardice (2.87.9).

17 See Macleod (n. 13), 71, 72, 77 (= Macleod, C., Collected Essays [Oxford, 1983]Google Scholar, 95, 96, 101). Winnington-Ingram, R.P., ‘ΤΑ ΔΕΟΝΤΑ ΕΙΠΕΙΝ: Cleon and Diodotus’, BICS 12 (1965), 7082Google Scholar, believed that Cleon was drawing on ideas found in tragedy, but does not observe the echoes of judicial language.

18 Gomme (n. 3), 297–318; Hornblower, S., A Commentary on Thucydides. Volume 1: Books I–III (Oxford, 1991), 420–38Google Scholar; Rhodes, P.J., Thucydides. History III (Warminster, 1994), 204–9Google Scholar; Andrewes (n. 3) and Yunis (n. 4), 87–92 do not notice the parallels between Cleon's speech and courtroom oratory. Connor, W.R., Thucydides (Princeton, 1984), 84–5Google Scholar, Macleod (n. 13) and Carey (n. 7), 236 note the forensic style of Cleon's speech but do not note all the parallels between Cleon's speech and forensic oratory.

19 Winnington-Ingram (n. 17), 72 thought that the idea of unchanging laws ‘had a strong appeal for the Greeks and particularly for conservatives’ but the passages cited below show that the idea appealed to all Athenians in general. Commentators have been puzzled because his measure about the Mytilenians was a decree, not a law. For brief discussion with references to earlier treatments see Hornblower (n. 18), 423–4. The law in question, however, may not be the decree passed at an earlier meeting of the Assembly but the general rule that Athenian allies did not have the right to revolt and would be severely punished if they did, as in the case of Naxos (1.98), Thasos (1.101), Euboea (1.114) and Miletus (1.115–17). Note that Cleon alludes to these revolts and their suppression by Athens and argues that the Mytilenians should have learned from these examples (3.39.3). For the oaths of allegiance sworn by the allies see Meiggs, R., The Athenian Empire (Oxford, 1972), 579–82Google Scholar.

20 Ten years: Hdt. 1.29; a hundred years: Plu. Sol. 25.

21 For entrenchment clauses see Lewis, D.M., Selected Essays in Greek and Near Eastern History, ed. Rhodes, P.J. (Cambridge, 1997), 136–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Harris, E.M., Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens: Essays on Law, Society and Politics (New York and Cambridge, 2006), 24–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 See Carey, C., ‘Nomos in Athenian law and rhetoric’, JHS 116 (1996), 3346CrossRefGoogle Scholar, with Antiph. 6.2; Dem. 23.29, 44, 82, 86; 34.52. The only exception occurs with accusers who are indicting a law as inexpedient. Yet even in these cases accusers say that the rest of the laws are good. See Dem. 20.93, 96, 98, 153; 24.24, 34, 43, 59.

23 On appeals to anger in judicial oratory see Rubinstein, L., ‘Stirring up dicastic anger’, in Cairns, D.L. and Knox, R.A. (edd.), Law, Rhetoric and Comedy in Classical Athens: Studies in Honour of D.M. MacDowell (Swansea, 2004), 187203Google Scholar. Allen, D., The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 2000)Google Scholar, passim claims that the Athenian courts provided a forum where litigants could vent their anger, but Rubinstein shows that defendants almost never attempt to stir the judges' anger and that accusers make such appeals only in certain contexts.

24 For this kind of argument (ekbolê eleou) see Stevens, E.B., ‘Some Attic commonplaces of pity’, AJPh 65 (1944), 125Google Scholar, at 9–15.

25 There is no reason to believe that appeals to anger and pity are extra-legal arguments and attempts to subvert the law. See Konstan, D., ‘Pity and the law in Greek theory and practice’, Dike 4 (2000), 125–45Google Scholar, who shows that defendants argue that they deserve pity because they have not violated the law. No defendant in an extant forensic oration asks the court to pity him and ignore the law. By the same token, prosecutors say that the judges should be angry with defendants because they have broken the law.

26 The verb ἐπεξέρχεται is the legal term for prosecuting a crime and bringing the case to court. See Antiph. 6.37; Dem. 21.103; 58.8–10 with Harris (n. 21), 405–22. Gomme (n. 3), 302–3 and Hornblower (n. 18), 425 make no comment on Cleon's use of the term.

27 Cf. Macleod (n. 13), 72 (= Macleod [n. 17], 96).

28 Nicias uses the noun οἶκτος in his speech to the Athenian troops retreating from Syracuse, but here the context is very different: the general says the Athenians are more likely to receive pity than phthonos from the gods (7.77.4).

29 Macleod (n. 13), 69 believes that Cleon ‘puts a case for summary and retaliatory, not legal justice’ and claims that ‘this contrasts strongly with his vaunted respect for the laws’. As the following analysis shows, however, Cleon follows generally accepted legal principles when justifying his punishment of the Mytilenians.

30 See Carey (n. 22) and Harris, E. M., ‘The rule of law in Athenian democracy: reflections on the judicial oath’, Dike 9 (2006), 158–81Google Scholar.

31 On the role of epieikeia in the Athenians courts see Harris, E.M., ‘Le rôle de l'epieikeia dans les tribunaux athéniens’, Revue historique de droit français et étranger 82 (2004), 113Google Scholar. On Aristotle's analysis of the term see Brunschvig, J., ‘Rule and exception: on the Aristotelian theory of equity’, in Frede, M. and Striker, G. (edd.), Rationality in Greek Thought (Oxford, 1996), 115–55Google Scholar.

32 Cf. Lys. 13.28 (Agoratus claims that he is innocent because he acted unwillingly); Lys. 20.14 (Polystratus was forced to join the Council in 411).

33 Note also that the Athenians acquitted Anytus when accused of losing Pylos when he said he could not reach the area because of a storm (Diod. Sic. 13.64.6 – there is no need to accept the allegations of bribery). For other examples of excuses, see Dem. 21.36–41.

34 It is worth noting that the term epieikeia occurs only in this pair of speeches in Thucydides. The topic is not considered relevant in other deliberative speeches in Thucydides.

35 Cf. Dem. 19.103: one should not allow the excuse of ignorance for men in politics. Cf. Isoc. 18.34.

36 Cf. Rh. Al. 1427a18–20, which says that accusers must deny their opponents any claim to forgiveness (ἡ συγγνώμη περιαιρετέα); also Lys. 14.2; [Dem.] 56.48. For types of excuses see Arist. Rh. 1416a.

37 Cf. Dem. 24.49 (τοῖς γὰρ ἄκουσιν ἁμαρτοῦσι μέτεστι συγγνώμης) and Antiph. 1.27. Both these passages are from accusers' speeches.

38 For ignorance as an excuse see Dem. 21.38 and [Dem.] 58.24 with Harris (n. 31), 9–11.

39 Note that the author of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (1427a3–5) says that in accusations ‘above all it must be demonstrated that he (i.e. the defendant) did wrong willingly (ἑκών) and deliberately (ἐκ προνοίας), not with ordinary intent but with the greatest possible preparation’.

40 The term hybris is found elsewhere in Thucydides only in narrative: 2.65.9; 3.84; 4.98.5; 6.28. The only exception is the Corinthians who accuse the Corcyreans of hybris resulting from wealth (1.38.5).

41 As the referee observes, king Archidamus praises the Spartans for not being so highly educated that they despise the laws and for having too much self-control to disobey them (1.84.3). Cleon's argument is not ‘democratic’ or ‘oligarchic’ – he is espousing the ideal of the rule of law common to all Greek city states. See Harris (n. 21), 14–25.

42 For the charge that one's opponent is deinos legein see also Isoc. 21.5.

43 Cf. Dem. 18.227 (σοϕίζεται).

44 For this charge in forensic oratory see Dem. 19.228; 20.98, 132; 22.4; 23.191, 215; 35.41; 45.87; 46.1. In all these passages one finds a form of the verb παράγειν.

45 Cf. Carey (n. 22), 45.

46 Cf. Rh. Al. 1427a10–18 for advice to accusers concerning arguments about punishment as a deterrent.

47 Cf. Lycurg. Leoc. 10; Lys. 14.12; 15.10; 22.19; 27.7; 28.11.

48 The parallel with forensic oratory is noted by Navarre, O., La rhétorique grecque avant Aristote (Paris, 1900), 305–6Google Scholar. Cf. Macleod (n. 13), 71 (= Macleod [n. 17], 95). Neither of these scholars notes that this argument tends to occur in the final section of a speech.

49 Note also that Thuc. 5.16.1 speaks of Cleon's διαβολή, a word which is often used to describe charges made by prosecutors in court. See Lys. 19.5; 25.6, 11; Dem. 18.7; 57.36; [Dem.] 49.11; 59.5.

50 For the argument that an Assembly should not act like a court see also 1.73.1.

51 Yunis (n. 4), 92–101 misses Diodotus' critique of Cleon's judicial rhetoric.

52 As the referee points out, Diodotus is not above some forensic mud-slinging when he insinuates that Cleon uses an aggressive style to cover up his own corruption (3.42.2).

53 de Ste Croix, G.E.M., ‘The character of the Athenian empire’, Historia 3 (1954/5), 141Google Scholar.

54 Connor (n. 18), 85.

55 For the tripartite structure of the Athenian constitution see Thuc. 2.37 with Harris (n. 21), 29–40.

56 Gomme (n. 3), 323.

57 Winnington-Ingram (n. 17), 79.

58 Macleod (n. 13), 77 (= Macleod [n. 17], 101). Heath (n. 7), 388 claims that in Diodotus' reply there is ‘the characteristic exclusion of moral argument’. Andrewes (n. 3), 73 writes of Diodotus' ‘refusal to move off the ground of expediency’. Gärtner (n. 3), follows this view. All of these scholars overlook Diodotus' argument from justice at 3.47.3.

59 The court should not listen to slanders about a defendant's character but judge only the legal charge: Lys. 9.1. On the judicial oath and its implications see Harris (n. 30).

60 The defendant gives the impression that this oath was sworn only in cases of homicide, but there was a similar oath sworn for other types of cases. See [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 67.1 with Rhodes, P.J., ‘Keeping to the point’, in Harris, E.M. and Rubinstein, L. (edd.), The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece (London, 2004), 137–58Google Scholar.

61 Cf. Dem. 34.50 (the Athenians put to death the son of a general). See also Lycurg. Leoc. 139 (sunêgoroi should not use their liturgies to have defendants acquitted) and Dem. 24.133–8 (the Athenians have put many powerful leaders in prison). There was always a concern that defendants would ignore the charges and speak only about their public service (Lys. 12.38), but the Athenians considered this a form of deception.

62 The importance of the Assembly's power to reward the city's benefactors is one of the main themes of Demosthenes' Against Leptines. The word euergetês occurs frequently in the speech (Dem. 20.12, 23, 30, 39, 54, 60, 62, 63, 67, 81, 86, 104, 109, 119, 138, 147).

63 This is not the place to discuss the accuracy of Diodotus' statement. De Ste Croix (n. 53) has shown that the Athenians enjoyed support from democrats in many allied cities, but de Romilly, J., ‘Thucydides and the cities of the Athenian Empire’, BICS 13 (1966), 112Google Scholar draws attention to situations in which the desire for freedom outweighed considerations of ideological solidarity.

64 For a catalogue of examples see Veligianni-Terzi, C., Wertbegriffe in den attischen Ehrendekreten der Klassischen Zeit (Stuttgart, 1997), 200–2Google Scholar. For the role of eunoia in international relations see Low, P., Interstate Relations in Classical Greece (Cambridge, 2007), 51–3Google Scholar.

65 See IG i3 101, line 39; 102, line 28; 107, line 7; 113, line 10; 182, line 26; 1454, line 7. The word is plausibly restored at IG i3 70, line 12; 107, line 9; 123, lines 6–7.

66 IG i3 19, line 2; 23, line 8; 74, line 3; 80, line 13; 81, line 22; 92, lines 10–11; 95, lines 8–9; 97, lines 2, 7; 98, line 10; 110, line 14; 121, line 5; 126, lines 3, 7; 159, line 10; 163, lines 1–2; 164, line 22; 172, lines 1–2; 174, line 8; 176, line 1; 181, lines 2, 6–7; 182, lines 2, 24; 227, lines 9–10; 228, lines 6–7, 24. The combination is plausibly restored at IG i3 18, line 1; 56, lines 5–6; 117, line 36.

67 Connor (n. 18), 88–9 does not mention Diodotus' appeal to this principle of justice. This undermines his claim that Diodotus' strategy is ‘based … on a manipulation of rhetorical categories’ because he denies a place for considerations of justice in deliberative oratory. Cf. Price, J.J., Thucydides and Internal War (Cambridge, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 99: ‘Diodotus' rejection of the demands of justice …’ and Yunis (n. 4), 99–101 (‘exclusive pursuit of advantage’). Macleod (n. 13) notes Diodotus' ‘appeal to considerations of justice’ but does not observe how Cleon and Diodotus appeal to different types of justice.

68 Even though one can question Diodotus' claim that the people in the allied cities are favourable to Athens, this statement is not contradicted by Thucydides' narrative, which places the main responsibility for initiating the revolt with only one thousand citizens, probably the upper class (3.50.1).

69 Diodotus' proposal is similar to that made by Aeschines to Philip in 346: he advised the king to punish only the Phocians who were guilty of seizing the temple at a trial before the Amphictyons and to let the others go free. See Aeschin. 2.117 with Harris, E.M., Aeschines and Athenian Politics (New York and Oxford, 1995), 87Google Scholar. One should also compare the treatment of the medizing Thebans after the battle of Plataea (Hdt. 9.86–8).

70 Pace Heath (n. 7), 388: ‘The coincidence of justice and advantage asserted by Cleon is impossible …’

71 Other scholars believe that Thucydides' criticism is directed mainly at Cleon's imperial policies. See for example Andrewes (n. 3), 85. But see Macleod (n. 13), 77 (= Macleod [n. 17], 101): ‘Diodotus’ speech overall makes a point hard to rebut – that what is needed is not a legal judgment inspired by anger, but a deliberation on matters of expediency governed by reason.’ This, however, underestimates the rational character of many of Cleon's arguments.

72 Andrewes (n. 3), 80.

73 Though Aristophanes obviously exaggerates the traits of Cleon's character and tactics, his parody must be based on his actual behaviour. As Andrewes (n. 3), 81 observes, ‘a successful comedy cannot be created out of nothing, and the real Kleon must have provided Aristophanes with usable materials’.

74 On the procedure of phasis see MacDowell, D.M., ‘The Athenian procedure of phasis’, in Gagarin, M. (ed.), Symposion 1990: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Cologne and Vienna, 1991), 187–98Google Scholar; and Wallace, R.W., ‘Phainein in Athenian laws and legal procedures’, in Thür, G. and Nieto, F. (edd.), Symposion 1999: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Cologne and Vienna, 2003), 167–81Google Scholar.

75 I accept Göttling's supplement δωροδοκίας at 442.

76 For the chorus as supporters of Cleon see Ar. Vesp. 242, 409, 596.

77 It is significant that Miltiades, Cimon, Themistocles, Aristides and Nicias do not appear to have used the courts to battle their enemies. Pericles may have acted as prosecutor once if we can trust Plutarch, but one should note that he performed the role with conspicuous distaste (Plut. Cim. 14.3–4; Per. 10.5. Cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 27.1). Ephialtes is reported to have used the courts but the information about him is suspect ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 25.1–2).

78 The debate about Mytilene therefore forms a pair with the Plataean debate in which the Plataeans deliver ‘a forensic speech to a body of deliberators’; see Macleod, C., ‘Thucydides' Plataean debate’, GRBS 18 (1977), 227–46Google Scholar, at 234 (= Macleod [n. 17], 110). As Macleod notes, both sides in the Plataean debate use many of the rhetorical techniques of forensic oratory.

Earlier versions of this essay were presented to the Department of Philology at the University of Athens and as a Work-in-Progress talk to the Department of Classics and Ancient History at Durham. I would like to thank Fred Naiden and the anonymous referee for Classical Quarterly for helpful comments and my student David Lewis for proofreading the final version. All remaining errors are my own responsibility.