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When Voluntary Donations Meet the State Monopoly: Understanding Blood Shortages in China
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 November 2018
Abstract
China's blood-borne HIV catastrophe in the 1990s prompted the government to adopt a blood-collection system that combines voluntary donations with the state's monopoly on blood services. Juxtaposing fieldwork and survey data, this study examines how the intricate interplay between government manoeuvres and citizen reactions has led to blood shortages that are serious yet manageable. This article reveals that even though voluntary blood donations are adversely affected by a public distrust of state-run collection agencies, owing to political concerns healthcare officials shirk from engaging with citizens to overcome the distrust. It also finds that the blood shortages are nevertheless largely manageable because the authorities have the capacity to recruit captive donors through work units, with the caveat that such captive practices are used sparingly. Overall, this study argues that the lack of state–society synergy in voluntary donations, while exacerbated by government involvement, is also partially remedied by the government's mobilization of captive donors.
摘要
九十年代的艾滋血祸促使中国政府认识到血液管理的重要性,进而推行公民无偿献血与国家全权管控相结合的血液供给制度。综合运用实地调查与问卷数据,本研究分析了国家和社会的互动如何导致严重但不致命的血荒。一方面,公众对采供血机构的不信任加剧了血荒,但政府官员出于若干政治考量倾向于逃避直面公众,这种不信任因而无从消弭。另一方面,血荒在很大程度上仍然是可控的,因为政府有能力动员单位来组织献血,尽管这一措施使用范围有限。概而言之,本研究表明,政府对献血的高度介入削弱了公众的参与意愿,但缓解因自愿参与不足而恶化的血荒恰恰依赖政府干预。
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- Copyright © SOAS University of London 2018
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