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The Sino-Japanese Relationship and East Asian Security: Patterns and Implications*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Jonathan D. Pollack
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Extract

The Sino-Japanese relationship is among the central factors in East Asian international politics, but it remains a derivative rather than primary strategic pattern. Leaders in Beijing, long preoccupied by the Soviet-American military competition in East Asia and the more immediate Soviet challenge to China's security, have only begun to assess the potential effects of Japanese power on Chinese political and security interests. Japan's predominant concern has been the maintenance of its political and security alignment with the United States, reinforced by decades of Soviet rigidity toward Tokyo.

Type
China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 124 , December 1990 , pp. 714 - 729
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1990

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References

1 Whiting, Allen S., China Eyes Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989)Google Scholar, especially Chs. 3–4.

2 See Pollack, Jonathan D. and Winnefeld, James A., U.S. Strategic Alternatives in a Changing Pacific (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, R-3933-USCINCPAC, June 1990).Google Scholar

3 For an extremely helpful exception, see Inoguchi, Takashi, “Four Japanese scenarios for the future,” International Affairs, Winter 1988/1989, pp. 15–28.Google Scholar

4 For more detailed discussion, see Pollack, Jonathan D., The Lessons of Coalition Politics: Sino-American Security Relations (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, R-3133-AF, February 1984).Google Scholar

5 On Sino-Japanese military contacts, see Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 131–34.

6 For my own views, see Pollack, Pollack, The Sino-Soviet Summit-Implications for East Asia and the U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: The Asia Society, May 1989).Google Scholar

7 Monong, Pei, “On the trilateral relationship of the United States, Japan, and ASEAN,” Guoji wenti yanjiu (Research into International Problems), No. 4. 13 October 1984, pp. 10–18Google Scholar; trans, in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS)-CPS-85–006, pp. 1–15.

8 For a relevant example, see Chun, Zhu, “Growing role of the Asian-Pacific Region in the world strategic pattern,” International Strategic Studies (Beijing). No. 2, 1987, pp. 1–10.Google Scholar

9 On Chinese responses to the one per cent decision, see Whiting, China Eyes Japan, especially pp. 134–141.

10 See Louren, Xi, “An exploration of the issue of Japan's march from an ‘economic power’ to a ‘political power’,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, No. 4, October 1987Google Scholar, in JPRS-CAR-88–002, pp. 1–4; see also Xiang, Huan, “Sino-U.S. relations over the past year,” Liaowang (Overseas Edition), 11 January 1988Google Scholar, in FBIS-China, 15 January 1988, especially p. 3.

11 Zhao is cited in Renmin ribao, 28 February 1988, p. 1, in FBIS-China, 29 February 1988, p. 13.

12 For a report on the Deng-Takeshita exchanges, see Asahi shimbun, 30 August 1988.

13 All citations are from Gengfu, Ge, “Changes in the development of Japan's defence policy and defence capabilities,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, No. 1, 13 January 1989, in JPRS-CAR-89–032, pp. 6–12.Google Scholar

14 Zhihao, Xi, “Japan is stepping up arms expansion,” Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), 28 August 1989Google Scholar, in FBIS-China, 14 September 1989, pp. 5–6.

15 All citations are from Jieqi, Zhao, “The present status and prospect of Japan-U.S. military relations,” International Strategic Studies (Beijing), No. 4, 1989. pp. 12–18.Google Scholar

16 All citations are from Jian, Zi, “Two problems in U.S.-Japanese relations,” Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge), No. 13, 1 July 1990, in FBIS-China, 6 August 1990, pp. 1–2.Google Scholar

17 A “well-informed Chinese official” has disclosed that the PLA has pressed for additional funds in the forthcoming Eighth Five-Year Plan to counter Japanese military capabilities. Kristof, Nicholas D., “China, reassessing its foes, views Japan warily,” The New York Times, 23 October 1990.Google Scholar Kristof also cites an internal Chinese publication (Neican xuanpian) that deems China a military and economic counterweight to Japan. If confirmed, these disclosures would indicate a major shift in China's future defence planning guidance. These would formalize the reassessment of Japanese power under way since the mid 1980s.

18 See the statement of the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, 18 October 1990, in FBIS-China, 18 October 1990, pp. 1–2; for a far harsher Chinese evaluation, see Kong, HongXin wan bao (New Evening Daily), 28 September 1990Google Scholar, in FBIS-China, 1 October 1990, pp. 7–8.

19 For a highly discerning Chinese assessment, see Xiaogong, Chen, “World military situation in the 1990s,” Jiefangjun bao, 7 September 1990Google Scholar, in FBIS-China, 27 September 1990, pp. 4–8.

20 See U.S. Department of Defense, Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1988).Google Scholar

21 Hexing, Wang, “The rise and impact of regional economic groupings,” Guoji wenti yanjiu, No. 2, 13 April 1990, trans, in JPRS-CAR-90–060 pp. 1–7.Google Scholar

22 Iklé, Fred Charles and Nakanishi, Terumasa. “Japan's grand strategy.” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1990, p. 84.Google Scholar

23 See Nixon's interview in Time, 2 April 1990, p. 49.

24 For a provocative effort to define such a future course, see Iklé and Nakanishi, “Japan's grand strategy.”