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The Politics of Destabilization and Confrontation: the Campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius in Zhejiang Province, 1974

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Keith Forster
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Extract

In the five years between the disappearance of Lin Biao in 1971 and the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 the Chinese political scene was highly volatile. Mass campaigns erupted regularly, disrupting and diverting efforts to normalize political, economic and social activities, which had originally been thrown into chaos during the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. After the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in August 1973 the question of succession to the ageing Mao and ailing Premier Zhou Enlai became a matter of urgency to the political elite. At issue was the direction China would take in the post-Mao era, central to which was an assessment of the validity of Mao's thesis concerning the continuation of class struggle in socialist society, and his attempt to put into operation the conclusions he drew from this analysis.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 107 , September 1986 , pp. 433 - 462
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1986

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References

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12. ZPS, 28 April 1973. SWB, FE/4285/BII/15–17; Trade unions controlling the Party”; “'The gang of four were the ringleaders.”

13. ZPS, 3 July 1973, SWB, FE/4342/BII/6–9; ZPS, 10 July 1973. SUB, FE/4350/ BII/2–4. Similar sentiments concerning unity appeared in an editorial of Zhejiang ribao, 19 March 1973, SWB, FE/4261/BII/1–2 concerning the Communist Youth League.

14. “A gang who stirred up trouble.”

15. “The gang of four were the ringleaders,”; rally to sentence Weng Senhe and arrest Zhang Yongsheng, Hangzhou ribao, 14 August 1978; “A gang who stirred up trouble”; “An ‘outpost’ to plot and seize power.”

16. When “bourgeois factionalism” came under heavy fire in the summer of 1975 Chinese propaganda referred indirectly to this qualitative change in the nature of factionalism. See Lan, Jiang, “Wage a resolute struggle against bourgeois factionalism,” Heilongjiang Provincial Service, 13 08 1975Google Scholar; SWB, FE/4987/BI1/I–3; Nanfang ribao (Nanfang Daily) (Guangzhou) editorial, Guangdong Provincial Service, 18 August 1975, SWB, FE/4992/BII/5–7. An article in China News Analysis (CNA) picked up and commented on the above broadcasts. CNA, No. 1012 (5 September 1975), pp. 3–5.

17. Renmin ribao, 15 April 1979, p. 1; Minsheng, Hua, “Beating, smashing and looting is sheer counter-revolutionary action,” Hangzhou ribao, 22 06 1977Google Scholar; Lingen, Yang, “An appeal written in blood and tears,” Hangzhou ribao, 22 06 1977Google Scholar; Hangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau criticism group, “An extremely ferocious counter-revolutionary gang,” Hangzhou ribao, 23 06 1977Google Scholar;

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19. Hangzhou ribao, 27 August 1978; author's visit to the Hangzhou Iron and Steel Works, 27 May 1979; see Forster, K., “A story from Hangzhou,” Eastern Horizon, Vol. XVIII, No. 12 (1979), pp. 42–44Google Scholar; Weng Senhe also visited the Hangzhou Red Flag Paper Mill for the same purpose; author's visit to the Hangzhou Red Flag Paper Mill, 12 March 1978.

20. “An ‘outpost’ to plot and seize power”; Xia, Chen “The crimes must be accounted for, the poison cleared away,” Hangzhou ribao, 10 04 1978Google Scholar;

21. Hongwen, Wang, “Report to the central study class,” 14 01 1974Google Scholar in Classified Chinese Communist Documents, pp. 64–82.

22. Mao later apparently criticized the introduction of this theme as weakening the movement and evidence of metaphysics and onesidedness. See CCP CC, Zhongfa, No. 24 (1976)Google Scholar; Zhonggong nianbao, 1977 (Yearbook of Chinese Communism, 1977), (Taibei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1977), p. V–16Google Scholar;

23. 70 Questions, p. 313; Ruoshui, Wang, “The greatest lesson of the Cultural Revolution,” p. 93Google Scholar; Yearbook of Chinese Communism, pp. V–15–16.

24. CCP CC, Zhongfa, No. 37 (1977)Google Scholar; Issues and Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 8 (1978), pp. 92–93Google Scholar; Hangzhou Garrison criticism group, “Iron-clad proof of attacking the Party and destabilizing the army,” Hangzhou ribao, 10 03 1977Google Scholar;

25. See for example, Renmin ribao, 9 February 1974, p. 2; Guangming ribao, 20 July 1974;Hangzhou ribao, 2, 4, 10 February 1974; ZPS, 7 February 1974, Union Research Service (URS), Vol. 76, No. 1 (2 07 1974), pp. 2–5Google Scholar; ZPS, 14 February 1974, SWB, FE/4533/BH/12–14: ZPS, 2 March 1974, SWB, FE/4545/BH/22; ZPS, 8 July 1974, SWB, FE/4648/BII/10–11; CNA, No. 974 (20 09 1974), p. 6Google Scholar;

26. “Banhao minbing” (“Run the peoples' militia well”). Renmin ribao, 29 September 1973, p. 1; “Zai Mao zhuxi geming luxian zhiyin xia jin yibu jiaqiang minbing jianshe” (“Further strengthen the construction of the people's militia under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line”), ibid. pp. 1–2.

27. Wang, J.C.F., “The urban militia as a political instrument in the power contest in China in 1976,” Asian Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 6 (1978). pp. 548–52Google Scholar; CNA, No. 940 (16 11 1973), pp. 5–7Google Scholar;

28. ZPS, 3 February 1974, URS, Vol. 75, No. 14 (17 05 1974), pp. 177–81Google Scholar; Hangzhou ribao, 3 February 1974.

29. ZPS, 7 February 1974, URS, Vol. 76, No. 1 (2 06 1974), pp. 2–5Google Scholar;

30. ZPS, 8 February 1974, URS, Vol. 76, No. 1 (2 07 1974), pp. 5–8Google Scholar;

31. CCP HMC Propaganda Department, “A loyal follower of the gang of four in Hangzhou.” Hangzhou ribao. 21 10 1977Google Scholar; “An ‘outpost’ to plot and seize power”; Feng, Zhou. “Completely dig out the secret traitor who opposed the party and caused trouble–an exposure and criticism of the gang of four's agent in Hangzhou.” Hangzhou ribao. 24 10 1977Google Scholar;

32. ZPS. 14 February 1974. SIIB. FE/4533/BII/12–14.

33. Hangzhou ribao. 3 03 1974: ZPS. 3 March 1974, URS. Vol. 76. No. 1, pp. 8–10Google Scholar; Hangzhou Daily criticism group. “The principle of the party nature of a proletarian newspaper is not easily twisted.” Hangzhou ribao, 22 November 1977.

34. Hangzhou Municipal Industry and Communications Bureau, “Smashing the kou and restoring the zu was a counter-revolutionary farce.” Hangzhou ribao, 23 November 1977; Tie Ying. “Premier Zhou taught me to undertake economic work”: Chen Xia. “The crimes must be accounted for.”

35. Chen Xia, “The crimes must be accounted for.” There is no evidence, however, that Weng Senhe actually held this post. Perhaps He and Wang were only playing games.

36. “Constitution of the CCP,” Peking Review, No. 35–36 (7 09 1973), p. 29Google Scholar;

37. CCP HMC Propaganda Department criticism group, “The new-born counter-revolutionary He Xianchun,” Hangzhou ribao, 20 06 1977Google Scholar; CCP HMC Propaganda Department criticism group, “The gang of four's fiendish hatchet-man”; Hangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, “An extremely ferocious counter-revolutionary gang”; CCP ZPC, “Report on the examination concerning Weng Senhe,” 19 06 1977Google Scholar; CCP CC. Zhongfa, No. 37 (1977),Google ScholarIssues and Studies, Vol. XV, No. 1 (1979), pp. 110–112Google Scholar; “A gang who stirred up trouble.”

38. Hangzhou ribao, 22 February 1974.

39. Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant criticism group, “Resolutely suppress the ringleaders of beating, smashing and looting,” ibid. 21 June 1977; ZPMD Logistics Department criticism group, “Rise to power and position and fall to destruction amidst chaos,” ibid. 9 April 1977.

40. Rally to sentence Weng Senhe and arrest Zhang Yongsheng, ibid. 14 August 1978; CCP HMC Propaganda Department, “The new-born counter-revolutionary; rally to sentence Xia Genfa and Huang Yintang”, Hangzhou ribao, 17 04 1979Google Scholar; rally to criticize Weng Senhe, ibid. 31 December 1976; meeting to criticize the crimes of the “gang of four” and the serious crimes of the two former principal men of the HMC in following the “gang of four”, ibid. 5 April 1978; Hangzhou Garrison criticism group, “A black model in establishing a ‘second armed force,’” ibid. 20 April 1977; Hangzhou Oxygen Generator Plant, “Resolutely suppress.”

41. CCP CC, Zhongfa, No. 24(1976)Google Scholar, Yearbook of Chinese Communism,” p. V–17. For evidence that Jiang's speech caused serious repercussions in Zhejiang seeYangwen, Ji, “A shocking display of opposing the Party and throwing the army into chaos,” Hangzhou ribao, 9 02 1977Google Scholar;

42. CCP CC, Zhongfa, No. 37 (1977),Google ScholarIssues and Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 8 (1978), pp. 93–95Google Scholar; 99. Weng and He took Wang's words as their guide to action and repeated them continually in their vendetta against the PLA in Zhejiang.

43. ZPS, 28 September 1973, URS, Vol. 73, No. 1 (2 10 1973), pp. 8–10Google Scholar;

44. ZPS, 18 October 1973, SWB, FE/4431/BII/4–8.

45. See ZPS, 17 December, 21 December 1973, SWB, FE/4492/BII/3, 10–11.

46. Agence France Presse (AFP), 24 June 1974, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (FBIS/CHI), 123, El–2.

47. Ji Yangwen, “A shocking display”; ZPMD Logistics Department criticism group, “Those who try to destroy the Great Wall will themselves be burned.” Hangzhou ribao, 14 09 1978Google Scholar; meeting to criticize Weng Senhe, Hangzhou ribao, 31 December 1976.

48. ZPMD Logistics Department criticism group “Rise to power and position.”

49. ZPS, 23 03 1974, URS, Vol. 75, No. 14, pp. 181–84Google Scholar;

50. Meeting to Senhe, criticize Weng, Hangzhou ribao, 31 12 1976Google Scholar; Ji Yangwen, “A shocking display.”

51. Diaoshi, Zhai, “Expose and criticize the gang of four's heinous crimes in opposing the army in Zhejiang and throwing it into chaos,” Hangzhou ribao, 1 02 1977Google Scholar; ZPMD Logistics Department criticism group, “Those who try to destroy.”

52. Foreign travellers observed posters in Hangzhou in mid 1974 denouncing Xia Qi. AFP, 9 July 1974, FBIS/CHI, 133, El.

53. “ZPMD links up criticism of the gang of four with Lin Biao,” Hangzhou ribao, 22 September 1978; Ji Yangwen, “A shocking display”; ZPMD Logistics Department, “Those who try to destroy.”

54. Ji Yangwen, “A shocking display,” ZPMD Logistics Department, “Those who try to destroy.”

55. ZPS, 10 04 1974, URS, Vol. 75, No. 14, pp. 184–87Google Scholar;

56. China News Analysis, in an issue published in 1975, stated that wall-posters in Hangzhou in mid 1974, signed by the urban militia, had referred to the existence of an illegal provincial militia.CNA, No. 1013 (12 09 1975), P. 4Google Scholar. It is therefore possible that certain military leaders kept the old militia units under their jurisdiction operational in order to counter the activities of the urban militia and bolster the position of Zhang, Weng and He's opponents, the “foot of the mountain” faction.

57. “Zhua pilin pikong cu gongye shengchan” (“Grasp criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius and promote industrial production”), Renmin ribao, 10 04 1974, p. 1Google Scholar;

58. ZPS, 22 April 1974, SWB, FE/4585/BII/11.

59. ZPS, 22 April 1974, cited in CNA, No. 959 (10 05 1974), p. 6Google Scholar.

60. Chen Xia, “The crimes must be accounted for.”

61. ZPS, 28 April 1974, SWB, FE/4589/BII/1–2.

62. ZPS, 30 April 1974, SWB, FE/4597/BII/12–13.

63. ZPS, 15 June 1974, SWB, FE/4631/BII/13–14.

64. Zhejiang ribao, 24 June 1974, SWB, FE/4637/BII/21; ZPS, 2 July 1974, SWB, FE/4644/BII/9–10.

65. CCP CC, Zhongfa, No. 21 (1974)Google Scholar; in Classified Chinese Communist Documents, pp. 612–16.

66. ZPS, 11 July 1974, SWB, FE/4655/BII/23–5.

67. ZPS, 24 July 1974, FBIS/CIII, 144, G2–3.

68. Zhejiang ribao (editorial), 30 July 1974, FBIS/CHI, 149, G2–5.

69. In October 1974 Mao called for stability and unity within the Party and the army; in November he issued instructions on the economy. SeeChan, A. and Unger, J. (eds.) “The Case of Li Yizhe,” Chinese Law and Government, Vol. X, No. 3. (1977), p. 65Google Scholar; CCP CC, Zhongfa, No. 37 (1977),Google ScholarIssues and Studies, Vol. XV, No. 5 (1979), p. 86Google Scholar;

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71. ZPS, 10 August 1974, SWB, FE/4682/BII/16–18; ZPS, 16 August 1974, SWB, FE/4687/BII/9–10.

72. Tie Ying, “Premier Zhou taught me to undertake economic work”; Ji Yangwen, “A shocking display.”

73. ZPS, 30 September 1974, SWB, FE/4720/BII/5–6.

74. ZPS, 21 November 1974, SWB, FE/4768/BII/29–30.

75. ZPS, 9 November 1974, SWB, FE/4761/BII/11.

76. In a speech on 2 October 1974 to a gathering of overseas Chinese, Deng Xiaoping represented the campaign as an exercise in keeping China on the socialist road. Qishi niandai (The Seventies), December 1974 in FBIS/CHI, 238, E4–5.

77. In a lecture which he delivered in 1980 Tie Ying, then first secretary of the CCP ZPC, commented on how Zhang Yongsheng, Weng Senhe, He Xianchun and their associates both cursed the CCP and racked their brains to force their way into it. Ying, Tie, “Gongchandangyuan yao wei sihua jianshe de weida shiye er xianshen” (“Communist Party members should devote themselves to the great cause of building the Four Modernizations”), Zhejiang ribao, 31 05 1980, p. 3Google Scholar;

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