* This article was written while I was a Research Associate at the University of Michigan's Centre for Chinese Studies, to which I would like to express my gratitude. I would also like to thank Mr Bruce Cameron for research assistance.

1. Unless otherwise indicated this section is based on my two articles: “The Chinese army under Lin Piao: prelude to political intervention,” in lindbeck, John M. H. (ed.), China; Management of a Revolutionary Society (University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 343–47Google Scholar; and “The Chinese army in the Cultural Revolution: the politics of intervention,” in Current Scene (CS) VIII: 18 (7 12 1970), pp. 1–25Google Scholar.

2. See Finer, S. E., The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York, 1962)Google Scholar.

3. Domes, Jürgen, “Party politics and the Cultural Revolution,” in Trager, Frank N. and Henderson, William (eds.), Communist China, 1949–1969: A Twenty-Year Appraisal (New York, 1970), p. 90Google Scholar.

4. I obtained this information from an unpublished paper by Jürgen Domes (“Leadership personnel after the Cultural Revolution”) presented at the Urchfont Conference of the European Study Group, 17–23 September 1972.

5. See, for example, China News Analysis (Hong Kong) 822 (20 11 1970)Google Scholarand 856 (1 October 1971). See also Powell, Ralph L., “Soldiers in the Chinese economy,” Asian Survey XI: 8 (08 1971), pp. 742–760CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6. For one example, see Terrill, Ross, “The 800,000,000,” The Atlantic Monthly, 11 1971, p. 96Google Scholar.

7. I obtained this information from an unpublished paper by Domes, Jürgen (“Transition towards a new political system in China: the role of the Party and the army”) delivered at a Conference on “China and the World Community,” in Melbourne, Australia, 10 06 1972, pp. 7–9Google Scholar.

8. This was evident from the continuous bickering between the military men and the mass representatives in most of the Revolutionary Committees.

9. Domes, , “Party politics,” p. 91Google Scholar.

10. Of the full members: Lin Piao, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Ch'iu Hui-tso, Hsü Shihyu, Huang Yung-sheng, Li Tso-p'eng, Wu Fa-hsien, Yeh Chien-ying and Yeh Ch'ün (assuming that Chu Teh and Liu Po-ch'eng no longer play an active role because of age). Of the alternates: Li Te-sheng and Wang Tung-hsing.

11. Nelsen, Harvey, “Military forces in the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly (CQ) 51 (07–09 1972), pp. 444–474CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12. Joffe, , “The Chinese army in the Cultural Revolution,” pp. 16–17Google Scholar; see also Robinson, Thomas W., “The Wuhan Incident: local strife and provincial rebellion during the Cultural Revolution,” CQ 47 (07–09 1971), pp. 413–438CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13. Domes, Jürgen, “The Ninth CCP Central Committee in statistical perspective,” CS IX: 2 (7 02 1971), pp. 5–14Google Scholar.

14. Most of the provinces have come out strongly in favour of moderate economic policies.

15. Joffe, Ellis, Party and Army; Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press East Asian Monograph Series, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chs 2 and 3.

16. See, for example, Canton Radio, 17 November 1971; Szechwan Radio, 22 November 1971; Hainan Radio, 24 November 1971 and Hupeh Radio, 22 January 1972.

17. Joffe, , “The Chinese army under Iin Piao,” pp. 366–69Google Scholar.

18. See, for example, the document reproduced in Chung-kung yen-chiu (Studies on Chinese Communism) (Taipei), 6:4 (04 1967), pp. 1–5Google Scholar, purportedly giving details of the plot against Mao. See also the article by Bridgham, Philip “The fall of Lin Piao” on pp. 427–449 of this issueGoogle Scholar.

19. See, for example, Lin's Directive of 9 August 1967; Canton, Chu-ying tung-fang-hung, 13 09 1967Google Scholar; in SCMP 4036, pp. 1–6.

20. See, for example, “Some directives concerning the dispatching of ‘Central Support-the-Left’ units in all military regions and provincial military districts (10 June 1968),” in Chinese Law and Government IV: 3–4 (1971), pp. 330–36Google Scholar. See also Nelsen, “Military forces.”

21. This became apparent in the coalition between Chou and his supporters on the one hand and the military commanders on the other, a coalition which was behind the fall of Lin in 1971. For one example of Chou's attitude towards the regional commanders, see “Excerpts from Premier Chou En-lai's comment on the situation in North-east China (28 September 1967),” reproduced in Chien Yu-shen, China's Fading Revolution: Army Dissent and Military Divisions, 1967–1968 (Hong Kong, 1969), pp. 318–327Google Scholar.

22. See ibid. pp. 200–202.

23. This charge has been repeated numerous times. See, for example, “Sum up experience in strengthening Party leadership,” editorial by the editorial boards of Jen-min jih-pao, Hung ch'i and Chieh-fang-chiin pao, 1 December 1971, in Peking Review 50 (10 12 1971), p. 5Google Scholar.

24. For a brief summary of this debate, see China News Analysis 854 (10 09 1971), pp. 1–2Google Scholar.

25. See Whiting, Allen S., “China: the struggle for power,” The New Republic, 4 12 1971, p. 20Google Scholar.

26. See, for instance, The Military Balance, 1971–1972 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies).

27. See, for example, Lhasa Radio Service, 27 April 1972; Szechwan Provincial Service, 26 December 1971; Kunming Provincial Service, 13 December 1971, and the radio services cited above, n. 16.

28. See, for example, Peking Domestic Service, 13 September 1971; Hupeh Provincial Service, 21 September 1971; Shensi Provincial Service, 6 January 1972. See also collection of articles in Union Research Service 66:3 (11 01 1972)Google Scholar.

29. As the Soviets frequently reminded the Chinese and other Communists.

30. Powell, Ralph L., “The Party, the government and the gun,” Asian Survey 10:6 (06 1970), pp. 441–471, esp. p. 445CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31. Domes, , “Transition towards a new political system in China,” pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

32. “China's provincial Party Committees in perspective,” CS 9:12 (7 12 1971), pp. 12–19Google Scholar.

33. For example, see Domes, “Transition towards a new political system in China”; also Powell, Ralph L., “The military and the struggle for power in China,” Current History 63:373 (09 1972), p. 98Google Scholar.

34. Nelsen, , “Military forces,” esp. pp. 466–67Google Scholar.

35. See, for example, Yunnan Radio, 2 December 1971; Shensi Radio, 6 January 1972 and Kweichow Radio, 8 January 1972.

36. See, for example, “Sum up experience in strengthening Party leadership”; also “Unite to win still greater victories,” 1972 New Year's Day editorial by the editorial boards of Jen-min jih-pao, Hung ch'i and Chieh-fang-chün pao in Peking Review 1 (7 01 1972), p. 10Google Scholar.

37. It appears that at least a dozen documents on the Lin Piao Affair were circulated, only three of which are available outside China: one is mentioned above (n. 18), the other documents are considered below (n. 42 and n. 54).

38. The New York Times, 28 and 29 July 1972.

39. For a summary of this campaign, see China News Analysis 851 (13 08 1971), and CS IX:11 (7 11 1971), pp. 13–15Google Scholar.

40. CS IX:8 and 11 (7 08 and 7 11 1971), pp. 12–16 and 13–15Google Scholar. See also Burton, Barry, “The Cultural Revolution's ultraleft conspiracy: the ‘May 16 Group',” Asian Survey XI:11 (11 1971), pp. 1029–1053, esp.p. 1051CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41. Burton, ibid.

42. “Chairman Mao's talks with provincial leaders,” reported in a document issued by the Central Committee and reproduced in Issues and Studies (September 1972), pp. 64–71. Of the three documents from China on the Lin Piao Affair, this one seems to merit consideration as the most authentic. The reason is that much of the information it contains refers to events at which many of the leaders whom Mao addressed were present. Or if they were not, their colleagues probably were. It is unlikely, therefore, that information pertinent to these events could be fabricated. This, of course, does not mean that other parts of the document are not suspect With respect to the political coup at the Second Plenum, Mao said that the conspirators pressed for appointing a State Chairman against his will, although it is not clear from Mao's remarks whether they wanted to appoint him or Lin Piao to this post.

43. See, for example, Powell, , “The military,” p. 100Google Scholar.

44. See, for example, Anhwei Provincial Service, 12 December 1971; Szechwan Provincial Service, 30 December 1971; Hunan Provincial Service, 6 November and 31 December 1971 and Fukien Provincial Service, 17 October 1971. See also collection of articles in Union Research Service 66:5 (18 01 1972)Google Scholar, and CS X:3 (10 03 1972), pp. 17–18Google Scholar.

45. Mao strongly alluded to such frictions in his talks with provincial leaders(n. 42).

46. For an expression of Mao's dissatisfaction with the extensive political role of the military, see “Chairman Mao's talks with provincial leaders.” For indications of tensions with the military leadership, see China News Analysis 830 (5 02 1971), pp. 4–5 and 862 (19 November 1971), pp. 2–3Google Scholar.

47. See above, n. 28; also, Powell, , “The military,” p. 100Google Scholar.

48. See above, n. 42.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Aside from official and unofficial Chinese reports, this seems to be substantiated by repeated references to conspiracies in the official press, as well as in other publications. For a summary of how literary productions have been used to allude to plots, see CS X:5 (10 05 1972), pp. 19–21Google Scholar.

52. See, for example, The New York Times, 27 August 1972; Powell, , “The military,” p. 102Google Scholar.

53. The New York Times, 29 July 1972.

54. This letter was reproduced in Chung-yang jih-pao (Taipei), 11 11 1972Google Scholar. Although the letter was probably written by Mao, its date – 8 July 1966 –is highly questionable. It seems likely that the letter was written after Lin's purge as part of the Chairman's effort to disassociate himself from his former heir.

55. See Joffe, “The Chinese army under Lin Piao” and “The Chinese army in the Cultural Revolution.”

56. In a conversation with French statesmen. See Terrill, , “The 800,000,000,” p. 68Google Scholar.

57. See, for example, Powell, , “The military,” pp. 102 and 134Google Scholar.

58. See, for example, Fukien Provincial Service, 25 December 1971; Kirin Provincial Service, 24 August 1972; Lhasa Radio, 28 August 1972. These and numerous other reports do not state explicitly that the PLA has withdrawn from the political sphere, but rather that it has accepted the leadership of local Party Committees. The overall impression is that with the reconstitution of Party Committees on the lower levels, many of the daily functions taken over by the army during the Cultural Revolution have been returned to Party cadres. This would also be in line with the renewed emphasis on professional training.

59. See above, n. 52.

60. See, for example, The New York Times, 29 October 1972.