1 Jowitt, Ken, “The Leninist extinction,” in Daniel, Chirot, (ed.), The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1991), p. 79.Google Scholar For stylistic purposes, I have omitted the italics found in the original.

2 Oksenberg, Michel and Dickson, Bruce J., “The origins, processes, and outcomes of great political reform: a framework of analysis,” in Rustow, Dankwart A. and Kenneth, Paul Erikson (eds.), Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 235–262.Google Scholar

3 Thus, in at least in one area, agriculture, one might question just how gradualist the strategy was.

4 As Peter Nolan writes, “It has become a part of the conventional wisdom among policy advisors on the reform of the former Stalinist economies that sweeping economic and political reform are inseparable.” Nolan, Peter, State and Market in the Chinese Economy: Essays on Controversial Issues (London: MacMillan, 1992), p. 218.Google Scholar

5 Johnson, Juliet, “Should Russia adopt the Chinese model of economic reform?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1994), p. 61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Prybyla, Jan, “The road from socialism: why, where, what and how,” Problems of Communism Vol. XL, Nos. 1–2 (January-April, 1991), p. 9.Google Scholar For another vigorous defence of the concept, see Brada, Josef C., “The transformation from Communism to capitalism: how far? how fast?” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1993), pp. 87–110.Google Scholar

7 Ericson, Richard E., “The classical Soviet-type economy: nature of the system and implications for reform,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 1991), p. 24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also, Knight, Peter T., Economic Reform in Socialist Countries (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1983), pp. 25–26.Google Scholar

8 Bialer, Seweryn, Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980)Google Scholar, ch. 1. Wlodzimierz Brus has argued that it is “the amalgamation of strictly political with economic power which makes the Communist mono-archy so special.” Brus, Wlodzimierz, “Political pluralism and markets in Communist systems,” in Susan, Gross Solomon (ed.), Pluralism in the Soviet Union (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982), p. 113.Google Scholar

9 Kornai, Janos, “The Hungarian reform process: visions, hopes, and reality,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIV (December 1986), p. 1729.Google Scholar

10 See for example, Gill, Graeme, “Sources of political reform in the Soviet Union,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 240–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

11 Ibid. Young, Christopher, “The strategy of political liberalization: a comparative view of Gorbachev's reforms,” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1992), pp. 47–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Philip Roeder, G., Red Sunset: The Failure of Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), ch. 9.Google Scholar

12 Brus, Wlodzimierz, “Marketization and democratization: the Sino-Soviet divergence,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, No. 17 (1993), pp. 433—444.Google Scholar This is also Roeder's point in Red Sunset. See also Breslauer, George W., “Evaluating Gorbachev as a leader,” reprinted in Alexander, Dallin and Gail, Lapidus (eds.), The Soviet System in Crisis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 178–209Google Scholar, Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, “Connection between political and economic reform,” in Gilbert, Rozman With Seizaburo, Sato and Gerald, Segal (eds.), Dismantling Communism: Common Causes and Regional Variations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 94—99Google Scholar, Lane, David and Ross, Cameron, “Limitations of party control: the government bureaucracy in the USSR,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1994), pp. 19–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and McFaul, Michael, “State power, institutional change, and the politics of privatization in Russia,” World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1995), pp. 224–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 For example, in 1986, he told a Japanese visitor that“… unless we modify our political structure, we shall be unable to advance the economic reform or even to preserve the gains that we have made so far.” Xiaoping, Deng, Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987), p. 149.Google Scholar

14 For an elaboration of these terms see Halpern, Nina “Economic reform and democratization in Communist systems: the case of China,” Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 22, No. 2/3 (Spring/Autumn, 1989), pp. 139–152.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 The quotations are from Shirk's, Susan, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 346.Google Scholar

16 McMillan, John and Naughton, Barry, “How to reform a planned economy: lessons from China,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 131.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 Brus, ”Marketization and democratization,” p. 428. See also Hao, Chen Kang Cited In Jia and Mingxia, Wang, “Market and state: changing central-local relations in China,” in Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin, Changing Central-Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994)Google Scholar, No. 14. Shirk argues that such a policy emerged out of the failure to reform the state sector. 77K;Political Logic of Reform, p. 145.

18 Socialist Entrepreneurs (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp. 16–18 and 212–18.

19 Szelenyi, Ivan, “Eastern Europe in an epoch of transition: toward a socialist mixed economy?” in Victor, Nee and David, Stark (eds.), Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and East Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 220Google Scholar and 222 and Kornai, “The Hungarian reform process,” p. 1710.

20 Szelenyi, Socialist Entrepreneurs, p. 213 and Kornai, “The Hungarian reform process,” pp. 1709–10, 1728–30. Indeed, the importance of the political system to an evolutionary alternative is apparent in Peter Murrell's recent writings on reform in post-socialist societies. He depicts the private sector playing a role vis-a-vis the planned, state sector analogous to McMillan and Naughton's “non-state” enterprises and argues this is made possible by the fact that the “old political system has vanished.” The lesson is once again clear: only the elimination of the Leninist bureaucracy would make meaningful, incremental reform possible. Murrell, Peter, “What is shock therapy? What did it do in Poland and Russia?” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1993), p. 119.Google Scholar

21 Naughton, Barry, “What is distinctive about China's economic transition? State enterprise reform and overall system transformation,” Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 18, No. 3 (June 1994), pp. 472–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

22 Jefferson, Gary, “The Chinese economy: moving forward,” in William, Joseph (ed.), China Briefing, 1992 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 48–49.Google Scholar See also Chen, Kang, Jefferson, Gary H. and Singh, Inderjit, “Lessons from Chinese reform,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1992), pp. 214–15.CrossRefGoogle ScholarYingyi, Qian and Xu, Chenggang, “Why China's reforms differ: the M-form hierarchy and entry expansion on the non-state sector,” (Stanford University, 1992), p. 45.Google Scholar This article was passed on to me after the conference paper which formed the basis for this article was completed. As will be noted, our analyses share common ground. For other analysts who have used this approach, see Solinger, Dorothy J., China's Transition From Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reforms (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993)Google Scholar, ch. 8, Nee, Victor, “Organizational dynamics of market transition: hybrid forms, property rights, and mixed economy in China,” Administrative Science Quarterly, No. 37 (1992), pp. 1–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Huang, Yasheng “Information, bureaucracy and economic reforms in China and the Soviet Union,” World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 102–134.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 The following discussion draws from: North, Douglass C., Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Dcenberry, John, “Conclusion: an institutional approach to American foreign economic policy,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 220–243Google Scholar, Krasner, Stephen D., “Approaches to the state: alternative conceptions and historical dynamics,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. 2 (January 1984), pp. 223–246CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Sven, Steinmo, Kathleen, Thelen and Frank, Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

24 Vivienne Shue makes a similar point: “As there was no single state socialism, there will be no single ‘postsocialism’,” “State power and social organization in China,” in Joel Migdal et ai, State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 85. Qian and Xu also make this point when they discuss the differences between China's “M-form” structure and the “U-form” structure of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. “Why China's economic reforms differ,” pp. 16–22.

25 Schurmann, Franz, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, enlarged edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 88–90.Google Scholar See also Bastid, Marianne, “Levels of economic decision making,” in Schram, Stuart R. (ed.), Authority, Participation and Cultural Change in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 162–63.Google Scholar sHuang presents an excellent discussion of these different approaches to planning in his “Information, bureaucracy and economic reforms in China and the Soviet Union.”

26 On the weakness of local government in the former Soviet Union see Ross, Cameron, Local Government in the Soviet Union: Problems of Implementation and Control (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987)Google Scholar, Cattell, David T., “Local government and the provision of consumer goods and services,” in Everett, Jacobs (ed.), Soviet Local Politics and Government (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), Ronald Hill, “The development of Soviet local government since Stalin's death,” in Jacobs, Soviet Local Politics and GovernmentGoogle Scholar, Gregory, Paul R., Restructuring the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, ch. 7, Fortescue, Stephen, “The regional party apparatus in the ‘sectional society’,” Studies in Comparative'Communism, Vol.21, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 11–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Rutland, Peter, The Politics of Economic Stagnation in the Soviet Union (London: Cambridge University Press, 1993).Google Scholar

27 Discussion of the earlier period can be found in Nicholas Lardy, R., Economic Growth and the Distribution in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chs. 1–4, Riskin, Carl, China's Political Economy: The Quest For Development Since 1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987)Google Scholar, chs. 5–7 and Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, pp. 85–87 and ch. 3. The period of the Great Leap Forward is, of course, particularly important. It was during this time, as Zhao Suisheng notes, that“… local governments were empowered to approve all locally financed large- and medium-sized investment projects, to plan local production, to distribute materials, and to collect revenues,” Zhao Suisheng, “China's central–local relationship: a historical perspective,” in Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin, Changing Central–Local Relations in China, p. 26.

28 It has been estimated that between 1965 and 1970 the number of enterprises under the central ministries was reduced from 10,533 producing 46.9% of total industrial output to 500 producing only 8% of total output. Most of these enterprises were turned over to the provinces, which, in some cases, passed them on to sub-provincial jurisdictions. See Ishihara, Kyoichi, China's Conversion to a Market Economy (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1991), pp. 15–19Google Scholar and Christine Wong, P., “The ‘Maoist’ model reconsidered: local self-reliance and the financing of rural industrialization,” in William Joseph el al., New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution (Cambridge!, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 188.Google Scholar For a discussion of depreciation funds see Naughton, Barry, “Finance and planning reforms in industry, in Joint Economic Committee, China's Economy Looks Towards the Year 2000, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 607.Google Scholar

29 Shue, Vivienne, “Beyond the budget: financial organization and reform in a Chinese county,” Modem China, Vol. 10, No. 2 (April 1984), p. 161.Google Scholar On the granting of greater budgetary discretion see Oksenberg, Michel and Tong, James, “The evolution of central-provincial fiscal relations in China, 1971 to 1984: the formal system,” The China Quarterly, No. 125 (March 1991), pp. 1–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Fujimoto, Akira, “The reform of China's financial system,” China Newsletter, March 1980, pp. 4—5Google Scholar, Kojima, Reeitsu, “The growing fiscal authority of provincial-level governments in China,” Journal of Developing Economies, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (December 1992), p. 336Google Scholar and Dexing, Zhao, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingjishi (1967–1984) (Economic History of the Chinese People's Republic, 1967–1984) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1989), pp. 48–49.Google Scholar While this was clearly at work in relations between the provinces and the Centre, it is not clear that sub-provincial bodies officially enjoyed the same privileges. Granick, David, Chinese State Enterprises (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 40–41.Google ScholarWong, Christine P. W. has argued for a greater national supervision of these budgetary categories. “Fiscal reform and local industrialization,”Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 2 (April 1992), pp. 205–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30 Lyons, Thomas P., “Explaining economic fragmentation in China: a systems approach,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 1986), pp. 209–236.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

31 Christine Wong does an excellent job of demonstrating the complexity of this classification. See “Ownership and control in Chinese industry,” pp. 581–599.

32 Tang, Jianzhong and Ma, Laurence C., “Evolution of urban collective enterprises in China,” The China Quarterly, No. 104 (December 1985), pp. 615–640Google Scholar, and Wong, “Ownership and control in Chinese industry,” table 5, p. 602.

33 The discussion in this paragraph draws from Byrd, William A. and Lin, Qingsong, China's Rural Industry: Structure, Development and Reform (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1990), p. 343Google Scholar, Shue, “Beyond the budget,” p. 176 and Naughton, Barry, “Financial reforms in China's industrial system,” in Perry, Elizabeth J. and Christine, Wong (eds.), The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 228.Google Scholar See also Kojima, “The growing fiscal authority of provincial-level governments in China,” p. 336.

34 Naughton, Barry, “The decline of central control over investment in post-Mao China,” in Lampton, David M. (ed.), Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 51–80Google Scholar and Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), p. 138. On the growth of extrabudgetary funds during these years see Shaoguang Wang, “The rise of the regions: fiscal reform and the decline of central state capacity in China,” in Andrew Walder, The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 93–95. Local control over allocation of industrial output is discussed in Christine Wong, “Material allocation and decentralization: impact of the local sector on industrial reform” in Perry and Wong, The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China, pp. 253–278.

35 The discussion in this paragraph draws from Wong, “The ‘Maoist’ model reconsidered,” pp. 186–191, Byrd, William, The Market Mechanism and Economic Reform in China (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 46 and 107Google Scholar, Donnithorne, Audrey, “China's cellular economy: some economic trends since the Cultural Revolution,” The China Quarterly, No. 52 (October-December, 1972), pp. 605–619CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Wong, Christine P. W., “Interpreting rural industrial growth in the post-Mao period,” Modem China, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 1988), p. 7.Google Scholar For a description of such overall planning in one municipality, see Blecher, Marc, “Developmental state, entrepreneurial state: the political economy of socialist reform in Xinju municipality and Guanghan county,” in Gordon, White (ed.), The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform: The Road to Crisis (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1991), pp. 265–289.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

36 This paragraph is based on Byrd, The Market Mechanism and Economic Reforms in China, pp. 5–6 and 45, Wong, “Material allocation and decentralization,” p. 264, Donnithome, “China's cellular economy,” p. 616, Blecher, ”Developmental state, entrepreneurial state,” pp. 272–73, Liu, Yang-Ling, “Reform from below: the private economy,” The China Quarterly, No. 130(June 1992), pp. 293–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Parris, Kristen, “Local initiative and national reform: the Wenzhou model of development,” The China Quarterly, No. 134 (June 1993), pp. 242–263.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 See, respectively, Wong, Christine Pui Wah, “Rural industrialization in the People's Republic of China: lessons from the Cultural Revolution decade,” in United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China Under the Four Modernizations, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 407Google Scholar and Donnithorne, “China's cellular economy,” p. 614.

38 Liu, “Reform from below,” p. 313. See also Parris, ”Local initiative and national reform, p. 263. In Wuxi county local officials ignored orders to shut down local industries and concentrate on agriculture. Byrd and Lin, China's Rural Industry, p. 7.

39 Jean Oi notes that “Many of the local officials who are now leading rapid economic development were the same people who presided over the minimally functioning economy during the Maoist period.” Rural China Takes Off: Incentives for Industrialization (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming), p. 5.

40 This is the central argument of Huang, “Information, bureaucracy and economic reforms in China and the Soviet Union.”

41 Wong, “Ownership and Control in Chinese Industry,” pp. 593–96. See also, Byrd, The Market Mechanism and Economic Reforms in China, pp. 4–7, 44–46 and 107–109, Shue, “Beyond the budget,” p. 148. On the question of dynamism in the pre-reform economy see Blecher, ”Developmental state, entrepreneurial state.”

42 The quotations are from McMillan and Naughton, “How to reform a planned economy,” p. 138 and Qian Yingyi and Chenggang Xu, ”Why China's Economic Reforms Differ,” pp. 14 and 6 respectively.

43 Weiyuanhui, Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige, Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige, 1993 nianjian (China Economic Systems Reform Yearbook, 1993) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1994), p. 605.Google Scholar

44 Referring to these local collectives, one author has written, “They are essentially ministate enterprises, but the‘states’ to which they belong are community governments, which supervise the enterprises through their industrial corporations.” Byrd, William A. (ed.), Chinese Industrial Firms Under Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 89.Google Scholar

45 Byrd and Lin, China's Rural Reforms, p. 195.

46 These are central themes of Susan Young's writings. See her “Private entrepreneurs and evolutionary change in China,” in David S. G. Goodman and Beverly Hooper (eds.), China's Quiet Revolution: New Interactions Between State and Society (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 105–125 and “Policy, Practice and the Policy Sector in China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 21, pp. 57–80. Similar points are made in David Goodman, “China: the state and capitalist revolution,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1992), pp. 350–59, Nee, “Organizational dynamics of market transition: hybrid forms, property rights, and mixed economy in China,” Solinger, China's Transition from Socialism, ch. 11, Oi, Rural China Takes Off, pp. 131–39, and Byrd and Lin, China's Rural Industry, ch. 5. For a useful review by a major Chinese economic journal of the problems facing private enterprise see Joint Publications Research Service, China Report (hereafter JPRS-CAR), 94–001, 14 October 1994, pp. 47–51.

47 For an anecdotal discussion of this issue see Lyons, Thomas P., Market-Oriented Reform in China: Cautionary Tales (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Department of Economics, 1992).Google Scholar

48 This is a theme of Louis Putterman's paper in this volume. A strong statement of this case, along with a review of the relevant literature, can be found in Andrew G. Walder, “Local governments as industrial corporations: an organizational analysis of China's transitional economy,” unpublished paper, pp. 10–11. See also White, Gordon, Riding the Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 76–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Goodman, “China: the state and capitalist revolution,” p. 356 for statements of their nature along these lines. An excellent discussion of the nature of non-state enterprises can be found in Qian Yingyi and Chenggang Xu, “Why China's reforms differ.” Frequent complaints in the Chinese press regarding local governmental intervention in the local economy substantiate the claims of certain Chinese economists that the collectives represent a “second state sector.” Rawski, Thomas G., “Chinese industrial reform: accomplishments, prospects, and implications,” American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 84, No. 2 (May 1994), p. 271.Google Scholar See also the remarks of the Chinese economist Wu Jinglian in JPRS-CAR 94–051, 27 October 1994, pp. 13–15.

49 The former contention is Pei Minxin in From Reform to Revolution and the latter is offered by Peter Murrell (“What is shock therapy? What did it do in Poland and Russia?” p. 121) as an explanation of why what appeared to be a mixed economy was developing in China despite the Leninist system.

50 On this point see also Qian Yingyi and Chenggang Xu, “Why China's reforms differ,” p. 9. One could also add a third policy change – the “open door.” Although Samuel Ho is probably right when he notes that this affected only the coastal provinces, it is also true that these provinces have seen some of the strongest growth in the non-state sector. Finally, of course, TVEs have been the recipients of a large amount of overseas investment and, as Lardy's paper in this volume suggests, are a major source of China's exports. Samuel Ho, Rural China in Transition: Non-Agricultural Development in Rural Jiangsu, 1978—1990(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 69–75.

51 See Oi, Rural China Takes Off, ch. 2 for a discussion of the issues raised in this paragraph.

52 The discussion which follows is drawn from Byrd and Lin, China's Rural Industry, Ho, Rural China in Transition, Nee, “Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition,” Anthony J. Ody, Rural Enterprise Development in China, 1986–1990 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1992), Walder, “Local governments as industrial corporations, and Qian Yingyi and Chenggang Xu, “Why China's economic reforms differ.”

53 See Wong, “Interpreting rural industrial growth in post-Mao China.”

54 This is the central theme of Christine Wong, P. W., “Central–local relations in an era of fiscal decline: the paradox of fiscal decentralization in post-Mao China,” The China Quarterly, No. 128 (December 1991), pp. 691–715.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Wong suggests that localities were given an additional impetus to develop economies by the fact that additional budgetary obligations were passed down to them. Victor Nee argues that “revenue-sharing arrangements forged a virtual partnership between local government and industry.” “Organizational dynamics of market transition,” p. 5. He also notes the more direct access to resources in the case of collective industries, p. 11. See also Walder, “Local governments as industrial corporations.” For a similar point made in a Chinese economic journal see JPRS-CAR 93–077, 20 October 1993, p. 18.

55 The themes in this paragraph run through Byrd and Lin, China's Rural Industry.

56 Oi, Rural China Takes Off, p. 179.

57 The very best study of how localities have manipulated the fiscal and monetary tools can be found in World Bank, China: Macroeconomic Stability in A Decentralized Economy Report No. 13399–CHA, 26 October 1994. See also Oi, Rural China Takes Off, chs. 2,4 and 5, Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China, ch. 4, and Singh, “Industrial policies for an economy in transition.”

58 This has been noted in the Chinese press. Thus, one official in Anhui called upon localities to “change the idea of helping enterprises by relying solely on reduction of tax payment and profit delivery …[and] help enterprises enter the market to participate in fair competition.” As another article put it, the goal of local government should be to get enterprises out of the habit of “looking for the mayor rather than the market.” FBIS Daily Report: China (hereafter FBIS-CHI), 3 May 1994, p. 48 and JPRS-C AR 93–034,24 May 1993, p. 15.

59 This argument is made by Blecher in “Developmental state, entrepreneurial state.” Similar points are made in David Granick's study of the Chinese reform, Chinese State Enterprises, pp. 1 and 17 and Dorothy Solinger's book China's Transition from Socialism, parts 2 and 3.

60 In her Political Logic of Economic Reform Susan Shirk deals with these issues in a somewhat different fashion. For example, although hers is an institutionalist analysis which seeks to demonstrate that some Leninist systems have a greater potential for reform than others, her emphasis seems to be on strategy. Specifically, she seeks to show how cultivating support among provincial leaders gave Deng Xiaoping the political power to affect a “market” reform in the absence of political reform. Her focus is thus more on strategy – the creation of allies for reform among the provinces - than on the impact of pre-reform structure. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the provinces are allies of reform since by her own account they sabotage the major industrial reform initiative of the 1980s (the “tax for profit” plan) and, in the end, freeze reform at a mid-point that is consistent with their bureaucratic interests. The latter point is, of course, consistent with my analysis above. However, it appears to contradict the central thesis of her book, to wit, that alliance with provinces can bring significant changes in the nature of China's Soviet style economy. For a further critique of this book see my forthcoming review in The Journal of Interdisciplinary History.

61 For a comprehensive review of the convergence literature of the 1960s and 1970s see Taubman, William C., “The change to change in Communist systems,” in Morton, Henry W. and Rudolf, Tokes (eds.), Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970s (New York: Free Press, 1974).Google Scholar

62 White, Riding the Tiger, pp. 198–99.

63 For a useful review of the Western literature that followed Tiananmen, see Xin, Gu, “A civil society and public sphere in post-Mao China? An overview of Western publications,” China Information, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (Winter 1993–1994), pp. 38–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a survey of Chinese views see Ma, Shu-Yun, “The Chinese discourse on civil society,” The China Quarterly, No. 137 (March 1994), pp. 180–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

64 Strand, David, “Protest in Beijing: civil society and the public sphere in China,” Problems of Communism, Vol. XX, No. 3 (May-June 1990), pp. 1–19.Google Scholar Mayfair Yang also spoke of a “civil society now reemerging” as a result of the reforms. “Between state and society: the construction of corporateness in a Chinese socialist factory,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 22 (July 1989), pp. 35–38. The debate on civil society in late Qing and Republican China can be found in Modern China, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 1993).

65 Cheng, Li and Iii, Lynn White, “China's technocratic movement and the World Economic Herald” Modern China, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 1991), pp. 342–388CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Wank, David L., “Private business, bureaucracy, and political alliance in a Chinese city,” The Australian Journal of International Affairs, No. 33 (January 1995), pp. 55–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Solinger, China's Transition From Socialism, ch. 11, and Pearson, China's New Business Elites (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).

66 Indeed, even as he made bold statements regarding the “radical social and ultimately political repercussions” of “market oriented economic reforms,” Gordon White found that the organizations which have emerged (or further evolved) since the reforms have been dominated by the party/state and have shown few traces of significant autonomy. White, Gordon, “Prospects for civil society in China: a case study of Xiaoshan city,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29 (January 1993), pp. 63–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For similar conclusions, see Shue, “State power and social organization in China,” pp. 64–85.

67 Pearson, China's New Business Elites, p. 181.

68 See Unger, Jonathan and Chan, Anita, “Chinese corporatism: a developmental state in East Asian context,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 33 (January 1995), pp. 29—53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar A similar process occurred more than a decade earlier in the study of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe when dissatisfaction with the modernization/pluralism approach led some to look to corporatism. Ekiert, Grzegorz, “Democratization processes in East Central Europe: a theoretical reconsideration,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, Part 3 (July 1991), pp. 285–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

69 The locus classicus for the concept of corporatism can be found in the writings of Philippe Schmitter. See his “Still a century of corporatism,”The Review of Politics, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January 1974), pp. 93–96 and “Modes of interest intermediation and models of societal change in Western Europe,” in Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hill: Sage Publications, 1979).

70 This discussion is drawn from Chan, Anita, “Revolution or corporatism? Workers and trade unions in post-Mao China,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29 (January 1993), pp. 36–37.Google Scholar It is she who cites Alex Pravda and Blair Ruble, A., “Communist trade unions: varieties of dualism,” in Alex, Pravda and Ruble, Blair A. (eds.), Trade Unions in Communist States (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), pp. 1–21.Google Scholar

71 The first term is Unger and Chan's, the second is Chan's and the third is Margaret Pearson's. See her “The Janus face of business associations in China: socialist corporatism in foreign enterprises,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 31 (January 1994), pp. 25–6.

72 Schmitter, “Still a century of corporatism,” p. 97.

73 Unger and Chan, “Chinese corporatism,” pp. 50–52, Pearson, China's New Business Elites, p. 187 and Wank, “Private business, bureaucracy, and political alliance.”

74 Schmitter has proposed two varieties of corporatism: “societal” and “state.”

75 Pearson, “The Janus face of business associations in China,” p. 47 and Unger and Chan's view, “Chinese Corporatism,” pp. 52–53. For the hollowness of the distinction between societal corporatism and pluralism see Cohen, Youssef and Pavoncello, Franco, “Corporatism and pluralism: a critique of Schmitter's typology,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January 1987), pp. 117–122CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Martin, Ross M., “Pluralism and the new corporatism,” Political Studies, Vol. XXXI, No. 1 (1983), pp. 86–102CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Cox, Andrew, “The old and new testaments of corporatism: is it a political form or a method of policy-making,” Political Studies, Vol. XXXVI (1988), pp. 294–308.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

76 For an interesting discussion of how past state-dominated economic growth affects future trajectories see Jayasuriya, Kanishka, “Political economy of democratization in East Asia,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall-Winter 1994), pp. 141–180.Google Scholar

77 White, Riding the Tiger, pp. 126–27.

78 This is a theme that has figured prominently in two recent essay collections. Goodman and Hooper, China's Quiet Revolution and Walder, The Waning of the Communist State. See, particularly, Andrew Walder, “The quiet revolution from within: economic reform as a source of political decline,” in the latter for a strong argument regarding the importance of going beyond a focus on civil society to one on the state. Other useful discussions of the relationship between state and society can be found in Solinger, China's Transition from Socialism, ch. 11 and Perry, Elizabeth J., “Trends in the study of state-society relations,” The China Quarterly, No. 139 (September 1994), pp. 704–713.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

79 Assessing the impact of partial economic reform on China's political structure is complicated in the first instance by definitional issues; in particular, the loose manner in which the term “local government” is used to identify political jurisdictions from the township up to the province. The influence of reform policies has differed between political jurisdictions depending on the predominant type of economy (“state” at the higher levels, “non-state” below the county) and the wealth of the particular area. In addition, it is unclear how each of these political subdivisions relates to the other. Although it is likely that the views and resources of provincial authorities are influenced by the vibrant economies at the county level and below, this relationship remains opaque. See Chung, Jae Ho in “Studies of central provincial relations in the People's Republic of China: a mid-term appraisal,” The China Quarterly, No. 142 (September 1995), p. 485.Google Scholar

80 For recent book-length discussions of the economic issues see Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China, World Bank, Macroeconomic Stability in a Decentralized Economy, and Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin, Changing Central-Local Relations in China. The disparity between the central government's ambitions and the resources at its disposal is a theme of Barry Naughton's piece in this volume. It is also argued vigorously in Shaoguang Wang, “The rise of regions: fiscal reform and the decline of central state fiscal capacity in China,” in Walder, The Waning of the Communist State. Andrew Walder's discussion can be found in his introduction to the latter, pp. 1–24 and in “The decline of communist power: elements of a theory of institutional change,” Theory and Society, No. 23 (April 1994), pp. 297–323.

81 The quotations are from Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China, p. 121 and Zhao, Suisheng, “From coercion to negotiation: the changing central local economic relationship in Mainland China,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 28, No. 10 (October 1992), pp. 1–22.Google Scholar

82 Gabriella Montinola, Qian, Yingyi and Weingast, Barry, “Federalism, Chinese style: the political basis for economic success in China,” unpublished paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1993, revised version in World Politics, Vol. 48 (October 1995), pp. 50–81.Google Scholar

83 Ibid. p. 8. As Walder notes in the introduction to this volume, the authors suggest that local democratic reforms might arise out of federalism.

84 Ibid. p. 26. Later (p. 30), the authors add infrastructural investment to the list of the central government's tasks.

85 Two works which explicitly address these questions are Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China and World Bank, Macroeconomic Stability in a Decentralized Economy, p. 59. It should be noted that while this latter study cites the literature on “market preserving federalism,” its emphasis is clearly on the need for strong central authority to complement local freedom.

86 Kumar, China: Internal Market Development and Regulation, p. 167. The earlier quotation is from p. xiv.

87 Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China, pp. 361–62.

88 For suggestions of a similar view see White, The Road to Crisis, introduction, and Peter Nolan, “Prospects for the Chinese economy,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, No. 15 (1991), p. 123.

89 In general, while Montinola et al. recognize these kinds of problems, they appear more sanguine than I would be regarding the ability of local governments, rooted in Leninism, to support and respect markets. Jeremy Paltiel discusses the problems of political systems managing economies for which they were not “programmed” in his “China: Mexicanization or market reform,” in James Caporaso (ed.), The Elusive State (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), p. 258. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry analyses the difficulties of a transition from planned to market economies in her “The myths of the market and the common history of late developers,” Politics and Society, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 245–274. For a useful Chinese discussion along these lines see FBIS-CHI 94–048, 11 March 1994, pp. 50–53.

90 For a report of a confrontation between Jiang Zemin and local officials see FBIS-CHI 95–023,3 February 1995, pp. 10–13. For other evidence of the Party Centre using its political tools see ibid. 94–229, 29 November 1994, p. 27, 94–238, 12 December 1994, p. 20 and 94–232,2 December 1994, p. 10. Convenient summaries of the reform policies that emerged in 1993–94 can be found in World Bank, Macroeconomic Stability in a Decentralized Economy, Maurice, Brosseau and Lo, Chi Kin (eds.), China Review, 1994 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1994)Google Scholar, chs. 9 and 10 and Toshide Mito, “1994 tax reform and the future,” China Newsletter, No. 116 (May-June 1995), pp. 18–23.

91 JPRS-CAR 94–035, 3 June 1994, p. 1.

92 Wong, Christine, “China's economy: the limits of gradualist reform,” in William, Joseph (ed.), China Briefing, 1984 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 52.Google Scholar