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2. See Thomson, J. C., “Communist policy and the united front in China, 1935–36,” in Papers on China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University), Vol. 11 (12 1957), pp. 108–11 and 117Google Scholar; Inprecorr, Vol. 16, No. 2 (11 01 1936), p. 40Google Scholar; and Reznikov, A. B. and Grigoriev, A. M., “Georgi Dimitrov and the problems of the united anti-imperialist front,” in Georgi Dimitrov, An Outstanding Militant of the Comintern (Sofia, 1972), pp. 201–202.Google Scholar

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17. Van Slyke, , Enemies and Friends, p. 56.Google Scholar “Steady contacts” were re-established in June 1936, according to Braun, , Chinesische Aufzeichnungen, p. 230Google Scholar, and Reznikov, and Grigoriev, , “Georgi Dimitrov,” p. 203.Google Scholar But in June 1937 Chu Teh said there were still no radio links with Moscow; see Bisson, T. A., Yenan in June 1937: Talks with the Communist Leaders (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 41.Google Scholar

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19. Mō Takutō bunken shiryōkenkyū-kai, Mō Takutō shū (Tokyo: Hokuma sha, 1970–1972), Vol. 5, pp. 25 and 32.Google Scholar

20. Ibid. pp. 13–14 and 30.

21. Ibid. p. 34.

22. The Communist International, Vol. 13, No. 5 (05 1936), p. 305.Google Scholar Similar criticisms were recently echoed by a Russian commentator, who wrote that “it was not easy for the CCP to take the sharp turn from agrarian revolution” and that “the main obstacle on the road to realizing the new tactical line was the left sectarian mood in the leadership of the CCP”; see Delyusin, , Comintern i Vostok, pp. 353 and 359.Google Scholar

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39. Reznikov, and Grigoriev, , “Georgi Dimitrov,” p. 204.Google Scholar

40. Delyusin, , Comintern i Vostok, p. 361.Google Scholar

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43. Ibid. p. 72; parts of Chiang's version are independently confirmed in Snow, , Random Notes, p. 7.Google Scholar

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46. The letter was apparently in reply to feelers Chiang put out through his military attaché in Moscow; see Braun, , Chinesische Aufzeichnungen, p. 237–38.Google Scholar

47. “Centralization” would be a more correct translation.

48. The Communist International. Vol. 13, No. 1 (01 1937), p. 809.Google Scholar

49. Inprecorr, Vol. 16, No. 44 (26 09 1936).Google Scholar

50. According to contemporary pro-Moscow sources, the call for a democratic republic was originally recommended by Dimitrov in a Comintern letter to the CCP; see Reznikov, and Grigoriev, , “Georgi Dimitrov,” p, 205.Google Scholar But even if this were so, the China-based leaders subsequently put much more stress on this qualifying clause than their Comintern counterparts.

51. Text in Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, pp. 174–81.Google Scholar

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56. According to Reznikov, and Grigoriev, , “Georgi Dimitrov,” p. 208Google Scholar, the telegram was “edited and signed” by Dimitrov. It was apparently common for Dimitrov to edit or supervise Wang's material on the Chinese situation.

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60. Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, p. 230.Google Scholar

61. Text in Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, pp. 272–73.Google Scholar

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63. Van Slyke, , Enemies and Friends, pp. 83–87.Google Scholar

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65. Reznikov, and Grigoriev, , “Georgi Dimitrov,” p. 208.Google Scholar See also Braun, , Chinesische Aufzeichnungen, pp. 260–61.Google Scholar

66. SW, Vol. 1, pp. 281–82.Google Scholar According to Reznikov, and Grigoriev, , “Georgi Dimitrov,” p. 209Google Scholar, these policy changes were “recommended” to the CCP on 20 January 1937 by the Comintern.

67. Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, pp. 248–52.Google Scholar

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72. Ibid. p. 59 and Mō Takutō shū, Vol. 5, pp. 301–302.Google Scholar

73. SW. Vol. 2, p. 59.Google Scholar

74. The Communist International, Vol. 14, Nos. 7–8, pp. 1117–128.Google Scholar

75. The following candid remarks of Bogomoloff, then Soviet ambassador to China, show the thinking of Wang's Comintern superiors in this period: “All that China wants is to be left alone. A spirit of nationalism is gradually asserting itself, and the nation is slowly being unified.… We believe that by supporting and assisting the Central Government we can help to make China strong. By assisting in the development of communications, a gradual economic unification will take place. This will lead to political unification. There will be no more civil wars in China” (quoted in Abend, Hallet, My Life in China, 1926–41 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943), p. 239).Google Scholar

76. Braun, , Chinesische Aufzeichnungen, p. 263.Google Scholar

77. SW, Vol. 2, p. 65.Google Scholar

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79. SW, Vol. 1, pp. 273–75.Google Scholar

80. Bisson, , Yenan in June 1937, pp. 57–59.Google Scholar

81. Ming-pao yüeh-k'an, No. 61 (01 1971), p. 90Google Scholar; Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, pp. 328–30Google Scholar; Braun, , Chinesische Aufzeichnungen, p. 301.Google Scholar

82. SW, Vol. 2, pp. 61–70.Google Scholar

83. Lattimore, Owen, “Unpublished report from Yenan,” in Ch'en, Jerome and Tarling, N., Studies in the Social History of China and South-East Asia (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 160–61Google Scholar; and Bisson, , Yenan in June 1937, pp. 53–55.Google Scholar

84. Brandt, C., Schwartz, B. and Fairbank, J., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 247–57.Google Scholar

85. Mō Takutō shū, Vol. 5, pp. 288–89 and 294.Google Scholar

86. SW, Vol. 2, pp. 72–73.Google Scholar

87. Ibid. p. 67.

88. Braun, , Chinesische Aufzeichnungen, p. 273.Google Scholar

89. After Stalin's death, however, Peking admitted that some of the opportunist lines in the history of the Party “arose under the influence of certain mistakes of Stalin's, insofar as their international sources were concerned. In the late Twenties, the Thirties and early and mid-Forties, the Chinese Marxist-Leninists … resisted the influence of Stalin's mistakes”; see On the Question of Stalin (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 8.Google Scholar

90. This list draws on Hua, Hu, Chung-kuo ke-ming shih chiang-i, pp. 380–82Google Scholar; Piao, Lin, Long Live the Victory of People's War! (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 15–16Google Scholar; Po-ta, Ch'en in Hsüeh-hsi, 1 07 1951, pp. 14–15Google Scholar; and Ch'u-huang, Miao, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chien-yao li-shih (Peking: Hsüeh-hsi tsa-chih she, 1957), pp. 118–19.Google Scholar

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96. SW, Vol. 2, p. 61 footnote.Google Scholar

97. Braun, , Chinesische Aufzeichnungen, pp. 305–306Google Scholar; Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, pp. 333–35.Google Scholar

98. Ming-pao yüeh-k'an 01 1971, pp. 90–92.Google Scholar For Wang's anti-Trotskyism, see Shao-yü, Ch'en, Chiu-kuo yen-lun hsüan-chi, pp. 233–40.Google Scholar But according to Braun, Otto, Chinesische Aufzeichnungen, p. 340Google Scholar, Wang warned him not to return to Moscow because of the purges.

99. Text in Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, pp. 360–64.Google Scholar

100. Mō Takutō shū, vol 6, p. 22Google Scholar – edited out of the text in the Selected Works, Vol. 2.

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2. Text in P'ing Fan (pseud), Shih-nien lai ti chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang (Shanghai: Nan-hua ch'u-pan she, 1938), pp. 176–80.Google Scholar

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4. Ibid. p. 286.

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12. Mō Takutō shū, Vol. 6, p. 241.Google Scholar

13. Ibid. p. 202.

14. SW, Vol. 4, p. 167.Google Scholar Mao was unusually successful in getting the Comintern's approval. He told the Plenum that the Comintern was in “complete agreement” with the new policies (Mō Takutō shū, Vol. 6, p. 166). It was only after the KMT's first anti-Communist “upsurge” and the Comintern's new “left” line after the Hitler-Stalin pact that Mao, in late 1939, once again took up the idea of communist leadership in the resistance and in the post-war.

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19. Ibid. pp. 37–39.

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23. Cf. Mao's attack at the Sixth Plenum on those Party members who were “willing only to work in Party organizations and in the mass movement but [were] unwilling to study or participate in warfare” or to “encourage students to go to the front” (SW, Vol. 2, p. 222).Google Scholar

24. Hua, Hu, Chung-kuo ko-ming shih chiang-i, p. 381Google Scholar (mostly taken from the partial translation in Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, pp. 469–70.)Google Scholar

25. Chou was a supporter of the Wang line: see, for example, En-lai, Chou, Tsui-chin yen-lun (Canton, 1938)Google Scholar, and En-lai, Chou, Ming, Wang et al. , K'ang-chan ti hsin hsing-shih yü hsin ts'e-lüeh (Hankow, 1938).Google Scholar Chou's enthusiasm for the united front at one point led the KMT bureau of investigation to believe that he was about to sever his links with the CCP (Hsu, Kai-yu, Chou En-lai: China's Grey Eminence (New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 149–50.Google Scholar The Tai wanese view is that “in the discharge of united front operations, Chou was a supporter of the Wang Ming line” (Kuo, Warren, “Chou En-lai,” in Issues and Studies, Vol. 8, No. 10 (07 1972), pp. 42–51).Google Scholar

26. SW, Vol. 2, p. 187.Google Scholar

27. Ibid. p. 173.

28. Ibid. p. 180.

29. Ibid. p. 187.

30. Shao-yü, Ch'en, Chiu-kuo yen-lun hsüan-chi, pp. 329–39.Google Scholar

31. Smedley, Agnes, Battle Hymn of China (London: Victor Gollancz, 1944), p. 145Google Scholar; Van Slyke, Lyman P. (ed.), The Chinese Communist Movement (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 67.Google Scholar

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33. Chün, Ch'en, Hsin-ssu-chün man-chi, p. 9.Google Scholar This information was edited out of the CCP's official English translation of Hsiang's speech (New China Information Committee, Bulletin, Chungking, No. 10, pp. 13–27).Google Scholar

34. Hsing-huo liao-yuan. Vol. 6, p. 379–80.Google Scholar

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36. Ibid. p. 330. In early October Chou En-lai backtracked on this analysis in a Hsin-hua jih-pao editorial. He wrote “… we must point out that the gain or loss of Wuhan cannot be considered as vital to the extended war of resistance. This is to prevent the psychology of pessimism and vacillation as well as any attempt to win an unstable victory at all costs.… For this reason, the defensive battle for Wuhan, though the better, should not become an attempt to stake everything when conditions disallow its indefinite defence” (quoted in Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, p. 444).Google Scholar

37. SW, Vol. 2, p. 67.Google Scholar

38. Mō Takutō shū, Vol. 5, p. 332.Google Scholar

39. Ibid. Vol. 6, pp. 193–94.

40. See also Mao's remarks on this question at the Plenum, Sixth, Mō Takutō shū, Vol. 6, pp. 187–89.Google Scholar

41. Hung-ch'i, No. 8 (1973), p. 40.Google Scholar

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43. One of the main criticisms Wang directed at the Party in mid-1937 was the “exceptional weakness” of work among the urban working class. This field should be the Party's first priority. Most cadres were of peasant background and had “no idea of the workers' movement in the big towns.” It would be “by no means an easy task” to re-educate them to work in this new field. The CCP should therefore devote its primary efforts to winning new working-class cadres; see Fan, P'ing (pseud.), Shih-nien lai ti chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang, pp. 156–64.Google Scholar According to Braun, , Chinesische Aufteichnungen, p. 325Google Scholar, Wang also proposed 37. stepping up work among the urban proletariat at the Sixth Plenum. Mao opposed this, saying that the centre of gravity should be the countryside, in order to prepare for civil war.

44. Snow, , Red Star Over China, p. 505Google Scholar, see Ch'en Shao-yü, Ying, Hsiang et al. , Ying-yung fen-tou shih-ch'i nienGoogle Scholar, passim, for the Wang group's emphasis on the urgent need for proletarianization.

45. Shao-yü, Ch'en, Chiu-kuo yen-tun hsüan-chi, pp. 360–63Google Scholar and Kuo, , Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 3, pp. 442–43.Google Scholar

46. Piao, Lin, Long Live the Victory, p. 16.Google Scholar

47. Shao-yü, Ch'en, Chiu-kuo yen-lun hsüan-chi, pp. 340–41.Google Scholar

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49. Ibid. p. 195 footnote.

50. Mō Takut¯ shū, Vol. 6, p. 166.Google Scholar Only a small portion of this speech was subsequently republished in the Selected Works.

51. Braun, , Chinesische Aufzeichnungen, p. 326Google Scholar, says Mao “outtrumped” Ch'en Tu-hsiu's right opportunism through this proposal. In reality, as I have shown, the proposal was Wang's.

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53. Since Mao's concluding speech directly contradicted or threw into a new light much of On the New Stage, it is no wonder that he waited a decade before making parts of it public (in the 1948 Tung-pei shu-tien edition of his works, pp. 179–81). The 1948 text is practically identical to that of the post-1951 Selected Works, and I have therefore quoted from the official translation of the latter. Judging from the other material in the 1948 edition, the practice of doctoring texts had not yet started. The published fragments of Mao's concluding Plenum speech are therefore almost certainly authentic.

54. Mō Takutō shū, Vol. 1, p. 253–59.Google Scholar

55. Cited approvingly by Wang Shih-wei in “Wild Lily,” Chieh-fang jih-pao, 26 03 1942, p. 42.Google Scholar Shih-wei shared Mao's dislike for Russophile dogmatists.

56. Ming, Wang, Lenin, Leninism and the Chinese Revolution, p. 15.Google Scholar

57. McClane, , Soviet Policy, p. 122.Google Scholar

58. K'ang-Jih min-tsu t'ung-i chan-hsien chih-nan, Vol. 7 (1940).Google Scholar

59. Ming, Wang, China: Cultural Revolution or Counter Revolutionary Coup?, p. 49.Google Scholar

60. Delyusin, L. P., Comintern i Vostok, p. 377.Google Scholar

61. For a Soviet report of Wang's death, see The China Quarterly, No. 58 (1974), pp. 410–11.Google Scholar