1. PWD was the joint Anglo-American psychological warfare organization in Europe during the war. Moltmann, Günter, “Zur Formulierung der amerikanischen Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 15 (06 1967)Google Scholar; and Chase, John L., “Unconditional Surrender Reconsidered,” Political Science Quarterly 70 (1955).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. JCS 1067, in Germany 1947–1949: The Story in Documents (Department of State, US Government Printing Office), 21–33Google Scholar. Also see Clay, Lucius D., Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y., 1950), 16 ffGoogle Scholar. And for a detailed analysis of JCS 1067 and its implementation by Military Government, see Gimbel, John, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949 (Stanford, Calif., 1968).Google Scholar

3. JCS 1067. A similar long-term positive notion was also contained in PWD policy where the ultimate restoration of Germany to the “world family of democratic nations” was laid down. See Standing Directive for Psychological Warfare Against Members of the German Armed Forces, quoted in Lerner, Daniel, Psychological Warfare against Nazi Germany: The Sykewar Campaign, D-Day to VE-Day (New York, 1949; reprint, Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 351Google Scholar.

4. Cover letter, 7 May 1945, from McClure to Chief of Staff, re: Directive No. 1 for Prop aganda of Overt Allied Information Services, plus Directive No. 1; archives of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in the United States National Archives, Modern Military Branch, Record Group 331 (henceforth PWD); PWD 53. Also see cover letter for “Proposed Directive No. 2 for Information Control Services,” 28 May 1945, from McClure, to Robert Murphy, C. Steel, and G-5 Division; PWD 53.

5. Directive No. 1.

6. Memo 16 Apr. 1945, from William S. Paley, Col., Dep. Chief PWD, to Maj. Gen. Bishop (Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office) and Mr. Philip Hamblet (OWI), re: Radio Propaganda to Allied Occupied Germany; PWD 2.

7. “Germany after the War, Round Table,” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 15, no. 3 (1945)Google Scholar. Especially see p. 385 regarding anti-Nazis. Also for views from the occupation see Rodnick, David, Postwar Germans: An Anthropologist's Account (New Haven, 1948)Google Scholar, and Schaffner, Bertram, Father Land: A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family (New York, 1948)Google Scholar. For a more nuanced interpretation of “guilt” see Jaspers, Karl, The Question of German Guilt (New York, 1961).Google Scholar

8. Hurwitz, Harold, Die Stunde Null der deutschen Presse: Die amerikanische Pressepolitik in Deutschland 1845–1949 (Cologne, 1972), 33.Google Scholar

9. Hurwitz, 64. Also see Niethammer, Lutz, Borsdorf, Ulrich, Brandt, Peter, eds., Arbeiterinitiative 1945: Antifaschistische Ausschüsse und Reorganisation der Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland (Wuppertal, 1976), 107–11Google Scholar for a discussion of different views in the US Administration, particularly views of the State Department.

10. This connection between unconditional surrender and collective guilt is clearly set forth in the Statement prepared for the German Committee (OWI) meeting, 20 Apr. 1945, from Norman Cousins; PWD 44, where it is stated, “All our publications, informational or propaganda activities must be directly related to and flow out of the policy of unconditional surrender, which is even more a political than a military concept.”

11. Norman, Albert, Our German Policy: Propaganda and Culture (New York, 1946), 14–15Google Scholar; and see Hartenian, Larry, “Propaganda and the Control of Information in Occupied Germany: The US Information Control Division at Radio Frankfurt 1945–1949” (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1984)Google Scholar, for further evidence.

12. As stated in the Manual for the Control of German Information Services, “This long-term education can be accomplished only by the Germans themselves. And those few Germans willing and able to do it can be successful only if, under our supervision, media of information are opened to them and closed to those in whom the spirit of aggression survives. It lies with us, through the fact of victory, to place the control of opinion-forming instruments where we will. The success or failure of our information services control will be determined finally by the contribution which it makes to the task of eliminating Nazis and militarists from the control of German information services and placing that control in the hands of Germans who can be trusted to use it well.” Manual for the Control of German Information Services, 4; PWD 37.

13. Dunner, Joseph, “Information Control in the American Zone of Germany, 1945–1946,” in American Experiences in Military Government in World War II, Friedrich, Carl J. and Associates, eds. (New York, 1948), 288Google Scholar; and see Niethammer et al. Also see Krieger, Leonard, “The Interregnum in Germany: March–August 1945,” Political Science Quarterly 64 (1949): 507–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14. Directive No. 1.

15. See Guidance on Treatment of Information on Anti-Nazi Resistance in Germany, 7 June 1945, PWD 40, where it is stated that if recordings by active anti-Nazis are used, “The individual must speak purely as an individual telling his story straight and must not be permitted to air his political views.” All the same, by this time reports of resistance by anti-Nazi individuals or groups were permissible if evidence was “completely ‘hard,’” but still there was to be “no campaign on this theme at present.”

16. Memo, 22 Aug. 1945, to Members of German Committee, OWI, from Mildred Allen, Secretary German Committee, re: Gerald Mayer's Two Day Visit with ICD; archives of the Office of Military Government United States, in the United States National Archives, Washington National Records Center, Record Group 260 (henceforth OMGUS), OMGUS 267 3/5, 269 1/5 3/5.

17. Norman, 26.

18. History ICD, OMGUS, 8 May 1945–30 June 1946, p. 5; OMGUS 242 1/5. Indeed the cover letter for Directive No. 2 stated that Directive No. 1 put forth the harsh policy “even at the cost of discouraging the democratic elements in Germany.”

19. Early on in the occupation there were some changes in US propaganda policy. Indeed Directive No. 1 was conceived as a short-term directive. The most important example is Directive No. 2 for Information Control Services, which came into effect just one week after Directive No. 1. The justification for Directive No. 2 was specifically related to the negative impact of Directive No. 1 on “democratic elements,” who “might regard the indictment [collective guilt] as unfairly applied to them.” Intelligence reports indicated that “a continuance of the present line may have a boomerang effect; and in particular may now begin seriously to de moralize those elements on which Military Government must increasingly rely for German self-help in the coming critical months.” A “measure of positive encouragement” for those Germans “ready and willing to shoulder heavy responsibilities and to work with a will,” was therefore called for. The actual change, however, was rather limited. As it was summed up, “Propaganda policy must be ruthless toward Nazis and militarists; hard to the German nation as a whole; but offering some positive encouragement to democratic elements.”

Although Directive No. 2 may have recognized the need for and directed that the roughest edge of the initial austerity be removed, the austere policy in general and collective guilt in particular remained in effect. Directive No. 2 did, however, institute a change in the propagation of collective guilt. One of the objectives of the directive was “To continue reeducation by the provision of hard, unemotional information on war guilt and the structure and system of National Socialism, differentiating clearly between the active guilt of the criminal, which can only be atoned by punishment, and the passive guilt of the people as a whole, which can be atoned for by hard work, national restitution and a change of heart.” That is, though collective guilt was still propagated, a distinction was made between the “active guilt” of the criminal and the “passive guilt” of the population as a whole. See cover letter for Directive No. 2, 28 May 1945, from McClure to Robert Murphy, C. Steel and G-5 Division, re: Proposed Directive No. 2, and Directive No. 2, 28 May 1945. Apparently, however, the nuance of the adjectives active and passive was lost behind the force of the noun, guilt.

A few days later, resting on the active/passive distinction, McClure went on to direct that Allied Information Services “distinguish legal responsibility (such as falls upon Nazi and militarist leaders, SS guards, etc.) from moral responsibility (such as rests with all those who supported or condoned the regime).” See Guidance on Propaganda Treatment of Individual German Responsibilities, 31 May 1945, signed McClure; PWD 40.

20. Norman, 14–16, and 23–24.

21. Policy: German Guilt, I7 Jan. 1946; OMGUS 242 1/5. Emphasis in original.

22. Ibid.

23. This evidence can be seen especially in the campaign talks given by German party leaders and candidates for the Communal elections in the US Zone at the end of January 1946. Another shift in emphasis in US Zone output can be seen in the increased reporting on German self-help, i.e., instances of rubble clearing, restoration of services, preservation of cultural artifacts, resto ration of political parties and German administrations, etc. See BBC Daily Digest for 1946; the BBC monitoring service of broadcasts in the US Zone; BBC Written Archives Centre, Reading, Great Britain.

24. Quoted in Gehring, Hansjörg, Amerikanische Literaturpolitik in Deutschland 1945–1953: Ein Aspekt des Re-Education-Programms (Stuttgart, 1976), 20–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Memo from Clay to McClure, 13 Dec. 1945. As with the propaganda theme of collective guilt, so too with the transfer of media responsibility to Germans, incremental changes leading up to the major policy change can be seen. For personnel, the most significant development goes back to 4 Sept. 1945, when Directive No. 4 for Control of German Information Services was issued. See Draft Directive No. 4, attached as Tab A to Cover letter, 9 Aug. 1945 to Chief of Staff, from McClure; OMGUS 270 2/5. Also see Hurwitz, I22ff. and History ICD, OMGUS 8 May 1945–30 June 1946, 8ff.

25. Memo, I7 Jan. 1946, quoted in Norman, 27. It is important to point out, however, that not all of Clay's instructions and recommendations were readily enacted. A contrary example can be seen in this same memo where he instructed that a political party press be established. Also, on 14 Dec. 1945, Clay argued that “the actions of Military Government at the earliest possible date should be restricted to disapproval of personnel rather than to their selection.” See Norman, 27. There was, however, another instruction in the 17 Jan. 1946 memo that was more in line with McClure's thinking, which would be enacted and which would have long-term significance for ICD propaganda in Germany. Here Clay instructed “to continue for an indefinite period of time to exercise policy control over German radio broadcasting.”

26. History ICD, OMGUS, 8 May 1945–30 June 1946, 87.

27. Dunner, 276–91. Mettler, Barbara, Demokratisierung und Kalter Krieg: Zur amerikanischen Informations- und Rundfunkpolitik in Westdeutschland 1945–1949 (Berlin, 1975), 92–98Google Scholar. Also see Manual for the Control of German Information Services, under heading “German Personnel.”

28. Historical Report on Radio Frankfurt Operations During the Period 25 Jan. 1946–30 June 1946, to Chief ICD, OMGH, from Herbert C.Gross, 21 June 1946, 8; OMGUS 154 2/8, where it is stated, “The task of recruiting German personnel to take over all operative functions was not an easy one. The first requirement, of course, was an unblemished political past on the part of all who were to have any share in informing, educating, and even entertaining the German population.”

29. History ICD, OMGUS, 8 May 1945–30 June 1946, 89.

30. Policy: German Guilt, 17 Jan. 1946. And as Albert Norman remarked in regard to this policy change, “in one very important respect American re-education policy continued un changed—it continued to remain negative. The position of Military Government was to be that of guardian, prohibiting and admonishing, rather than that of an instructor, teaching and pointing out the way,” Norman, 16.

31. Speier, Hans, “‘Re-education’–The U.S. Policy,” in Social Order and the Risks of War (1952; reprint ed.Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 397–414.Google Scholar

32. See the chapter, “Personnel and Programming at Radio Frankfurt, 1945–1949,” in Hartenian.

33. See Historical Report, 21 June 1946, Radio Frankfurt Operations (above, n. 28). For developments concerning Gaston Oulman, the official commentator, see Mettler, 96 and Bausch, Hans, Rundfunkpolitik nach 1945, Erster Teil 1945–1962 (Munich, 1980), 152–53Google Scholar. And for broad casts on Nuremberg at Radio Munich see Mettler, 100.

34. Mayer, Hans, Ein Deutscher auf Widerruf (Frankfurt, 1982), 340–41Google Scholar. Mayer was the Chief News Editor at Radio Frankfurt during the second half of 1946. Also see Mayer's radio talk on the Nuremberg verdict, 342–52, and in Mayer, Hans, Nach Jahr und Tag: Reden 1945–1977 (Frankfurt, 1978), 23–33.Google Scholar

35. Incoming Message, HQ, USFET, 30 Nov. 1945, Summary of German Guidance November 30th 1945: OMGUS 261 2/5 3/5.

36. Ibid.

37. As a result of this change of procedures at the Neue Zeitung the editor, Hans Habe, resigned his position on 11 Mar. 1946. Habe wrote that he resigned because he was not suited to be a mouthpiece (Sprachrohr) even when he agreed with the views that had to be voiced. See Habe, Hans, Im Jahre Null: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Presse (Munich, 1966), 136–39Google Scholar. It is also worth noting that Habe did not follow the instructions, rather he considerably “downplayed” the Churchill speech, and certainly downplayed the anticommunist aspects. See the Neue Zeitung front page, 8 Mar. 1946.

38. The view that there was no one time when anticommunism suddenly emerged in US Zone media was held by many people I interviewed. For developments at the Tagesspiegel see Hurwitz, 340–49.

39. Hurwitz, 327–28.

40. While it is not the purpose of this article to analyze Soviet “information control” and propaganda practices in occupied Germany, there can be no question that Soviet media in Germany and Soviet-controlled German media were instrumentalized to serve the propaganda goals of the Soviet occupation authorities. Clearly, however, the style of propaganda and control was strikingly different from that of ICD. And there is little question that ICD viewed the “covert” campaign as a response to the behavior of the Soviet information authorities in Ger many. See Hurwitz, 326–33, for a description of these developments in late 1946 and 1947. Hurwitz, however, does not recognize the onset of the covert ICD campaign in January 1947.

41. Outgoing Cable, 1 Mar. 1947, to AGWAR for WDSCA RO, from OMGUS signed Clay; OMGUS 246 2/5. This cable also cited subsequent Neue Zeitung articles published in support of the new campaign.

42. Memo 21 Feb. 1947, to Lewis from O. J. Brandes, Content Analysis; OMGUS 348 3/5 and 349 1/5.

43. Ibid. Already here some of the key elements of the later overt anticommunist campaign can be seen coming together.

44. The paper meant here is the Frankfurter Rundschau. Memo, 18 Feb. 1947, to Chief ICD, OMGH, from Howard W. Calkins, Press Control Officer, Frankfurt Scrutiny Report week ending 15 Feb. 1947; OMGUS 155 2/8. Also see additional Press Scrutiny Reports from Frankfurt: 8 Jan. 1947, 5 Mar. 1947, 14 Mar. 1947.

45. Outgoing Cable, 1 Mar. 1947, to AGWAR for WDSCA RO, from OMGUS signed Clay. DENA stood for Deutsche Nachrichten Agentur.

46. Guidances addressed not only ICD-devised propaganda-as-news, but the coverage, treatment, and play to be given to any important news story, any news and propaganda originating with the other occupiers, the appropriate news/propaganda buildup for events yet to take place, etc.

47. Cable, 18 Jan. 1947, to AGWAR for WDSCA RO, from OMGUS, signed Clay; OMGUS 246 2/5. As described by Clay, “no guidance will be fully implemented except in Neue Zeitung, on US Zone German radio and by suggestion to DENA. Implementation to licensed newspapers must be by indirect means.”

48. Mettler, 57.

49. Interview with Hans B. Meyer, at his home in Washington, D.C., on 9 Mar. 1982. Also see Mettler, 57.

50. Mettler, 118 ff. (emphasis in original). And see Horine's letter of resignation there, 199–201. Also for the views of an ICD control officer who carefully followed the genesis of ICD/MG policy and resigned from ICD earlier see Belfrage, Cedric, Seeds of Destruction (New York, 1954)Google Scholar.

51. Outgoing cable 1 Mar. 1947, where it is stated that “ODIC [Office of the Director of Information Control] does not issue guidance to licensed German press since it is unwise to publicly proclaim hands-off policy before publication and then build up file of guidances in German hands.”

52. Interview with Hans Mayer, at his home in Tübingen, 6 May 1981. Also see his book, Ein Deutscher auf Widerruf, and Hartenian, 280–83. Radio Munich commentator Herbert Gessner also quit at this time and went to Radio Berlin in the Soviet Zone, though his departure was more directly linked to his feeling of sham denazification procedures in Bavaria. Mettler, 119.

53. IC Weekly Summary, 5–12 Apr. 1947, under heading “Intelligence Branch”; OMGUS 234 2/5.

54. Mettler, n. 331, p. 158. Also see Hurwitz, 334, and Information Control Weekly Review 30, 19 July 1947, re: Economic Conditions and Reorientation; OMGUS 234 2/5. Also see Information Control Weekly Review 33, 30 Aug. 1947, re: Resistance to Reorientation Efforts; OMGUS 234 2/5.

55. For the transcript of the press conference in which Clay announced the campaign see, Smith, Jean Edward, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany 1945–1949, 2 vols. (Bloomington, Indiana, 1974), 451–59.Google Scholar

56. Minutes, 4 Nov. 1947, ICD Staff Conference; OMGUS 246 3/5.

57. Memo, no date, no signature, re: policy impact of Clay's 28 Oct. 1947 press conference; OMGUS 269 1/5 2/5 3/5, 267 1/5.

58. Ibid.

59. VIP (Vigorous Information Program) Directive, “MG Political Information Program,” cover letter dated 10 Feb. 1948, from G. H. Garde, to Land Military Governors, ICD, etc., re: VIP Directive; OMGUS 262 1/5, 261 1/5 2/5. Emphasis in original.

60. At his 28 October press conference, Clay of course did not come out and announce an “overt anticommunist propaganda campaign.” Indeed Clay's announcement was almost cryptic. He only spoke of “providing information to the German people” and most forcefully, “to defend the principles in which we believe and to attack those in which we don't believe.” Any explicit mention of an “anticommunist campaign” came only from the journalists present, though Clay did not counter this characterization. According to Clay, he went public with the campaign because his instructions at an earlier staff meeting had leaked out and were being “misinterpreted by [the] press.”

It also bears mentioning that although Clay had just recently returned from a trip to Washington, he apparently did not get prior approval to launch this campaign while there. Hinting at the earlier covert campaign, he countered Army concerns that he had issued a new “major policy” by remarking that “our new instructions would simply point up in direct fashion what we have done indirectly for many months.” See his comments at the press conference, and items 281 and 285, in Smith.

61. Memo, no date, but post-28 Oct. 1947, to Noce, from Textor; OMGUS 349 1/5.

62. Memo, no date, no signature, re: impact of Clay's 28 Oct. 1947 press conference. Here the adjective “overt” indicates that these media are official, publicly acknowledged Military Government media for the German population as opposed to German-run media for the German population. Concerning the German radio stations established during the occupation, MG reserved time for itself on these stations for official MG broadcasts. These official MG broadcasts were also referred to as “overt” even though they aired on German stations. See n. 63 below.

63. In the first position stood RIAS (Radio in the American Sector of Berlin). The value of RIAS was that as an overt American radio station (which was to remain a US station, i.e., it was neither planned nor considered to turn it over to German control, unlike the other US Zone stations) MG/ICD had under its direct control a station which could be devoted as much as was deemed necessary and in whatever manner to the anticommunist campaign. The broadcasting area of RIAS comprised virtually the entire Soviet Zone. Coverage of the remaining portions of the Soviet Zone was provided for by pushing the transmissions of Radio Frankfurt and Radio Munich into the Soviet Zone.

Radio Frankfurt, Radio Munich, Radio Stuttgart, and Radio Bremen—unlike RIAS—were not “overt” MG organs. Rather they were the newly established German radio stations under MG control. However, from the start of the occupation ICD had reserved broadcast time for itself on these German stations which was used for the broadcast of “overt” MG programs; i.e., official MG programs such as Voice of America, MG talks and announcements, etc. Furthermore, unlike the German press, the German radio stations were still under direct ICD control at this time, and subject to prebroadcast scrutiny and censorship, and subject to direct guidance implementation. This was the case until early 1949. Thus the need to distinguish between MG overt radio programs on German stations and German programming which itself was still directly controlled.

64. VIP Directive.

65. Memo, 6 Jan. 1948, to Reports Officer, from C. Lewis, Chief of Radio Branch, re: Policy Changes Radio Control Branch 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1947; OMGUS 242 2/5 3/5.

66. Advance transcript of radio talk, delivered 13 Nov. 1947, by Dr. Edward Lichtfield; Introduction to MG radio series “Freedom vs. Totalitarianism”; OMGUS 242 2/5 3/5.

67. Advance transcript of radio talk, delivered 27 Nov. 1947, by Gordon Textor; third in MG radio series “Freedom vs. Totalitarianism”; OMGUS 242 2/5 3/5.

68. Mettler, 79–83. The contrast between the treatment and coverage given the London Foreign Ministers Conference and the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference is instructive. Whereas in early 1947 the announcement of the Truman Doctrine came at the beginning of the Moscow Conference and was thus allowed to have a predictably negative effect on the course of the conference, for the reasons noted above in the text a similar approach to the London Foreign Ministers Conference was ruled out. See Fleming, Denna Frank, The Cold War and its Origins 1917–1960 (Garden City, N.Y., 1961), 465–76Google Scholar; Gimbel, 168 and 194 ff.; and Badstübner, Rolf and Thomas, Siegfried, Entstehung und Entwicklung der BRD: Restauration und Spaltung 1945–1955 (Cologne, 1979), 296 ff.Google Scholar

69. Semi-Monthly Summary for period 16–31 Dec. 1947; OMGUS 244 2/5 3/5.

70. Press Release, 16 Dec. 1947, “The American View”; OMGUS 242 2/5 3/5.

71. For example, see Memo, 22 Oct. 1945, to Powell, from Intelligence Section, re: Permanent Effects of Nazi Propaganda Lines; OMGUS 245 2/5 3/5. Also Merritt, Anna J. and Merritt, Richard L., eds., Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949 (Urbana, Chicago, London, 1970)Google Scholar, in particular Reports 84, 85, 100, 175. See especially ICD Opinion Survey No. 73, “A Guide to Some Propaganda Problems,” 28 Oct. 1947; OMGUS 246 3/5; also found in abbreviated form in Merritt and Merritt, Report 73.

72. Mettler, 67–68.

73. This was contrary to the VIP Directive which stated, “German Radio Programs (as distinguished from overt radio programs): All US controlled German language radio stations must maintain their objective and factual character as free and independent public service institutions.” And further, “The German information services will not be asked to take part in the program, but will be left free to treat it and the subject of communism as they see fit within existing directives.” Emphasis in original. See transcript of Clay's 28 Oct. press conference for statements to same effect.

74. Activities Reports, semi-monthly Jan.–Apr. 1948, monthly thereafter; Hessischer Rund-funk Archiv (henceforth HRA); HRA Ordner 45.

75. Amzon Press Reaction to General Clay Announcement of New Policy, 7 Nov. 1947; OMGUS 245 1/5, 244 3/5. Also cited in Mettler, 71. The report summarized the response of the German licensed press to Clay's announcement as follows:

“1. Germany is powerless, an object, not a subject of world policies and geographically very close to Russia. The anticommunist campaign is part of a quarrel to which Germany is no party. The overweening [sic] consideration for any German must be the reestablishment of German unity to which the new policy is no contribution.

“2. The announced campaign resembles drives ordered by Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry preceding aggressions.

“3. Solidarity with the Germans in SOVZON. (‘Our brothers on the other side of Elbe River.’)

“4. This is the time for radical reforms (‘social action’) in West Zones to prevent the two halves of Germany from drifting farther apart; (‘On the other hand we must try to convince Communists of importance of personal freedom.’).

“5. The press is prevented by lack of newsprint from fully discussing political philosophies. It is not quite fair that official MG organs now should get more paper unless the licensed press also gets increased allowance.”

76. Mettler, 71–73; and Hurwitz, 361–67.

77. Hurwitz, 367.

78. See Mettler, 73, where she comments, “That the German press did not, however, become a mouthpiece for American interests is shown by the subsequent overwhelmingly negative attitude in the issue of rearming and building up the German military.”

79. Reprinted in Belfrage, 231, from New York Herald Tribune, 21 Aug. 1947, under heading “Red Editor in Frankfurt is Dismissed by AMG.” Also see Belfrage, 211–32, and Hurwitz, 314–21. Also see letter, 3 Nov. 1947, to George S. Eyster, from Textor, where he remarks, “… the basis for revoking Carlebach's license was secret information which had nothing to do with his professional journalistic competence nor the evaluation of the Frankfurter Rundschau as a newspaper”; OMGUS 246 3/5. The letter does not indicate the nature of this secret information.

80. Monthly Summary, 30 Nov. 1948, ISD, OMGH Chief, from Kimental, Personnel Control and Scrutiny and Analysis Board; OMGUS 155 1/8. In 1948 ICD was renamed Information Services Division, ISD. For developments at Radio Munich, see Mettler, 118–27.

81. Smith, 1: 451–52. And see Mettler, 126, for MG media personnel who left for political reasons, and see her n. 496 for nonmedia personnel.

82. Memo, 4 Mar. 1948, to Director ICD, from F. N. Leonard, re: letter written by Mr. Cedric Belfridge [sic]; OMGUS 268 2/5 3/5.

83. Monthly Summary, 3 May 1949, ISD, OMGH, Personnel Control and Scrutiny and Analysis Board; OMGUS 155 1/8.

84. Memo, 16 Feb. 1949, to All Licensees of Hessian Newspapers, from Joseph M. Frankenstein, Dep. Chief Press Branch, re: Dr. Paul Laven; HRA Chronik 1949. Letter, 25 Feb. 1949, to Beckmann, from Rudert; HRA Chronik 1949.

85. Monthly Summary, 3 May 1949.

86. Memo, 4 Apr. 1949, to ISD, OMGH, from Kimental, re: Dr. Paul Laven; OMGUS 155 3/8.

87. Ibid.

88. Article in Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 Nov. 1947, cited by Mettler, 72.

89. VIP Directive.

90. Letter, 10 Feb. 1948, to Ambassador Murphy, from Friedrich Minssen, and attachment entitled, “Three Plans for Anti-Communist Information and Publications by Dr. Eberhard Taubert”; OMGUS 260 3/5. Taubert's three plans were: 1) a secret anticommunist information agency; 2) a public and political anticommunist movement in Western Europe; 3) anticommunist publications for the zone.

91. Letter, 21 Feb. 1948, from Taubert, to Ambassador Murphy; OMGUS 260 3/5.

92. Smith, 1: 456.