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The Perils of Eighteenth-Century Peacemaking: Austria and the Treaty of Belgrade, 1739

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Karl A. Roider Jr.
Karl A. Roider Jr.
Affiliation:
Louisiana State University
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Extract

The Treaty of Belgrade, concluded in 1739, ended over fifty years of Austrian expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. From the siege of Vienna in 1683 to the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718, the Austrians enjoyed almost absolute supremacy on the battlefield and at the peace table, forcing the Turks deep into the Balkan peninsula and adding to the Habsburg possessions such cities as Buda, Pest, Timişoara, Cluj, Debrecen, and finally Belgrade, guardian of the confluence of the Danube and Sava rivers and bastion of Austrian might in southeastern Europe. Given these successes and the apparent decline of the Ottoman state, in the 1720's and 1730's Austria appeared capable of establishing its hegemony over most of the remaining Turkish possessions in Europe.

Type
Articles
Information
Central European History , Volume 5 , Issue 3 , September 1972 , pp. 195 - 207
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1972

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References

1. For a general impression of the Habsburg army in the period from 1718 to 1736, perhaps the best work is Braubach, Max, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen, vols. IV and v (Vienna, 1965.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. Johann Graf Brown, “Türkenkrieg, welcher im Jahr 1737 angefangen und im Jahr 1739 mit dem Belgrader Frieden sich geendiget hat” (manuscript in Kriegsarchiv, Vienna), 1737, Appendix Q. This manuscript, although contained in five volumes, is divided not according to volume but to years of the war. The text for each year includes consecutive page numbers followed by many unnumbered appendices that do not correspond to individual volumes. Consequently I have used rather than volume numbers in references to this work.

3. The best published account of the Austrian military effort in the war of 1736–39 is von Angeli, Major Moriz, “Der Krieg mit der Pforte, 1736 bis 1739,” Mitteilungen des k.k. Kriegsarchivs (1881), pp. 147–298, 409–79.Google Scholar

4. Cassels, Lavender, Struggle for the Ottoman Empire, 1717–1740 (London, 1966), pp. 156–70.Google Scholar

5. le grand, Frédéric, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la maison de Brandenbourg (Berlin, 1846), p. 172.Google Scholar

6. Brown, “Türkenkrieg,” 1739, pp. 165–85. For troop strength see ibid., Appendix DD.

7. Ibid., 1739, p. 227.

8. Conference Protocol, July 31, 1739, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Staatskanzlei (hereafter cited as HHSA, SK), Vorträge, 49. The Privy Conference, called at various times Geheimer Rat, Geheime Konferenz, and Konferenzrt, discussed the major problems of the realm, composed policies, and recommended them to the Emperor. During the war of 1737–39, members included the Austrian court chancellor, Count Louis Sinzendorf, the president of the war ministry, Count Lothair Joseph Königsegg and after 1738 Count John Harrach, the president of the finance ministry Count Gundaker Thomas Starhemberg, and the conference minister of finances Count Aloysius Thomas Harrach. Secretary of the Privy Conference was the Emperor's favorite, John Christopher Bartenstein.

9. Regele, Oskar, “Die Schuld des Grafen Reinhard Wilhelm von Neippergs am Belgrader Frieden, 1739, und an der Niederlage bei Mollwitz, 1741,” Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs, VII (1954), 374.Google Scholar

10. Conference Protocol, Aug. 10, 1739, HHSA, SK, Vorträge, 49; Emperor to Neipperg, Aug. 11, 1739, HHSA, SK, Türkei, 220.

11. Emperor to Neipperg, Aug. 11, 1739, HHSA, SK, Türkei, 220. In a private letter written to Neipperg at the insistence of the Emperor, Francis Stephen of Lorraine, the Emperor's son-in-law, warned the count to say nothing to Wallis of his instructions and not to listen to Wallis's estimate of the military situation because “the [Field] Marshal depicts the state of the army as if he were discouraged and intimidated, completely unable to view the enemy without fear of being defeated.” Francis Stephen to Neipperg, Aug. 11, 1739, in Brown, “Türkenkrieg,” 1739, pp. 374–75.

12. Brown, “Türkenkrieg,” 1739, p. 351–64.

13. Wallis to war ministry, Aug. 21, 1739, ibid., 1739, pp. 412–18.

14. Schmettau to Wallis, Aug. 27, 1739, ibid., 1739, pp. 412–18.

15. Angeli, “Krieg mit der Pforte,” pp. 440–42.

16. Ibid., p. 252.

17. Marquis Botha d'Adorno (Austrian ambassador to Russia) to Emperor, Aug. 4, 1739, HHSA, SK, Russland, 20.

18. Emperor to Neipperg, Aug. 31, 1739, HHSA, SK, Türkei, 220.

19. Conference Protocol, Sept. 3, 1739, HHSA, SK, Vorträge, 49; Emperor to Neipperg, Sept. 5, 1739, HHSA, SK, Türkei, 220.

20. Neipperg to Emperor, Sept. 2, 1739, HHSA, SK, Türkei, 219.

21. Brown, “Türkenkrieg,” 1739, p. 226. For Neipperg's estimate of the situation on Aug. 12, 1739, see ibid., Appendix VVV.

22. Neipperg to Francis Stephen of Lorraine, Aug. 16, 1739, ibid., 1739, pp., 375–76.

23. In response to a request by the Grand Vizier, on July 26 Wallis sent Colonel Gross and another officer to the Ottoman camp to discuss a possible armistice. Upon returning, Gross reported to Wallis that one of the Grand Vizier's advisers had suggested that the Austrians cede Belgrade and end the war immediately, but Gross replied that the Austrians would defend Belgrade to the utmost extremity. Report of Colonel Gross, July 27, 1739, ibid., 1739, Appendix RR. Gross returned to the Turkish camp on August 14 but did not offer to surrender Belgrade on that visit either. Ibid., 1739, p. 566, Appendix 40.

24. Neipperg to Wallis, Aug. 28, 1739, ibid., 1739, Appendix EEEE.

25. A common interpretation of the proceedings at Belgrade awards Villeneuve the honor of formulating this treaty that so damaged Habsburg interests and strengthened French influence in Constantinople. In Neipperg's dispatches, however, Villeneuve scarcely receives mention; without doubt Neipperg considered his chief adversary to be the Turkish Grand Vizier. Max Braubach declares that the primary reasons for Villeneuve's prominence lie in the popular reaction in Vienna, which blamed the Frenchman largely because it found it inconceivable that a lowly Turk could have effected such a diplomatic success; in the dispatches of Cardinal Fleury, the French king's chief minister, who praised his ambassador's mediation; and Villeneuve's own accounts. Braubach, Max, Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV bis Kaunitz (Bonn, 1952), p. 329.Google Scholar Chief proponents of the Villeneuve thesis include the venerable Vandal, Albert, Une ambassade française en orient sous Louis XV: la mission du Marquis de Villeneuve, 1728–1741 (Paris, 1887)Google Scholar, and the more recent Cassels, Struggle for the Ottoman Empire.

26. de Keralio, M., Histoire de la guerre des russes et des impériaux contre les turcs (Paris, 1780), II, 197–99Google Scholar

27. Mrde Schmettau, le Comte, Mémoires secrets de la guerre de Hongrie (pendant les campagnes de 1737, 1738, et 1739) (Frankfurt, 1786), p. 256.Google Scholar On August 28 Neipperg repeated his warning, but by no means declared that Wallis should send him no news at all. Neipperg to Wallis, Aug. 28, 1739, in Brown, “Türkenkrieg,” 1739, Appendix EEEE. The next day Wallis reported to Vienna that the Turks would allow no mail to reach Neipperg and suggested that Vienna send a French official to act as courier. Wallis to war ministry, Aug. 29, 1739, in Brown, “Türkenkrieg,” 1739, pp. 430–31. Had Wallis encountered difficulty in sending messages to Neipperg, he should have sent them through Villeneuve, for if the Turks had stopped mail going to the mediator they would have violated diplomatic procedure and voided any treaty.

28. Constantine Dapontes, Éphémérides Daces ou chronique de la guerre de quatre ans, 1736–1739 (Paris, 1881), II, 267.Google Scholar

29. Neipperg to Emperor, Sept. 2, 1739, HHSA, SK, Türkei, 219.

30. Neipperg to Wallis, Sept. 1, 1739, HHSA, SK, Türkei, 219.

31. Conference Protocol, Sept. 9, 1739, HHSA, SK, Vorträge, 49.

32. Keralio, , Histoire de la guerre, II, 247–48.Google Scholar

33. These articles can be found in Johann Graf Brown, “Untersuchungsakten über General Doxat, FM Graf von Seckendorf, FM Graf Wallis, und FZM Graf Neipperg” (manuscript in Kriegsarchiv, Vienna). The charges against Wallis are contained in 1739, Beilage XI, and those against Neipperg in 1739, Beilage 36. An article by Tupetz, Theodor entitled “Der Türkenfeldzug von 1739 und der Friede zu Belgrad,” Historische Zeitschrift, XL (1878), 1–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar, is based on the evidence presented at Wallis's hearings. For an excellent discussion of Neipperg's case, see Regele, “Schuld des Grafen Neippergs”.

34. Regele, “Schuld des Grafen Neippergs,” p. 390.

35. Conference Protocol, Sept. 9, 1739, HHSA, SK, Vorträge, 49.

36. Emperor to Empress Anne of Russia, Sept. 13, 1739, HHSA, SK, Russland, II, 140.

37. Botha to Emperor, Oct. 3, 1739, HHSA, SK, Russland, II, 20.

38. For a published copy of the treaty of Dec. 28, 1739, see Martens, F., Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russe avec les puissances étrangères, I (St. Petersburg, 1874), 126–27.Google Scholar

39. Conference Protocol, Feb. 4, 1739, HHSA, SK, Vorträge, 48.