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The “Skeleton Key” — American Foreign Policy, European Unity, and German Rearmament, 1949–54

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Thomas A. Schwartz
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Extract

An older colleague recently observed to me that today we stand further removed in time from the end of World War II than Americans at the beginning of that conflict were from the Spanish American War. To those Americans of 1939, he said, the war with Spain seemed almost antediluvian, while to us World War II lives vividly in memory, and its consequences still shape our lives. As a student of modern American foreign policy, I found my colleague's observation particularly appropriate. American and Soviet soldiers still face each other in the middle of Germany, and Europe remains divided along the lines roughly set by the liberating armies. Yet could we now be facing major changes? Will an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons in Europe, and glasnost in the Soviet Union transform this environment? Will the postwar division of Europe come to an end? What will be the consequences for the United States?

Type
Articles
Information
Central European History , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , December 1986 , pp. 369 - 385
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1986

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References

This article was originally a paper entitled “Europe as the Solution: John J. McCloy and the Rearmament of Germany, 1949–1952,” presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association in New York in December 1985. My thanks to Thomas J. Sugrue for his assistance in preparing the article for publication.

1. Joffe, Josef, “Squaring Many Circles: West German Security Policy Between Deterrence, Detente, and Alliance,” in Cooney, James A., Craig, Gordon A., Schwarz, Hans Peter, and Stern, Fritz, eds., The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States (Boulder and London, 1984), 174Google Scholar. On the value of knowing the history of the postwar period for dealing with current problems, Neustadt, Richard E. and May, Ernest R., Thinking in Time (New York, 1986)Google Scholar. Among the new records are the new volumes of the Foreign Relations series, the State Department's Record Group 59, from 1950–54, the papers of Jean Monnet housed in Lausanne, the records of Adenauer's conferences with the High Commissioners, FO 1005, in the Public Record Office in London, and the Herbert Blankenhorn diary in Germany. Blankenhorn was one of Adenauer's closest advisors in the first years of the Federal Republic.

2. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1949, 4 (Washington, 1975): 470Google Scholar. Acheson's concern with Schuman's position was confirmed in an interview with Lucius Battle, 12 Oct. 1982. Battle was Acheson's personal secretary. McCloy's statement about the French comes from an interview in the Boston Herald, 18 Sept. 1949.

3. Memo from the President to the Secretary of State, 16 June 1950, NSC Meeting #60, President's Secretary's File, Box 208, Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. McCloy to Stimson, 28 June 1950, Papers of Henry Stimson, Reel 123, microfilm edition, Sterling Library, Yale University. One of the polls which influenced McCloy found two-thirds of all Germans opposed to rearmament. “German Attitudes Toward an Army and Military Training,” Report #19, 17 Mar. 1950, Reaction Analysis Staff-Office of Public Affairs, High Commission, (RAS-OPA, HICOG), Papers of Shepard Stone, in private possession. Stone was McCloy's Public Affairs officer, a former New York Times editor who was particularly sensitive to public relations.

4. On the military's interest in German rearmament, U.S. Policy Respecting the Disarmament and Demilitarization of the Federal German Republic, 23 Jan. 1950, G–3, 091–Germany TS (Section I) Cases 1–20, Plans and Operations Division, Decimal File 1949–Feb. 1950, RG 319 Records of the Army Staff, Box 538, National Archives, Modern Military Branch (NARS–MMB). The Soviet Union was thought to have some 175 divisions available for an offensive against Western Europe, while NATO had only 12 divisions available for defense. See also Martin, Lawrence, “The American Decision to Rearm Germany,” in Stein, Harold E., ed., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Birmingham, 1963), 645–63Google Scholar. On the change in British policy, Christopher Steel to Dennis Allen, 15 Apr. 1950, FO 371/85048, Public Record Office/London, and “Military Aspects of United Kingdom Policy Toward Germany,” Chiefs of Staff Report, 29 Mar. 1950, FO 371/85048, PRO/London.

5. For McCloy's view on a German police force, cable, McCloy to Acheson, 26 June 1950, 762A. 5/6–2650, National Archives, Diplomatic Branch (NARS–DB). On McCloy's background, see Isaacson, Walter and Thomas, Evan, The Wise Men (New York, 1986), 65–71, 119–25, 191–209, 334–37Google Scholar. McCloy's views on European unity were contained in a speech given in London, 4 Apr. 1950, in the Stone Papers. McCloy's support for German participation in an international army was expressed to Adenauer privately, as were Adenauer's concerns about Germany's security. Diary of Herbert Blankenhorn, 7 June 1950, in private possession.

6. For a more detailed investigation of the effects of the Korean war on Washington's thinking, see Schwartz, Thomas A., “From Occupation to Alliance: John J. McCloy and the Allied High Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1952” (unpubl. diss., Harvard Univ., 1985), 291–335Google Scholar. See also May, Ernest R., Lessons of the Past (New York, 1973), 82–83.Google Scholar

7. For Adenauer's demands for action, Meeting of the Allied High Commission, 28 June 1950, FO 1628/1126a, PRO/London. The American political liaison in Bonn offers a vivid description of the German reaction to the Korean War. Thayer, Charles W., The Unquiet Germans (New York, 1957), 210Google Scholar. For the German concerns, see the memorandum prepared by Adenauer's security advisor, General Schwerin, in FO 371/85050, PRO/London. McCloy's interim suggestions are in a cable, McCloy to Byroade, 18 July 1950, G–3 091 Germany TS (Section I) (cases 1–20) RG 319 Army Operations, Box 20, NARS–MMB. McCloys' cables had a great impact on Acheson. Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), 436Google Scholar. For the cable proposing a European Army, see FRUS 1950, 3 (Washington, 1977): 180–81.Google Scholar

8. FRUS 1950, 3: 167–68Google Scholar. For the indications of support within Germany for a European Army, “Germans View the Korean Outbreak,” Report #33, 23 Aug. 1950, RAS–OPA, HICOG, Stone Papers.

9. The military's opposition is captured in the Addendum, dated 2 Sept. 1950, to a Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Rearmament of Western Germany, 27 July 1950. CCS–092 Germany [5–4–49] (SCC. 3) RG 218- Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Box 19, NARS–MMB.

10. Adenauer's interview appeared in the New York Times, 18 Aug. 1950. For Adenauer's attempts to convey his message privately to Americans, Adenauer to Allen Dulles, 6 Sept. 1950, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Princeton University. See also Adenauer, Konrad, Memoirs 1945–1953, trans. von Oppen, Beate Ruhm (Chicago, 1966), 280–81.Google Scholar

11. FRUS 1950, 3: 273–78Google Scholar, and Martin, “Decision to Rearm Germany,” in Stein, Civil-Military, 657.

12. McCloy to Acheson, 20 Sept. 1950, Memo of Conversation, Papers of Dean Acheson, Box 65, Truman Library.

13. David Bruce's efforts are clear from his diary. Bruce Diary, 22 Sept. 1950, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond. For Monnet's views, Monnet to Pleven, 21 Oct. 1950, AMI 4/7/3, Papers of Jean Monnet, Fondation Jean Monnet Pour L'Europe, Lausanne, Switzerland. For McCloy's impression of the French position, cable, McCloy to Byroade, 28 Oct. 1950, 762A.5/10–2850, NARS–DB. The opposition to the Pleven Plan is captured in FRUS 1950, 3: 428–29Google Scholar.

14. For McCloy's proposal, see his two cables, McCloy to Acheson, 29 Nov. 1950, 762A. 5/ 11–2950, and 4 Dec. 1950, 762A. 5/12–450, NARS–DB. McCloy clearly recognized that Germany's status would change with rearmament. McCloy, Memorandum for the President, 10 Sept. 1950, PSF, Germany Folder 2, Box 178, Truman Library.

15. Schumacher saw the rearmament question as his best opportunity to force new elections and oust the Adenauer government. Drummond, Gordon D., The German Social Democrats in Opposition 1949–1960: The Case Against Rearmament (Norman, Oklahoma, 1982), 46–48Google Scholar. Yet Schumacher also denounced pacifism and told the deputies that an “ohne mich” attitude toward rearmament invited the Russian domination of Germany. Protokolle, Meeting of the Parteivorstand, 16 Sept. 1950, SPD Archive, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn. For Adenauer's own assessment of his troubles, Adenauer, Memoirs, 339–42.

16. For Eisenhower's skepticism about the European army, Sulzberger, Cyrus L., A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries 1934–1954 (Toronto, 1969), 615Google Scholar, and Meeting of President Truman and General Eisenhower, 5 Nov. 1951, Papers of Eben Ayers, Folder EDC and Contractuals, Box 6, Truman Library. For Eisenhower's frustration with the Europeans, Eisenhower to W. Averell Harriman, 12 May 1951, Pre-Presidential Correspondence 16–52, Folder W. Averell Harriman, Box 55, Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Eisenhower's changing views on the subject can be seen through his diary. Eisenhower Diary, entry 11 June 1951, DDE Diary Series, Eisenhower Library.

17. For one example of McCloy's intervention in the Schuman Plan negotiations, see McCloy to Adenauer, 11 Mar. 1951, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amt, 242.19, Band 5, Bonn. For McCloy's efforts, McCloy to Eisenhower, undated letter but probably 9 or 10 June 1951, Pre-Presidential Correspondence 16–52, Folder McCloy, Box 75, Eisenhower Library. For Eisenhower's reaction to Monnet's presentation, see Monnet, Jean, Memoirs, trans. Mayne, Richard (London, 1978), 358–59Google Scholar. A copy of NSC–115 is in FRUS 1951, 3 (Washington, 1981): 849–52.Google Scholar

18. Cable, McCloy to Acheson, 6 July 1951, 762.5/7–651, RG 59, NARS-DB. For the negative German reaction, see Speidel, Hans, Aus unserer Zeit: Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1977), 292–93.Google Scholar

19. For Washington's view of the contractual negotiations, see Acheson, Present at the Creation, 615–50.

20. An account of the final phases of the EDC can be found in Fursdon, Edward, The European Defense Community: A History (New York, 1980).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21. Josef Joffe makes a similar argument to justify a continued American military presence in Europe. “Europe's American Pacifier,” Foreign Policy, no. 54 (Spring 1984), 83. See also Ireland, Timothy P., Creating the Entangling Alliance (Westport, Conn., 1981), 221–28.Google Scholar

22. Stern, Fritz, “Conclusion: German-American Relations and the ‘Return of the Repressed,’” in Cooney, , et al. , The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, 238Google Scholar. Under DeGaulle, the French also strengthened their ties with the Germans, and attempted to create a Bonn-Paris axis, but the French came to realize that the Germans put their relationship with the United States in a special category of critical importance.

23. Martin, “Decision to Rearm Germany,” in Stein, Civil-Military, 661ff.

24. Some of the surveys which McCloy used were “Germans View the Korean Outbreak,” Report #33, 23 Aug. 1950, RAS–OPA, HICOG, “Trend in Opinion on West German Remilitarization,” Report #45, 31 Oct., 1950, RAS–OPA, HICOG, and “Germans View the Remilitarization Issue,” Report #55, 28 Dec. 1950, RAS–OPA, HICOG, Stone Papers. Hans Peter Schwarz has traced opinion on the reunification vs. European unification debate. Schwarz, Hans Peter, “The West Germans, Western Democracy, and Western Ties in the Light of Public Opinion Research,” in Cooney, , et al. , The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, 73Google Scholar.

25. McCloy's own personal assessment of his achievement in Germany emphasizes Franco-German reconciliation. Interview with John J. McCloy, 28 June 1985.