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The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

R. St.J. MacDonald
R. St.J. MacDonald*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, University of Toronto
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Extract

By Resolution 2062 (XX) of December 16, 1965, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council to transmit to the Commission on Human Rights a proposal by Costa Rica to create the post of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, so that the Commission might study the matter and report on it to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session in 1966. The Commission on Human Rights considered the item in March 1966, and by resolution 4 (XXII) established a Working Group comprising nine members of the Commission to study the proposed institution and to report to the Commission at its twenty-third session in 1967. The item was not taken up by the Third Committee during the Assembly’s twenty-first session in 1966, partly because background studies on the subject had not been completed, and partly because the Committee had allocated most of its time to the task of completing measures of implementation for the two International Covenants on Human Rights.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 5 , 1967 , pp. 84 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1967

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References

1 For the full text of the Costa Rican draft, see U.N. Doc. A/6167 (Report of the Third Committee, December 15, 1965); for an explanatory memorandum, see U.N. Doc. A/5963.

2 Proceedings of the Commission in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 876 of March 30, 1966 to U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 883 of April 4, 1966.

3 The Working Group comprised representatives of Austria, Costa Rica, Dahomey, France, Jamaica, Philippines, Senegal, U.K. and U.S.A. The Soviet representative noted in his intervention before ECOSOC on June :, 1967, that the membership of the Working Group did not reflect the composition of the General Assembly or of the Commission on Human Rights: U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR. 572, at 6. The Tanzanian (U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/ SR. 57a, at 8) and the Indian (U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR. 574, at 14) representatives expressed similar views. The Philippine representative (U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR. 573, at 10), who was the Chairman of the Working Group, noted that the composition of the Group had taken full account of equitable ideological and geographical distribution. He expressed the view that it was unfortunate that certain countries which had been requested to serve on the Working Group had refused to co-operate and that the responsibility for their refusal did not lie with either the Commission or the Working Group itself. The Belgium representative thought that the maxim nemo auditur suam absentiam allegans was relevant: U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR. 574, at 4. The socialist states also criticized the Working Group on the ground that it did not consider alternatives to a High Commissioner. What the Working Group did do — and do very well indeed — was to produce a fairly clear indication of what the institution of a High Commissioner should be, and to that extent it placed governments in a position to determine their policies on the matter. The present paper makes extensive use of the proceedings of the Working Group.

4 For provisional summary records of the proceedings of the Working Group, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.21/SR. 2 of January 27, 1967, to U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.21/SR. 15 of February 9, 1967.

5 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.21/L. 1 of December 30, 1966. The present article relies heavily on this valuable study. But in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.21/ L.i/Add. i of March 21, 1967, the Soviet representative criticized the Secretary-General’s study on the ground that it was one-sided; that the views of the U.S.S.R. representative had been “stripped beyond recognition of [their] essential arguments against the creation of the institution of a High Commissioner"; and that the study had failed to consider adequately “some other appropriate machinery,” which was an integral aspect of the agenda item.

6 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.21/L. 2 of January 9, 1967.

7 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.21/NGO/1 of January 19, 1967 (International League for the Rights of Man); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.21/NGO/2 of January 24, 1967 (Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations) ; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/141 of March 2, 1967 (International Council of Jewish Women); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/144 of March 14, 1967 (International Federation of Christian Trade Unions).

8 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/934 of February 8, 1967.

9 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Twenty-Third Session February 20-March 23, 1967, in ECOSOC Official Records, Forty-Second Session, Supplement No. 6, U.N. Doc. E/4322, at 161–73; and for provisional records, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 938 of March 21, 1967 to U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 940 of March 22, 1967. India, Tanzania and a number of the socialist states noted (in the ECOSOC debate) that the Commission was able to devote “only three incomplete meetings which were insufficient for a comprehensive consideration of the question and that the question of the implementation of human rights through some other appropriate international machinery was not discussed”: U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/L. 516/Rev. i of May 18, 1967, which would have referred the question for study to an ad hoc committee. This proposal was defeated.

10 Resolution 14 (XXIII) ; text in U.N. Doc. E/4322, chapter XVII, resolution 4.

11 For proceedings before the Social Committee of ECOSOC, see U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR. 572 of May 26, 1967 to U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR. 575 of June 5, 1967.

12 U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/L. 526 of May 29, 1967, and U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/L.526/Cor. i of May 29, 1967.

13 ECOSOC approved the Commission’s draft 15-4-8 (U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/ SR. 575 of June 5, 1967, at 17). Those in favour were: Guatemala, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Sweden, U.K., U.S., Venezuela, Belgium, Canada, Dahomey, France. Those against were: India, Roumania, U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia. Those abstaining were: Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Tanzania, Cameroon, Gabon.

14 In the Commission, those voting in favour of the draft, which became resolution 14 (XXIII), were: Argentina, Austria, Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Dahomey, Greece, Guatemala, Iran, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sweden, U.K., and U.S.A. Those opposed were: India, Iraq, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., U.A.R., and Yugoslavia. Those abstaining were: France and Nigeria: U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/940 at 171 ; but when the Commission’s draft was considered by ECOSOC, France gave it strong support (U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR. 573, at 7-9). The U.S. and the U.K. are enthusiastic supporters of the idea of the High Commissioner.

15 In 1947, Professor Réne Cassin, French representative on the Human Rights Commission, espoused the idea of a United Nations Attorney-General who would be an advocate representing individuals and groups of individuals in appellate proceedings before an international court of human rights. In 1959, the Consultative Council of Jewish Organizations submitted a memorandum to the Commission stating that, though the French proposal was contingent upon vesting jurisdiction in an international court, the idea could be adapted to other forms of implementation. At the fifth session of the General Assembly, the Uruguayan delegation submitted a proposal for establishing (by convention) the office of a High Commissioner (Attorney-General) as a measure of implementing the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The emphasis in this proposal was on the Attorney-General’s function to screen petitions from individuals and organizations and to seize a Human Rights Committee with cases in which he himself would appear as advocate of the petitioners. These elements do not appear in the current ECOSOC draft. For analysis of the institution of the High Commissioner (Attorney-General), see Moskowitz, M., Human Rights and World Order: The Struggle for Human Rights in the United Nations 137–51 (1958).Google Scholar

16 U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/L. 526 of May 29, 1967.

17 Text in U.N. Doc. E/3290, Supp. 1, at 19.

18 There is general agreement that he should be eligible for re-election.

19 U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/L. 526 of May 29, 1967, operative paragraph 5.

20 Citations in supra note 4.

21 For comments on the issue, see The Analytical and Technical Study Prepared by the Secretary-General under Paragraph 3 of Resolution 4(XXII) of the Commission on Human Rights: U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.21/L. 1, at 8-11.

22 Statements by the Soviet representative to ECOSOC are to be found in U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR. 572 of June 1, 1967, and following.

23 U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/L.5i6/Rev. 1 of May 18, 1967.

24 Lauterpacht, H., International Law and Human Rights 167 (1950).Google Scholar

25 On the relationship between Article 2(7) and Charter provisions on human rights, see generally the Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, vol. 1 (1955) and Supplements (1958 and 1964).

26 U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR. 573 of May 31, 1967, at 7-8.

27 Gross, Leo, “Domestic Jurisdiction, Enforcement Measures and the Congo,” The Australian Year Book of International Law, 1965, at 137–59Google Scholar, esp. at 143 (an incisive study).

28 Supporting statements before ECOSOC can be found in U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/ SR. 573 of May 31, 1967, at 4 ff. (Czechoslovakia), and U.N. Doc. E/ AC.7/SR. 572 of June i, 1967, at 15 ff. (Ukraine). For relevant statements before the Commission, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 881 (Ukraine); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 880 (Poland); U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/SR. 552 (Czechoslovakia); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 879 (Iraq); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 881 (India); and see too Carey, John, “Implementing Human Rights Conventions — The Soviet View,” (1964) 53 Kentucky L.J. 115.Google Scholar

29 U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/L. 526 of May 29, 1967.

30 It was once thought that this responsibility would be discharged by the Commission on Human Rights “pending the eventual establishment of an agency of implementation”: Journal of ECOSOC, First Year, No. 14 (May 24, 1946), at 164.

31 For detailed discussion, see Stoessinger, John G. and associates, Financing the United Nations System, c.4 (1964).Google Scholar

32 Articles 16–21. Text and comments on the measures of implementation of the two Covenants and the Optional Protocol are to be found in the Rapporteur’s report to the Third Committee, U.N. Doc. A/6546 of December 13, 1966.

33 Articles 28–45. See too U.N. Doc. A/6228 of April 22, 1966, Report of the Secretary-General on Methods of Fact-Finding. Paragraphs 3–19 deal with human rights.

34 Resolution 14(XXIII) of the Commission, preambular paragraph 8. The same wording appeared in the Costa Rican draft.