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Trading Away Women’s Rights: A FeministCritique of the Canada–Colombia Free TradeAgreement
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2016
Summary
The internal conflict in Colombia has resulted indocumented violations of human rights andinternational humanitarian law. In particular,Colombian women and their human rights have beendisproportionately impacted by the conflict. It iswithin this context that the Canada-Colombia FreeTrade Agreement (CCFTA) is being proposed, and thereis serious concern that Canadian investors couldperpetuate the violence or become complicitbeneficiaries of human rights violations in Colombiaonce the CCFTA is ratified. Against this background,this article takes a feminist approach tointernational investment law to demonstrate thatinternational investment agreements (IIAs) and freetrade agreements with investment provisions (FTAs),such as the CCFTA, maintain and reinforce genderhierarchy to the detriment of women’s socio-economicrights, needs, and interests. By engaging in afeminist critique of the CCFTA’s provisions onnon-discrimination, performance, expropriation,corporate social responsibility, reservations,investor-state arbitration, and general exceptions,as well as the labour side agreement, theramifications of international investment law onColombian women’s rights and women’s rightsgenerally becomes apparent. In order to remedy theseshortcomings, recommendations are made to alleviatethe potential strain of international investment lawand the CCFTA specifically on women’s rights.
Sommaire
Le conflit interne en Colombie a donné lieu à desviolations documentées des droits de la personne etdu droit international humanitaire. En particulier,les femmes colombiennes et leurs droits fondamentauxont été touchés de façon disproportionnée par leconflit. C’est dans ce contexte que l’Accord delibre échange Canada-Colombie (ALECC) est proposé etil est préoccupant que les investisseurs canadienspourraient perpétuer la violence ou devenircomplices bénéficiaires de violations des droits dela personne en Colombie une fois l’ALECC ratifiée.Dans ce contexte, cet article adopte une approcheféministe au droit international sur lesinvestissements pour soutenir que les accordsd’investissement internationaux et les accords delibre échange avec dispositions sur l’investissement(comme l’ALECC) maintiennent et renforcent lahiérarchie entre les sexes au détriment des droitssocioéconomiques, des besoins et des intérêts desfemmes. À la lumière d’une critique féministe desdispositions de l’ALECC sur la non-discrimination,la performance, l’expropriation, la responsabilitésociale, les réserves, l’arbitrageinvestisseur-État, et les exceptions générales,ainsi que de l’accord parallèle sur le travail, lesconséquences du droit international sur lesinvestissements pour les droits des femmes enColombie et ailleurs deviennent apparentes. Afin deremédier à ces lacunes, des recommandations sontfaites pour atténuer les préjudices potentiels dudroit international des investissements et del’ALECC sur les droits des femmes.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 47 , 2009 , pp. 161 - 196
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international 2009
Footnotes
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Gregg Erauw, B.A. (Hons) (WLU), M.A. (McMaster),J.D. candidate (Ottawa). Sincere thanks toPenelope Simons in the Faculty of Law at theUniversity of Ottawa and Stefanie Ligori for theirendless encouragement, guidance, and editorialinput in the production of this article.
References
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2 UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Protect Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (2008) at para. 12–13.
3 Penelope Simons, cited in Canada, Standing Committee on International Trade, Human Rights, the Environment and Free Trade with Colombia (June 2008) at 65. See also UNHRC, supra note 2; Sornarajah, M., The International Law of Foreign Investment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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35 UNHRC, supra note 26 at para. 61.
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49 The CCFTA provisions mentioned include: the rules on non-discrimination, national treatment (Article 803), most-favoured-nation treatment (Article 804), restrictions on performance requirements (Article 807), rules on expropriation and compensation (Article 811 ), and the investor-state dispute settlement clause (Article 819).
50 MiningWatch Canada et al., supra note 27 at 1.
51 See Canada, Standing Committee on International Trade, supra note 3 at 19, 22, 23, 29, and 65. The advocates that I refer to include individuals that gave testimony to this effect to the Standing Committee on International Trade. They include Alvaro Uribe, president of Colombia; Thomas D’Aquino, chief executive officer and president of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives; Jean-Michel Laurin, vice-president of global business policy for Canadian Manufacturers and Exporters; and Brian Zeiler-Kligman, policy analyst for the Canadian Chamber of Commerce.
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55 Office of the Chief Economist, Outward FDI Stocks by Country, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, <http://www.international.gc.ca/economist-economiste/assets/pdfs/FDI_stocks-Outward_by_Country-ENG.pdf>.
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62 Ibid. at 803.
63 Ibid. at 804.
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68 I credit Penelope Simons for bringing this point to my attention.
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78 Ibid.
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80 Ibid.
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82 For example, the Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility, the International Code of Ethics for Canadian Business, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the Global Compact.
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100 Ibid., Article 2201.3.
101 See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (2007), Case no. ARB/97/3, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In its decision, ICSID awarded Vivendi US $105 million, plus interest against Argentina when the province of Tucumán had denied Vivendi fair and equitable treatment and expropriated Vivendi’s investment for the provision of water and sewage services in the province. Vivendi’s investment was protected under a bilateral investment treaty between France and Argentina. In addition, the arbitration tribunal awarded legal costs to Vivendi in the amount of US $701,961. In its defence, Argentina argued that it and the province were not liable because the water provided by Vivendi was a risk to human health. This is a defence that is similarly provided by Article 2201.3 of the CCFTA.
102 CCFTA, supra note 6, Article 2201.3.
103 Beveridge, supra note 52 at 185–6. In her article, Beveridge makes a feminist critique of the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel and Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. I cite her analysis here since it is illustrative of the same principles that the CCFTA’s Article 2201.3 is based. In addition, the fundamental international economic law principles and provision wording underpinning the WTO panel’s defence, GATT Article XX, is the same as that under Article 2201.3 of the CCFTA.
104 Ibid. at 186.
105 Ibid. at 188.
106 Ibid. at 186.
107 Ibid.
108 Canada, Canada-Colombia Labour Cooperation Agreement, 21 November 20Ο8, Human Resources and Skills Development, <http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/labour_agreements/ccalc/index.shtml> [CCALC].
109 Currie, supra note 22 at 545.
110 CCFTA, supra note 6 at Chapter 16.
111 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998, International Labour Organization, <http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm>.
112 CCIC et al., supra note 81 at 12.
113 CCALC, supra note 108 at Article 1.
114 CCIC, supra note 81 at 13.
115 UNHRC, supra note 26 at 23, 75, 76.
116 CCALC, supra note 108 at Articles 10–20.
117 Ibid. at Article 2.
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