¹ NATO was established as a regional common defence and security organization by the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. Current members of the Alliance are: Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

² In this comment, “humanitarian intervention” is used generally to refer to the use of force by one state against another state on humanitarian grounds, and excludes unless otherwise stated intervention based on consent, aid to, or rescue of one’s nationals, aid to insurgency movements or national liberation movements, or intervention to install or support democratic governments. On the issue of the many definitions of intervention and their normative importance, see, e.g., Damrosch, L. F., “Changing Conceptions of Intervention in International Law” in Reed, L. W. and Kaysen, C., eds., Emerging Norms ofJustified Intervention 91 at 91 (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993)Google Scholar; Brownlie, I., “Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen” in Lillich, R. B., ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 139 at 140 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973)Google Scholar; Simon, S. G., “The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention” (1993) 24 Cal. W. Int’l L. J. 117 at 119–21.Google Scholar

³ See Franck, T. M. and Rodley, N. S., “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention By Military Force” (1973) 67 A.J.I.L. 275 at 303:Google Scholar

⁴ See Higgins, R., “Intervention and International Law” in Bull, H., ed., Intervention in World Politics 29 at 42 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)Google Scholar: “the task of the international lawyer over the next few years is surely not to go on repeating the rhetoric of dead events which no longer accord with reality, but to try to assist political leaders to identify what is the new consensus about acceptable and unacceptable levels of intrusion.”

⁵ This comment does not offer any view as to the legality of the conduct of the military actions of NATO or the military forces of its member states once initiated (i.e., the jus in bello as distinct from the jus ad bellum). Similarly, it will be for others to assess the overall wisdom of military intervention, whether in the Balkans or elsewhere, in furtherance of humanitarian interests. No comment is offered here on the political, military, or moral correctness of NATO’s actions in Kosovo and the FRY, all of which require assessments far beyond the somewhat crude calculus of our present system of international law. This comment therefore focuses solely on the issue of what impact, if any, NATO actions in relation to Kosovo may have on the threshold issue of the purported existence of a legal right of unilateral forcible humanitarian intervention.

⁶ Grotius, H., The Rights of War and Peace 285–89 (Universal Classics Library, Campbell trans. 1901)Google Scholar; Vattel, E., Droit des Gens 56 (Pomroy, T., ed. 1805)Google Scholar; both quoted in Reisman, W. M. and McDougal, M. S., “Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos” in Lillich, R. B., ed., Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 167 at 170 (Charlottesville, Va.: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1973).Google Scholar

⁷ See, e.g., Stowell, E., Intervention in International Law 63 ff. (Washington, DC: J. Byrne and Company, 1921)Google Scholar; Ganji, M., International Protection of Human Rights 22ff. (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1962)Google Scholar; Franck, T. M. and Rodley, N. S., “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force” (1973) 67 A.J.I.L. 275 at 279–85Google Scholar. See also, for a brief overview of the principal of such instances of state practice, Reisman and McDougal, supra note 6 at 179–83.

⁸ See, e.g., Guggenheim, P., Traité de droit international public 289 (Geneva: Georg, 1953)Google Scholar; Borchard, E., The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 14 (New York: Banks Law Publishing, 1916)Google Scholar; Stowell, E., Intervention in International Law 63 (Washington, DC: J. Byrne and Company, 1921)Google Scholar; Oppenheim, L., International Law 347 (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1905)Google Scholar; Oppenheim, L., International Law 279–80 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, H.; London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1948)Google Scholar; Moore, J., Digest of International Law 347–67 (New York: AMS Press, 1970; originally printed 1906)Google Scholar; Lauterpacht, H., International Law and Human Rights 120ff. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1973)Google Scholar. But see, e.g., Winfield, P. H., “The Grounds of Intervention in International Law” (1924) 5 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 149Google Scholar; Hodges, H., The Doctrine of Intervention 87 (1915).Google Scholar

⁹ See Damrosch, L. F., “Nationalism and Internationalism: The Wilsonian Legacy” (1994) 26 N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. and Pol. 493.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See, e.g., Jessup, P., A Modern Law of Nations 169–70 (New York: Macmillan, 1948)Google Scholar; Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Waldock, C. H. M., ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law” (1952–II) 81 Hague Recueil 455 at 492Google Scholar; but see Lillich, R. B., “Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights” (1967) 53 Iowa L. Rev. 325 at 347Google Scholar; Reisman and McDougal, supra note 6 at 176–78.

¹¹ See, e.g.,Akehurst, M., “Humanitarian Intervention” in Bull, H., ed., Intervention in World Politics 95 at 104–112 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Wehberg, H., “L’Interdiction du Recours à la Force: Le Principe et les Problèmes Qui Se Posent” (1951) 78 Hague Recueil at 7, 70ffGoogle Scholar; von Verdross, A., “Idées Directrices de l’Organisation des Nations Unies” (1953) 83 Hague Recueil at 1, 14Google Scholar; Oppenheim, L., International Law, vol. 2 at 154 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, H.; London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1952)Google Scholar; Brownlie, supra note 10 at 265 –68; Akehurst, M., A Modern Introduction to International Law (4th ed.; Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1987) at 259–61.Google Scholar

¹² Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.A.), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14 [hereinafter Nicaragua v. U.S.A].

¹³ Principle 1, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV), UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028(1971), adopted by consensus Oct. 24, 1970. Note too the language used in the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the Declaration: “[T]he strict observance by States of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other State is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security” [emphasis added].

¹⁴ Nicaragua v. U.S.A., supra note 12 at 106–10.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Stone, J., Aggression and World Orde 43, 95–96 (Berkeley: California University Press, 1958)Google Scholar, arguing that a use of force not aimed at the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, and not otherwise inconsistent with the principles of the United Nations, would not be in violation of Art. 2(4); Reisman and McDougal, supra note 6 at 177; Reisman, W. M., “The Role of the Economic Agencies in the Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards: A Functional Approach” (1965) 19 Int’l Org. 929CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McDougal, M. S., Lasswell, H. D., and Chen, L.-C., Human Rights and the World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980) 236–47.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See, e.g., Oppenheim, L., International Law, vol. 2, 154 (7th ed.: Lauterpacht, H., 1952)Google Scholar; Akehurst, , “Humanitarian Intervention,” supra note 11 at 105.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 11 at 106–8; Moore, J. N., ed., Law and Civil War in the Modern World 44–46 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1974)Google Scholar; Brownlie, I., “The Use of Force in Self Defence” (1961) 37 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 183 at 235.Google Scholar

¹⁸ E.g., by invitation, or to protect nationals abroad; see Schachter, O., “The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force” (1985) 10 Yale J. Int’l L. 291–94Google Scholar; Reisman, W. M., “Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law” (1985) 10 Yale J. Int’l L. 279Google Scholar; Reisman, W. M., “Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold-War World: Practices, Conditions and Prospects” in Damrosch, L. F. and Scheffer, D. J., eds., Law and Force in the New International Order 26 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Bowett, D., Self Defence in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958) 87–105.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See, e.g., Akehurst, , “Humanitarian Intervention,” supra note 11 at 107–8Google Scholar; Brownlie, supra note 10 at 299.

²⁰ See, e.g., the dictum of the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] ICJ Rep. 4 at 34: ‘The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention [viz., forcible intervention to secure possession of evidence for submission to an international tribunal] as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law.” See also Akehurst, , “Humanitarian Intervention,” supra note 11 at 110Google Scholar; Burmester, B. F., “On Humanitarian Intervention: The New World Order and Wars to Preserve Human Rights” (1994) Utah L. Rev. 269 at 273–74Google Scholar. See also the Court’s forceful assertion of the primacy of the Art. 2(4) prohibition on the use of force, subject only to very narrow exceptions, in Nicaragua v. U.S.A., supra note 12, esp. at 109–10 and 147.

²¹ See, e.g., the surveys of state opinion in Fonteyne, J.-P. L., “Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations” in Lillich, , ed., supra note 2 at 197Google Scholar; Higgins, R., “The Legal Limits to Use of Force by Sovereign States — United Nations Practice” (1961) 37 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 269.Google Scholar

²² See, e.g., Franck and Rodley, supra note 3 at 285–89. For the view that the French intervention in the Central African Republic in 1979 constituted a unilateral humanitarian intervention, see Simon, supra note 2 at 147–48.

²³ See Weisburd, A. M., Use of Force: The Practice of States since World War II 146–50 (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Akehurst, , “Humanitarian Intervention” supra note 11 at 96Google Scholar; Burmester, supra note 20 at 285-89. And see generally Franck and Rodley, supra note 3.

²⁴ See Tesón, F. R., Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1988) at 159–75Google Scholar; Akehurst, , “Humanitarian Intervention,” supra note 11 at 99Google Scholar; Weisburd, supra note 23 at 40–42; Burmester, supra note 20 at 289–91.

²⁵ Weisburd, supra note 23 at 43; Akehurst, supra note 11 at 97–98; Burmester, supra note 20 at 292–95.

²⁶ See, e.g., Reisman, W. M., “Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)” (1984) 78 AJ.I.L. 642Google Scholar; Weisburd, supra note 23 at 234–40.

²⁷ E.g., defence of their nationals or of the nationals of third party states, or invitation, or reprisals.

²⁸ See Farer, T. J., “An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention” in Damrosch, and Scheffer, , eds, supra note 18 at 185, 193.Google Scholar; Weisburd, supra note 23 at 41 (Tanzania), 43 (Vietnam), 148 (India), 236 (Grenada), 239 (Panama). See also Akehurst, , “Humanitarian Intervention,” supra note 11 at 99.Google Scholar

²⁹ Most of these interventions were also denounced by the UN General Assembly; see Rodley, N. S., “Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: The Legal Framework” in Rodley, N. S., ed., To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of International Law 14 at 20 (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1992)Google Scholar. See also Weisburd, supra note 23 at 42 (Tan-zania), 43 (Vietnam), 148–49 (India), 237–38 (Grenada), 239–40 (Panama); Akehurst, “Humanitarian Intervention,” supranote 11; O’Connell, M. E., “Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: The Continuing Importance of State Autonomy” (1997) 36 Col. J. Transnat’l L. 473 at 477.Google Scholar

³⁰ See, e.g., Luard, E., “Collective Intervention” in Bull, , supra note 4 at 157–79Google Scholar; see also Akehurst, , “Humanitarian Intervention,” supra note 11 at 106.Google Scholar

³¹ See Wippman, D., “Change and Continuity in Legal Justifications for Military Intervention in Internal Conflict” (1996) 27 Col. H.R.L. Rev. 435 at 457–59.Google Scholar

³² See, e.g., Gordon, R., “United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia and Beyond” (1994) 15 Mich. J. Int’l L. 519 at 520–21, 539, 563–75Google Scholar; Wippman, supra note 32 at 436.

³³ Gordon, supra note 32 at 544–46.

³⁴ See, e.g., Burmester, supra note 20; Kresock, D. M., “Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention” (1994) 27 Cornell Int’l L. J. 203Google Scholar; Nafziger, J. A. R., “Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Power — Part II” (1994) 22 Denv.J. Int’l L. and Pol. 219Google Scholar; Nanda, V. P., “Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Haiti — Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention under International Law Part I” (1992) Denv. J. Int’l L. and Pol’y 305Google Scholar; Pruitt-Hamm, B., “Humanitarian Intervention in South-east Asia in the Post-Cold War: Dilemmas in the Definition and Design of International Law” (1994) 3 Pac. L.J. 183Google Scholar; Scheffer, D. J., “Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention (1992) 23 U. Tol. L. Rev. 253.Google Scholar

³⁵ For a detailed review of these events, see O’Connell, M. E., “Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War” (1992) 67 Ind. L.J. 903 at 904–9.Google Scholar

³⁶ See Gordon, R., “Humanitarian Intervention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia and Haiti” (1996) 31 Tex. Int’l L.J. 43 at 49.Google Scholar

³⁷ UN Doc. S/Res/688 (April 5, 1991). The resolution was adopted ten votes to three (Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe), with two abstentions (China and India).

³⁸ See Gordon, supra note 36 at 49. See also Malanczuk, P., Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force 18 (Hingham, MA: M. Nijhoff International, 1993).Google Scholar

³⁹ Gordon, supra note 36 and Malanczuk, supra note 38.

⁴⁰ See Harrington, M. J., “Operation Provide Comfort: A Perspective in International Law” (1993) 8 Conn. J. Int’l L. 635 at 643–46Google Scholar; Stromseth, E., “Iraq’s Represssion of its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing Challenges” in Damrosch, L. F., ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts 77 at 89–90 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).Google Scholar

⁴¹ All sources cited, ibid.

⁴² All sources cited, ibid. See also Wippman, supra note 31 at 472.

⁴³ See O’Connell, M. E., “Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in Civil War” (1992) 67 Ind. L.J. 903 at 906–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Malanczuk, supra note 38 at 19.

⁴⁵ Ibid. See also Stromseth, supra note 40 at 97–98; Gordon, supra note 36 at 49–50.

⁴⁶ ECOWAS was established under the Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, May 28, 1975, (1975) 1010 UNTS 17. Original members of the Community were Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). For a description of the genesis of the Community, see K. Nowrot and E. W. Schabacker, ‘The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone” (1998) 14 Amer. U. Int’l L. Rev. 321 at 332–34.

⁴⁷ See Levitt, J., “Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone” (1998) 12 Temp. Int’l and Comp. L.J. 333 at 343.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 347. See also Security Council Resolution 788 (1992), UN Doc. S/Res/ 788 (November 19, 1992), commending ECOWAS for its attempts to bring peace to Liberia; Security Council Resolution 866 (1993), UN Doc. S/Res/866 (Sept. 22, 1993), establishing the UN Observer Mission in Liberia, which was to co-operate with the ECOWAS peacekeeping mission.

⁵⁰ See Levitt, supra note 47 at 347.

⁵¹ Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), UN Doc. S/Res/794 (December 3, 1992). See generally, on the events leading to this resolution, Burmester, supra note 20 at 313–17.

⁵² See Gordon, supra note 36 at 51.

⁵³ Letter of the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/24868, Nov. 29, 1992, at 2.

⁵⁴ See Gordon, supra note 36 at 52, noting, in particular, that the significance for sovereignty of Resolution 794 is difficult to discern. See also generally Ramlogan, R., “Towards a New Vision of World Security: The United Nations Security Council and the Lessons of Somalia” (1993) 16 Houst.J. Int’l L. 213 at 236–38Google Scholar. See also Security Council Resolution 814 (1992), authorizing UN forces to disarm warring parties and armed bands.

⁵⁵ See Gordon, supra note 36 at 55, n. 86.

⁵⁶ Security Council Resolution 912 (1994), UN Doc. S/Res./912, (Apr. 21, 1994).

⁵⁷ Security Council Resolution 918 (1994), UN Doc. S/Res/918, (May 17, 1994).

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Security Council Resolution 925 (1994), UN Doc. S/Res/925 (June 8, 1994).

⁶⁰ See Gordon, supra note 36 at 56, n. 88.

⁶¹ Security Council Resolution 929 (1994), UN Doc. S/Res/929 (June 22, 1994).

⁶² See, e.g., Security Council Resolution 770 (1992), UN Doc. S/Res/770 (August 13, 1992); Security Council Resolution 816 (1993), UN Doc. S/Res/816 (March 31, 1993).

⁶³ See, e.g., O’Connell, M. E., “Regulating the Force in the a 21st Century: The Continuing Importance of State Autonomy” (October 8, 1997) 36 Col. J. Transnat’l L. 473 at 486Google Scholar. Note, in particular, the conclusion of a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on Dec. 14, 1995, reprinted in (1996) 35I.L.M. 75 at 89.

⁶⁴ See generally Rupp, R. E.. “Co-operation, International Organizations, and Multilateral Interventions in the Post-Cold War Era: Lessons Learned from the Gulf War, the Balkans, Somalia, and Cambodia” (1998) 3 U.C.L.A.J. Int’l and Foreign Affairs 183.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Nowrot and Schabacker, supra note 46 at 332; Levitt, supra note 47 at 364–67.

⁶⁶ Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997), UN Doc. S/Res/1132 (1997).

⁶⁷ Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/1998/5 (1998).

⁶⁸ See generally Nowrot and Schabacker, supra note 46; but see Levitt, supra note 47 at 364–67.

⁶⁹ Note that the 1994 intervention in Haiti is not discussed here as it cannot truly be considered an instance of humanitarian intervention. Rather, it is more correctly characterized as an intervention (ultimately virtually non-forcible) to restore a democratically elected government: see R. Gordon, supra note 36 at 53; O’Connell, supra note 63 at 487–88. See also generally Falk, R., “The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations” (1995) 36 Harv. Int’l L.J. 341.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Wippman, supra note 31 at 461–64.

⁷¹ See Baggett, T., “Human Rights Abuses in Yugoslavia: To Bring an End to Political Oppression, the International Community Should Assist in Establishing an Independent Kosovo” (1999) 27 Ga. J. Int’l and Comp. L. 457Google Scholar, text accompanying fns. 12–15 and 24–35. See also Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada “Backgrounder: Canada and Kosovo,” June 17, 1999, http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreignp/kosovo/text/back-e.asp, visited June 30, 1999; U.S. Information Agency, Kosovo, “Timeline of Important Events, 1989-1999,” http://www.usia.gov/regional/eur/balkans/kosovo/timeline.htm, visited June 30, lggg; and U.S. Information Agency, Kosovo, “Crisis in Kosovo: Background,” http://www.usia.gov/regional/eur/balkans/kosovo/kbkgrnd.htm, visited June 30, iggg. The following chronology of facts borrows liberally from these on-line sources.

⁷² Baggett, supra note 71, text accompanying fn. 56.

⁷³ Ibid., text accompanying fns. 56–70.

⁷⁴ Ibid., text accompanying fns. 49–55.

⁷⁵ Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998), UN Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998).

⁷⁶ Ibid., para. 8.

⁷⁷ Ibid., para. 17.

⁷⁸ Statement on Kosovo issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session, Press Release M-NAC-D-1 (98)77, June 11, 1998.

⁷⁹ Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998), UN Doc. S/RES/1199, (Sept. 23, 1998), adopted by a vote of 14 in favour, none against, one abstention (China).

⁸⁰ Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/1998/834 and Add.i, Sept. 4, 1998.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² NATO estimates that, during 1998, the conflict between Serb security forces and ethnic Albanians (many organized under the banner of the Kosovo Liberation Army) led to the deaths of over 1,500 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and forced 400,000 people from their homes: “NATO’s role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo: historical overview,” NATO Office of Information and Press, available online at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm, visited on June 23, 1999.

⁸³ Supra note 79, esp. paras. 1 and 2.

⁸⁴ Ibid., paras. 4(b) and 9.

⁸⁵ Ibid., para. 16. The U.K. particularly emphasized that the Resolution did not authorize the use of force: see Press Release, UN Doc. S/6577, Sept. 23, 1998.

⁸⁶ NATO, Press Statement by Secretary General Solana following the ACTWARN decision, Sep. 24, 1998.

⁸⁷ NATO Press Statement by Secretary General Solana Following Decision to Issue ACTORD,Oct. 13, 1998.

⁸⁸ See “The Wider Institutional Framework for Security” in NATO, The NATO Handbook, 1998 ed., ch. 15, available online at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/voo6.htm, visited June 30, 1999.

⁸⁹ Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/1998/991, Oct. 15, 1998.

⁹⁰ Agreement between the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Kosovo Verification Mission, UN Doc. S/1998/978, Oct. 16, 1998.

⁹¹ Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998), UN Doc. S/Res/1203, (Oct. 24, 1998).

⁹² Established by the 1992 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The contact group comprised France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the U.K., and the U.S.A. See Statement of the Contact Group, Jan. 29, 1999, UN Doc. 8/1999/516.

⁹³ Press Statement by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, Mar. 23, 1999, NATO Press Release (1999) 040.

⁹⁴ See, for a statement of these, “The Situation in and around Kosovo,” Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Apr. 12, 1999, NATO Press Release M-NAC-1 (99)51, at para. 5.

⁹⁵ “Agreement on the principles (peace plan) to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis presented to the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, representing the European Union, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation,” UN Doc. S/1999/649, June 3, 1999; “Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo,” UN Doc. S/1999/648,June 7, 1999; Military-Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, UN Doc. S/1999/682,June 9, 1999.

⁹⁶ Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), UN Doc. S/1999/1244 (June 10, 1999).

⁹⁷ See “Yugoslavia institutes proceedings against ten States for violation of the obligation not to use force against another State and requests the Court to order that the use of force cease immediately,” ICJ Press Communiqué 99/17, Apr. 29, 1999.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Spain and the U.S.A.

¹⁰⁰ See “The Court rejects the requests for the indication of provisional measures submitted by Yugoslavia,” ICJ Press Communiqué 99/23, June 2, 1999.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² See Baggett, supra note 71, text accompanying fn. 74.

¹⁰³ See also the statement made by UN Secretary General on Mar. 24, 1999, insisting that while “there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace … the [Security] Council should be involved in any decision to resort to force.” Clearly the Secretary General was of the view that no Security Council authorization existed for NATO’s use of force.

¹⁰⁴ As required by Art. 53 of the UN Charter.

¹⁰⁵ See the preamble to the Treaty and Arts. 1, 5, and 7.

¹⁰⁶ See NATO, The NATO Handbook, 1998 ed., ch. 2 (“The Principal Policy and Decision Making Institutions of the Alliance”) and ch. 7 (“Policy and Decision Making”), available online at http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/, visited June 30, l999.

¹⁰⁷ North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 9.

¹⁰⁸ Supra note 106, ch. 2:

¹⁰⁹ This is not to prejudge, however, the validity of arguments that the potential for abuse of a right of humanitarian intervention may more readily be avoided or reduced through concerted, as opposed to truly unilateral, action: see, e.g., Burmester, supra note 20 at 282–83. The only point made here is that, in assessing the generality of state practice, the mere fact of concerted action among 19 states does not detract from the fact that this still represents 19 instances of state practice.

¹¹⁰ The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.

¹¹¹ Turkey.

¹¹² See, e.g., Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “Backgrounder: Canada and Kosovo,” June 17, 1999, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/kosovo/text/back-e.asp, visited June 30, 1999. See also ‘The Situation in and around Kosovo,” Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Apr. 12, 1999, NATO Press Release M-NAC-t (99)51; “Statement on Kosovo,” Statement issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., Apr. 23,1999, NATO Press Release S-1 (99)62; Press Statement by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, Mar. 23, 1999, NATO Press Release (lggg) 040; “Statement on Political and Military Objectives of NATO Action with Regard to the Crisis in Kosovo,” Mar. 23, l999, NATO Press Release (l999) 043; Press Statement by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General following the Commencement of Air Operations, Mar. 24, l999, NATO Press Release (1999) 041; Letter from NATO Secretary General to President of the FRY, Jan. 30, 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/107.

¹¹³ See Baggett, supra note 71, text accompanying fns. 74 and 146.

¹¹⁴ As contemplated by the ICJ in Nicaraguav. U.S.A, supra note 12.

¹¹⁵ sources cited, supra notes 75, 78, and 112.

¹¹⁶ All sources cited, ibid.

¹¹⁷ All sources cited, ibid.

¹¹⁸ All sources cited, supra note 112.

¹¹⁹ See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] ICJ Rep. 4 at 42.

¹²⁰ Nicaraguav. U.S.A., supra note 12 at 108–9. See also Kritsiotis, D., Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Invervention” (1998) 19 Mich. J. Int’L. 1005 at 1010–11, 1013.Google Scholar

¹²¹ North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 119 at paras. 73–74.

¹²² See Baggett, supra note 71, text accompanying fn. 74.

¹²³ See, e.g., Declaration of the Interparliamentary Assembly of States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States Concerning Military Operations by NATO in the FRY, Apr. 3, 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/461, Apr. 22, 1999 (unanimous objection to such use of force by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Ukraine); Communiqué of Mar. 25, 1999 of the Rio Group of Latin American States Concerning the Situation in Kosovo, UN Doc. S/1999/347, Mar. 26, 1999 (challenging NATO actions as contrary to Arts. 53 and 54 of the UN Charter); Statement of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, Apr. 9, 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/451, Apr. 21, 1999 (emphasizing that diplomacy is the only route to peace and that the Security Council bears sole responsibility for invoking the use of force).

¹²⁴ See, e.g., J. A. Beesley, Canadian Statement of Dec. 4, 1970 to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, reprinted in Beesley, J. A. and Bourne, C. B., eds., “Canadian Practice in International Law during 1970 as Reflected Mainly in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs” (1971) 9 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 276–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also McDougal, M. S., “The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea” (1955) 49 A.J.I.L. 356–58.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ It is also noteworthy that a draft Security Council Resolution tabled by Russia on Mar. 26, 1999 calling for an end to NATO’s actions in Kosovo was defeated by a 12–3 vote: See “Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against FRY,” UN Press Release SC/6659, Mar. 26, l999. Only Russia, China, and Namibia voted in favour of the draft resolution.

¹²⁶ See, e.g., Chairman’s Summary of the Deliberations on Kosovo at the Informal Meeting of EU Heads of State on Apr. 14, 1999, UN Doc. S/199/429, esp. para. 2 (expressing unanimous support for NATO intervention in Kosovo); Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Bosnia and Hercegovina and Kosova, Apr. 7, 1999, UN Doc. S/1999/394, Apr. 7, 1994 (condemning human rights abuses by FRY in Kosovo and expressing “regret” that the Security Council has been unable to discharge its responsibilities in the matter). On the significance of acquiescence to the formation of new customary norms, see, e.g., MacGibbon, I. C., “Customary International Law and Acquiescence” (1957) 33 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 115 at 118–19.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ See generally Kritsiotis, supra note 120.

¹²⁸ Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, in an address to the Canadian Parliament, Apr. 29, 1999, reprinted in the Ottawa Citizen, Apr. 30, 1999 at A19.