In a systemic and structural analysis of centralization and de-centralization, these phenomena appear as different means of regulating social systems. The types of controls which the Centre maintains or concedes identify centralization and de-centralization. Seven types of stakes can be involved in the struggle over controls: objectives, positions occupied by actors, the organization and internal functioning of these posts, personalities, goods, information and the controls themselves. The first two stakes are more important than the others. In the “game” of centralization and de-centralization, one structural law of politics seems at least in part to determine the behaviour of the protagonists. Whether an actor is in a superior, equal, or inferior position in a structure characterized by control relations, the actor will seek to establish a “political” environment which maintains or augments his or her position. The debates regarding The Decentralization of Local Centres of Community Services in Quebec (C.L.S.C.) illustrate these theoretical propositions. Events unfolded as if there were a logical order between the stakes of controls, and as if in the struggle for controls the actors sought to establish power structures which would maintain or augment their original position.

Improvement of services is one of the principal objectives of reforms introduced into local governments, although this objective does not always guide the formulation of the contents of these reforms. A more rigorous analysis of the implications of service improvement should concentrate on local public goods, on their nature and, above all, on their supply and production—aspects hitherto only slightly developed. To start, one can try to infer certain local institutional characteristics which would be the most suitable for the purpose of service improvement. Certain authors who adopt this course anticipate a quasi-market model for local government services. A critical examination of this model shows that it is no longer suitable and that a preferable model is one which we can call “community co-responsibility.”

Severe criticisms since 1945 have been directed against Canadian defense policies. These criticisms are addressed both to the choice of strategic priorities and allocation of resources.

This article has two main objectives: to underline the dilemmas of policy-making in defense, and to demonstrate the necessity for developing a new procedure for defining priorities. The article proposes a model of theoretical analysis and applies it to the strategic variables which are most influential in determining contemporary Canadian defense policy. The analysis reveals the weaknesses and deficiences of the present decisional system. Procedures which would promote coherent policies, and the creation of a security council, are recommended as means to the development of a realistic defense policy.

Using data based on Quebec municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants, this article tests the hypothesis that the conjunction of economic conditions and labour unrest contributed significantly to the defeat of the Liberal party in the 1976 Quebec election. This hypothesis, suggested by the results of the election polls, follows from the conceptual framework furnished by political economy models. These models and the controversies they have given rise to are discussed first from a theoretical perspective. This discussion is followed by a brief review of empirical studies which could shed light on these controversies. Much of the theoretical discussion and most of the empirical results suggest that economic conditions generally have a significant influence on election results.

In the second part of the article, after a methodological discussion, we present the results of empirical tests conducted to examine our hypothesis about the influence of economic conditions on the November 1976 general election in Quebec. These results show that increased “fiscal pressure” between 1975 and 1976, union unrest, and the unemployment rate in 1976 had significant negative effects on the Liberal vote.

We conclude by raising questions about the effect economic factors could have on the results of the referendum on sovereignty-association.

At the centre of the debate raised by the development of Eurocommunism is the question of violence and its role in the Western European revolutionary process. This article first examines the major approaches taken by the French, Italian and Spanish Communist parties on this question. The purpose is to see whether these approaches are consistent with Lenin's thoughts. The body of the study focusses on Lenin's various views on the role of violent struggle and its use by the workers' party to achieve the socialist revolution. Lenin's view on this matter gives four meanings to the word constraint, each of which refers to a specific situation: The emphasis is on the evolution in the thinking of the Bolshevik leader concerning violence under the pressure of reality without denying the resulting theoretical profile. The analysis concludes by outlining the points of agreement and conflict between Lenin's thoughts and the ideas of Marchais, Berlinguer and Carillo.