The quality of the administration in a municipal government is probably more dependent on the quality of the officers and employees than is the case in either of the senior levels of government, for there is not that constant daily supervision of the work of the permanent personnel which obtains where the various departments operate under the full time direction of a member of the elected body. It is probable also, although one of those things which cannot be proven with exactitude, that the permanent personnel in the higher ranks in municipal service has more influence upon the policies of the elected body than is the case in either the provinces or the Dominion.

The purpose of my remarks is to raise for your consideration some thoughts with respect to the possibilities of public administration training at the municipal level and to outline briefly what is being done in the matter. It is not necessary here for me to argue the desirability of the aims of such training.

In considering what might be done it is necessary to keep in mind the circumstances of employment peculiar to the municipal field, some of which are advantageous to our purpose and some are not. It is difficult to generalize with respect to municipal problems because the range is so great. In the Province of Ontario for example, we have over 900 organized municipalities varying from a township with an assessed population of 78 and a total tax levy of $1,692 per annum to a city of 674,000 people with an annual tax levy of over $29 million. Consequently, we have a wide variation in the problems of administration. The public employees in municipal government fall into two general groups. There are those who are employed on a part time basis, usually at a very low salary, and whose public employment is not their main source of livelihood. These occur in the smaller or rural municipalities and probably form the larger portion of the total number. There are also those who are employed on a full time basis, who are paid a reasonable (?) salary and among whom are many extremely competent administrators.

It is extraordinary that almost all the well developed analysis of the alleged drift toward collectivism in economic organization is composed of studies of industrial concentration, of the banking system, and of the relations in general between government and economic life. We have no comparable studies of labour markets. It is the intention of this paper to offer hypotheses relating to the part played by collective bargaining in the alleged decline of competition and the inevitability of its attacks on competition and also to make several suggestions on public policy.

The question of training for administrative posts in the Public Service gives rise to certain questions regarding administration in general, and public administration in particular. What do we mean by administration? Does public administration differ from private administration? What qualities are necessary to make a good public administrator? Can training aid in the development of these qualities? If so, what form should it take? And how can it best be given?

“Administration” has been defined as “the performance of the executive duties of an institute or business”; and “public administration” as “the activities of the executive departments in the conduct of government.” “Executive duties” as related to public administration have again been defined as “pertaining to the execution of the country's laws,” and for the purpose of this discussion, we can perhaps agree that the public administration which we have in mind consists of the carrying out of the law in the various departments of government.

Are there fundamental differences between this form of administration and that which prevails in private business? There are at least certain distinctive elements in each. In industry the profit motive is a much more important factor than it is in government. Similarly the question of remuneration bulks more largely in private industry than it does in public administration. While the old conception of a post in the Public Service as “a job for life and a pension afterward” may have passed away, the financial rewards at present attached to administrative positions in the Public Service are not such as to render the public administrator subject to what Seneca speaks of as the most fertile source of human sorrow, namely, great possessions. A public servant, on the other hand, must be much more responsive to public opinion than his counterpart in industry. He must not only carry out a policy but must sense whether or not that policy meets with public approval. He is subject at all times to public criticism and to investigations as to his acts, and this factor has a determining effect upon his methods of administration to a greater degree than exists in industry.

Prior to 1930 discussion of public investment was conducted largely on the basis of an assumption of full employment within a closed economy. Consequently it centred around the productiveness of public investment as opposed to that undertaken in the privately-operated sector of the economy, the appropriate methods of financing the projects undertaken, and the legitimate spheres of operation of public bodies. The usefulness of public investment projects was believed, in the main, to be confined to their long term contribution to the productiveness of the economy. In practice, even well into the nineteen-thirties, governments, with exceptions, undertook public projects when finances were buoyant and borrowing relatively easy, and curtailed them, in attempts to balance budgets, when depression became serious.

After 1930 both in the thought and practices of some central governments and in economic writing the pendulum swung the other way. Main emphasis was laid on the current employment and income giving effects of public investment. This change in emphasis received additional impetus after the advent of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money when economic discussion became much more concerned with the level of employment than the distribution of the factors of production among alternative uses.

The transfer of attention from the long term aspects of public projects to their effect on current employment and income maintenance was accompanied by the shortcomings of practice and thought which are inevitable in an undeveloped field. While a good deal was written and spoken about the desirability of well thought out and well planned investment, insufficient attention was given to its attainment and in practice resort was had to many undertakings whose value, from either a short or long term viewpoint, was dubious. The shortcomings were largely associated with failure to cope adequately with the institutional and administrative problem involved. Further, there was a penchant for fastening on single devices to meet the overall employment problem.

Hobbes is as renowned a name in political science as is Adam Smith in economics. Accordingly, prevailing notions of what Hobbes meant to say have varied from time to time. While his materialist utilitarianism has been a strong current since he propounded it, Hobbes's modern reputation dates from the re-emphasis on sovereignty and utilitarian morals by the Benthamists. The reaction against Benthamism led to strong criticism of Hobbes by English idealists such as T. H. Green. Their criticism of his materialist metaphysics and of his behaviourist ethics set the tone of the standard treatment of Hobbes, and seemed to have rendered his political views harmless. As long as Hobbes was regarded as primarily a materialist and his political doctrines were seen as consistent deductions from his materialist position, it was relatively easy to dispose of his unpleasant theory of the state, for materialism has had little standing in English political thinking since the eighteenth century when the historical materialism of Millar, Ferguson, and Robertson enjoyed some prestige.

Hobbes's stature, however, was too great for his political ideas to be tidied away in this fashion. Later generations of scholars set out to detach Hobbes's political theory from his materialism. Croom Robertson in 1886, John Laird in 1934, and Leo Strauss in 1936 have taken the position that Hobbes's political philosophy was not derived from his materialism or decisively influenced by his concept of science. While it is possible to show that Hobbes might have reached his political conclusions from certain moral attitudes and preconceptions unrelated to materialism or science, this position raises other difficulties. In view of the emphasis which Hobbes placed on his materialism and in view of his insistence on the scientific nature of his method it seems unsatisfactory to dismiss these attributes of his thought as merely his share in the current intellectual fashion, especially when the result is to say, as does John Laird, that his thought is mediaeval, or, as with some current text-book writers, to leave his theory rootless and unexplained except as the reaction of a timid man to the disturbed political conditions of his time.

Statistics provide data for action. A statistic which will not be used was not worth the trouble of collecting. I consider this a part of the definition of the subject and will not undertake to support it here. The action of course need not follow immediately; it may not be taken until the results of many other observations are available.

Specifically, statistics deal with random variation. In any practical situation, after we have accounted for every variable which can be brought under control, we still cannot say exactly what will happen. In manufacturing a coil spring, we may use metal of fixed chemical specification, even from the same heat, have a fixed setting on the machine which coils the spring, the same time and the same temperatures in tempering it, and still the tensions of the successive springs which are produced will vary. Given a variety of wheat whose seed is the purest strain we can procure, we plant a number of plots in soil of the same chemical composition, apply the same manurial treatment, see to it that the slopes and the irrigation are the same, plant the seed and cultivate the grain in the same way, and yet we find that the yields vary. In no practical case can theory provide an exhaustive account of the relevant variables, our physical control of real situations is never perfect, and consequently we are never in a position where the result will come out exactly to order.

The great expansion of governmental activities into social and economic affairs during the last few decades has led to an enormous increase in the amount of “delegated legislation” or “administrative law.” The necessity for such delegation and the dangers to individual liberty which it involves have been fully explained elsewhere. It is the purpose of this article to discuss these problems in so far as the Board of Transport Commissioners is concerned. Known for thirty-four years after its inception in 1904 as the Board of Railway Commissioners, this body is not only the oldest but by far the most important administrative board in Canada. A study of its powers and performance should reveal the strengths and dangers of this type of administrative authority.

The chief function of the Board is to control steam railways under the jurisdiction of the Dominion government including those which, according to the terms of the B.N.A. Act, have been declared to be “works for the public advantage of Canada.” All other railways come under the Board where their connections with, or their crossing of, a Dominion railway is concerned and with respect of navigable waters. The Board also controls the rates charged by certain telegraph, telephone, and marine cable companies and the tolls of express companies and international bridges. It has authority to license ships operating between certain ports of Canada including control of their rates, and from 1938 to 1944 it supervised transport by air. Where water-power has been acquired under lease from the Crown, the Board may fix the quantity to be developed and the price to be paid in case of dispute. Authority for every order of the Board must be found in the Railway Act as amended. The Board is limited by certain Special Acts notably the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement, as amended, and the Maritime Freight Rates Act.