¹ Brecht, , Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth Century Political Thought (Princeton, 1959CrossRefGoogle Scholar), especially chaps. 9 and 10.

² The relevant citations, with page or chapter numbers indicating the writer's statement of a logical distinction between reason, fact, and value, are as follows: Weldon, , The Vocabulary of Politics (Baltimore, 1953Google Scholar), chaps. 2 and 5; Meehan, , The Theory and Method of Political Analysis (Homewood, Ill., 1965), 47, 215, 221, 230, 263Google Scholar; Runciman, , Social Science and Political Theory (Cambridge, 1965), 177Google Scholar; Simon, , Administrative Behavior (2nd ed., New York, 1957), 249Google Scholar; Kerlinger, , Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York, 1964), 25Google Scholar; Lundberg, George A., Can Science Save Us? (New York, 1961), 76.Google Scholar Lundberg's answer to the question posed in his book's title is an almost unqualified “yes.” Lundberg also is a long-standing advocate of the applicability of natural science techniques to the social sciences (see his “Semantics and the Value Problem,” Social Forces, 27 (1948), especially 116). For an attack on Lundberg's thought and “value-free” social science, see Horowitz, Irving L., “Establishment Sociology: The Value of Being Value-Free,” Inquiry, 6 (1963).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Perhaps the most concise statement of Hume's, David position may be found in his A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740Google Scholar), Book iii, part I, especially the conclusion of section ii. For Max Weber I particularly have in mind his essay “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics,” which may be found in Shils, Edward and Finch, Henry, eds., The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, Ill., 1949Google Scholar), especially 20–5.

³ Foundations of Behavioral Research, 488.

⁴ Voegelin, , The New Science of Politics (Chicago, 1952Google Scholar). A distinguished scholar of political philosophy and the classics, Voegelin has taught most recently at Louisiana State University and the University of Munich. Another example in this particular category of anti-behavioural criticism is Russell Kirk's essay in Polsby, Nelson, Dentler, Robert, and Smith, Paul A., eds., Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior (Boston, 1963Google Scholar), especially 63. Leo Strauss's criticisms of value-free social science, in terms of its apparent nihilistic implications, are noted below.

⁵ The New Science of Politics, 172.

⁶ Ibid., 144. Terminiello's public attacks on Jews and the Roosevelt administration had placed him in the fascist category. In his dissent, however, Justice Jackson clearly was referring to both communist and fascist movements.

⁷ See Jackson's, holding opinion in the second flag-salute case, West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette (United States Reports, Washington, DC, vol. 319, 1942Google Scholar), and his dissent in Korematsu v United States ( ibid., vol. 323, 1944).

⁸ In addition to Jackson's dissent in Terminiello v Chicago (ibid., vol. 337, 1948), see his opinions in Saia v New York (ibid., vol. 334, 1947), and Kunz v New York ( ibid., vol. 340, 1950).

⁹ Riker, , The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, 1962Google Scholar); Downs, , An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York, 1957Google Scholar).

¹⁰ The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York, 1961; first published in German in 1934), 40, 47.

¹¹ For an attempt at providing an inductive justification of inductive inference, see Braithwaite, R. B., Scientific Explanation (Cambridge, 1955Google Scholar). But also see Coburn's, Robert C. critical review of Braithwaite's book in Philosophy of Science, 28 (Jan. 1961), 65–71.Google Scholar

¹² The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962).

¹³ Social Theory and Social Structure (3rd ed., New York, 1968; first published in 1949), 157. By “deflects” Merton means that empirical research shifts attention to new and unanticipated problems, thereby giving rise to new theory.

¹⁴ Ibid., 153–5; Kaplan, , The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (San Francisco, 1964), 298Google Scholar; Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis, 161–7.

¹⁵ To cite a leading example in the study of political parties, see the concluding chapter in LaPalombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 1966CrossRefGoogle Scholar), which is especially rich in hypothesis formation and empirical testing. In the broader context of political development, Apter, David is explicit about the deductive character of his work in The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965Google Scholar), a volume understood as preliminary to the empirical testing of his hypotheses which will be the subject of a subsequent book.

¹⁶ Eckstein, Harry, Pressure Group Politics (London, 1960), 21.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Quoted in Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 150.

¹⁸ Social Theory and Social Structure, 42 (emphasis in the original). Also see Merton's, “The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory,” British Journal of Sociology, 8 (June 1957CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

¹⁹ Rae, Douglas, “A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems,” Comparative Political Studies, 1 (Oct. 1968), 414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁰ (New York, 1962), ed. Herbert J. Storing, with the following contributions: Walter Berns, “Voting Studies”; Herbert J. Storing, “The Science of Administration: Herbert A. Simon”; Leo Weinstein, “The Group Approach: Arthur F. Bentley”; Robert Horwitz, “Scientific Propaganda: Harold D. Lasswell”; and Leo Strauss, “An Epilogue.” For another listing of social scientific inquiry which apparently has assumed its value-neutrality erroneously, see Value in Social Theory: A Selection of Essays on Methodology by Gunnar Myrdal, ed. Streeten, Paul (London, 1958), 134–52.Google Scholar For reasons noted below, however, Myrdal can not be included in the Straussian category.

²¹ Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, especially 24, 44, 50, 150, 220–1, 303, 317.

²² What is Political Philosophy? (New York, 1959), 13.

²³ Strauss, “An Epilogue,” Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, 308–10. See also the introduction to Strauss's more exhaustive study of this general problem in Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953). In this latter work, Strauss (as Voegelin) argues the nihilistic implications of value-free social science for public policy by citing those “generous liberals [who] view the abandonment of natural right not only with placidity but with relief. They appear to believe that our [alleged] inability to acquire any genuine knowledge of what is intrinsically good or right compels us to be tolerant of every opinion about good or right or to recognize all preferences or all ‘civilizations’ as equally respectable” (p. 5). This is a thinly veiled reference to Max Weber's thought, although as I noted above it is an erroneous interpretation of Weber.

²⁴ See Schaar, John H. and Wolin, Sheldon S., “Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics: A Critique,” American Political Science Review, 57 (March 1963), 125–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Schaar and Wolin write a careful and generally fair criticism of each of the essays appearing in the Storing volume, cited above. Their critique is followed (pp. 151–60) by responses from each of the contributors to Essays, responses which are notable more for their acrimony than their attempts at rebuttal.

²⁵ The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York, 1961), 486–7. See also Toulmin, Stephen, The Philosophy of Science (New York, 1960), 17–18Google Scholar; Russell, Bertrand, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London, 1948), 339–41Google Scholar; Mills, C. Wright, The Sociological Imagination (New York, 1961), 79Google Scholar; Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, 381; Rose, Arnold M., Theory and Method in the Social Sciences (Minneapolis, 1954Google Scholar), chap. 7; and Bernard, Jessie, “The Art of Science,” American Journal of Sociology, 55 (July 1949), 1–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ To cite only two important contributions to the study of political culture, where the methodological sophistication of the authors is not matched by a concern for value control: Banfield, Edward C., The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York, 1958Google Scholar), and Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture (Boston and Toronto, 1965Google Scholar). Other leading studies focusing on political culture in the process of modernization, but studies which ignore the problems of value control in research and analysis, include Pye, Lucian W., Aspects of Political Development (Boston and Toronto, 1966Google Scholar), and Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, G. Bingham Jr., Comparative Politics, A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto, 1966Google Scholar). The value problem appears to be especially crucial to David E. Apter's study of modernization in terms of the structural, behavioural, and normative characteristics of developing societies. Apter recognizes the value bias of developmental models based on western ideals and norms, and he explicitly states that “my contention is that, in political life, that which is significant (both from the standpoint of the observer and from that of the participant) can only be understood in moral terms.” And yet Apter does not explain why his own models and evaluations of the processes of development in non-western societies are free of the bias he attributes to other studies. The Politics of Modernization, Preface, 13–14, and chap. 1.

²⁷ For example, see Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Rosenberg, Morris, The Language of Social Re-search (Glencoe, Ill., 1955Google Scholar); also, Polsby, Dentler, and Smith, Politics and Social Life. And while both Kerlinger (Foundations of Behavioral Research) and Runciman (Social Science and Political Theory) accept the traditional distinction between fact and value, neither of them attempts to explain how the search for fact can be controlled for the influence of value.

²⁸ See Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, 383–4, 409; Myrdal, Gunnar, “Methodological Note on Facts and Valuations in Social Science,” in his American Dilemma (New York, 1944), 1027–64Google Scholar; Paul Streeten, Value in Social Theory, Introduction, 27; Rose, Theory and Method in the Social Sciences, 163; and Nagel, The Structure of Science, 489.

²⁸ See Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 44–8; Berelson, Bernard, “Introduction to the Behavioral Sciences,” in Berelson, , ed., The Behavioral Sciences Today (New York, 1963), 3Google Scholar; Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis, 174; Phillips, Bernard S., Research Strategy and Tactics (New York, 1966), 62–3Google Scholar; Golembiewski, Robert T., Welsh, William A., and Crotty, William J., A Methodological Primer for Political Scientists (Chicago, 1969), 241Google Scholar; Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, 390–1; and Nagel, The Structure of Science, 488–9. For Kant's, advocacy of replication as a test of “objectivity,” see his Critique of Pure Reason (1781Google Scholar), chap. 2, sec. 3.

³⁰ Dewey, John, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York, 1938), 496Google Scholar; Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, 391–6; Streeten, Value in Social Theory, Introduction, 14; Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics, 13–14, 153–7, 163; Nagel, The Structure of Science, 489; and Hempel, Carl G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York, 1965), 84–5.Google Scholar

³¹ This is true, for example, of Edward Banfield's work in southern Italy (The Moral Basis of a Backward Society), and of Laurence Wylie's study of peasant society in the south of France, Village in the Vaucluse (Cambridge, Mass., 1957). The implicit assumption that participant-observation controls for the values of the researcher also is characteristic of the great variety of studies in social and cultural anthropology, dating back to Margaret Mead's work, Coming of Age in Samoa (this book and two others by Professor Mead, are included in From the South Seas: Studies of Adolescence and Sex in Primitive Societies [New York, 1939Google Scholar ]), and even earlier to Bronislaw Malinowski's studies in Australia, East Africa, Mexico, the South Pacific, and among the Hopi of Arizona (see Malinowski's, last book, A Scientific Theory of Culture [Chapel Hill, NC, 1944Google Scholar ]). Well before the development of modern anthropological techniques the French Enlightenment produced studies (especially those by Bougainville and the French lesuits) of pre-modern cultures, including the cultures of the Huron Indians of North America and the Hottentots of Africa. And, again, the implicit assumption was that the cultural values carried by the researcher could be neutralized by intensive exposure to the foreign culture. In a recently edited volume explicitly concerned with methodological theory in anthropology, there is no reference to the value problem: The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology (London, 1965).

³² The Conduct of Inquiry, 396–7, 409.

³³ Moodie, , The Government of Great Britain (New York, 1961Google Scholar), Introduction, 8; Lipset, , Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, NY, 1963Google Scholar), Foreword, 10, and chap. 13.

³⁴ An example of disconfirmation of the findings of prior research, following a conscious replication of research strategies, appears in Marsh, Robert M. and Parish, William L., “Modernization and Communism: A Re-Test of Lipset's Hypotheses,” American Sociological Review, 30 (Dec. 1965), 934–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁵ See Thorez, Maurice and Claude, Henri, Une tragique réalité: la paupérisation des travailleurs français (Paris, 1961Google Scholar). This is a publication of the French Communist party.

³⁶ A Scientific Theory of Culture, 23.

³⁷ Social Theory and Social Structure (1949 ed.), 6, 9.

³⁸ For example, see Golembiewski, Welsh, and Crotty, A Methodological Primer, 26; also, LaPalombara, Joseph, Interest Groups in Italian Politics (Princeton, 1964), 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ Methodology of the Behavioral Sciences: Problems and Controversies (Springfield, Ill., 1964), 33–4.

⁴⁰ Social Theory and Social Structure (3rd ed.), 40–1, 51, 61, 68.

⁴¹ Ibid., 39.

⁴² Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, 1960), 10; see also part iv, 191— 205.

⁴³ Ibid., 20.

⁴⁴ This mistake may be found in Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis, 120–1. In the relevant literature, however, this is a frequent error, and Meehan's book otherwise may serve as a very useful introduction to the methodologies of political science.

⁴⁵ The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York, 1953).

⁴⁶ Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 147, In the passages that immediately follow this quotation, Kuhn shows how even contradictory interpretations of the same data may be valid, in which case the selection of a particular paradigm (which no longer is dependent on empirical testing) is very likely to reflect the theorist's value preferences.

⁴⁷ Aspects of Scientific Explanation, 95.

⁴⁸ The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), 309.