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Trends in Intensity Variation of Palestinian Military Activity: 1967–1978*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Abraham Diskin
Abraham Diskin
Affiliation:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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Abstract

This note reports the results of an attempt to detect a systematic pattern in the development of terrorist activity of the Palestine Liberation Organization during the period 1967-1978. Since its establishment in 1964 the PLO has seen the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as insoluble by political, as distinct from, military means. A quantitative analysis of Palestinian military activities explores a downward trend in the annual frequency of activity in the administered territories and an upward trend in the annual frequency of activity within the pre-1967 lines. Israeli punishment did not work as a deterrent but remained an essentially retaliatory activity despite the apparent intentions of its authors. The changes in the military activity of the PLO were systematic rather than coincidental. The main cause of significant long-term increases in the activity of the Palestinian organizations was the impetus provided by political events for the recovery of operative bases of action and motivation for guerrilla activity. Reinforcement of both organizational and motivational militancy followed the perception by the Palestinian organizations that political victories could not be gained without terrorist activity.

Résumé

Cette note se propose de montrer qu'il existe un modèle d'interprétation susceptible de rendre compte de l'activité terroriste de l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine pendant la période 1967–1978. Depuis sa constitution en 1964, l'O.L.P. a considéré que le conflit israélo-palestinien ne pouvait se résoudre ni par des moyens politiques, ni par des actions militaires. L'analyse quantitative des activités militaires palestiniennes montre la diminution des activités à l'intérieur des lignes de démarcation de 1967. La riposte israélienne ne joue pas comme un élément de découragement, mais elle reste essentiellement une activité de représailles malgré les intentions des auteurs. Les changements dans l'activité militaire de l'O.L.P. furent systématiques et non pas conjoncturels. La cause principale de l'accroissement significatif, à long terme, de l'activité des organisations palestiniennes fut l'encouragement issu des événements politiques associés à la récupération des bases opératives d'action et par la motivation de l'activité de guérilla. La perception des organisations palestiniennes d'après laquelle l'activité terroriste prépare les victoires politiques a eu pour effet de renforcer le militantisme organisationnel et la motivation.

Type
Notes
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 335 - 348
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1983

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References

1 Nahmath. el Tahrir el Falastina. 1968.

2 Yaniv, Avner, PLO–A Profile (Haifa: Israel Universities Study Group for Middle Eastern Affairs, 1974).Google Scholar

3 Central Intelligence Agency, International Terrorism in 1976 (Washington: U.S. Government, 1977).Google Scholar

4 The term “incidents,” which is not well defined by the spokesman of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) is generally used by Israeli sources. It is equivalent to the term “operations” generally used by Palestinian sources. To enable the reader to compare my data with statistics published by the IDF spokesman, I am using the original terms throughout the note.

5 Mishal, Shaul and Diskin, Abraham. “Palestinian Voting in the West Bank: Electoral Behavior in a Traditional Community Without Sovereignty,” Journal of Politics 44 (1982), 538-58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Ha'aretz, May 18, 1981, gives the most up to date information.

7 Lesche, Ann M., “Israel Deportation of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 1967-1978,” Journal of Palestine Studies 8 (1979). 101-12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Fuad Jabber, “Guerrilla Military Operations Carried Out by Fatah, 1965 to May 1967,” in Quandt, William B., Jabber, Fuad, and Lesch, Ann M. (eds.), The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 172.Google Scholar

9 All these developments are closely related to well-known theories about deterrence, retaliation and escalation, and certain aspects of comparative politics. With very few exceptions, I did not attempt to elaborate on such aspects.