¹ Walter Young's magnificent study of the ccf rests upon a careful documentation of precisely this conflict – between the demands of the movement and the demands of the party. See in particular chap. 1 of Young, Walter D., The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932–61 (Toronto, 1969)Google Scholar.

² See Underhill, Frank H., “The Winnipeg Declaration of the c.c.f.,” in his In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto, 1960), 243–7Google Scholar.

³ The so-called Waffle Manifesto was printed in Canadian Dimension, Aug.–Sept. 1969, 8–10.

⁴ See the account of the debate in the Globe and Mail, Oct. 31, 1969, and reports earlier that week of discussions in the Federal Council of the party. At the October 1970 convention of the Ontario party a more carefully worded statement came much closer to being accepted. See New Democratic Party of Ontario, Resolutions for the Fifth Biennial Convention (Toronto, 1970), 14–17.

⁵ Young, Walter, “Regina Thirty Years Later,” Canadian Forum, Sept. 1963, 124–6Google Scholar. See also Taylor, Charles, “Regina Revisited: Reply to Walter Young,” Canadian Forum, Oct. 1963, 150–1Google Scholar.

⁶ “Towards An Extra-Parliamentary Opposition in Canada,” Our Generation, 6, no. 4 (1969), 15–16.

⁷ “The Choice Before the Labour Party,” Political Quarterly, 3, no. 3 (July–Sept. 1932), 327.

⁸ “British Socialism Today,” in his The Radical Tradition, ed. Hinden, Rita (London, 1964), 173–4Google Scholar.

⁹ Marx's own view of the effect of the extension of the franchise on the proper strategy for. socialists is still a matter of controversy, but it seems clear that he accepted the idea of peaceful parliamentary change at least as far as England was concerned. See Lichtheim, George, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (London, 1961), 98–9Google Scholar. In the last paragraph of the preface to the first English edition of Capital Engels attributes to him a belief which, when taken in the context of Marx's other writings and the conditions of the time, strongly suggests that this was his view. There is, as well, his alleged statement after the Hague Congress of the First International in 1872: “… we do not deny that there are certain countries, such as the United States and England, in which the workers may hope to secure their ends by peaceful means.” Quoted in Steckloff, G. M., History of the First International, trans. Eden, and Paul, Cedar (London, 1928), 241.Google Scholar Engels' own view of the question is well known. See his introduction to the 1895 edition of The Class Struggles in France, Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick, Selected Works (Moscow, 1958), I, especially 125, 130, 132–3, and 136Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See Cole, G. D. H., The Second International: 1889–1914, vol. III of his History of Socialist Thought (London, 1956), 255.Google Scholar

¹¹ Such a description of this aspect of the debate within modern social democratic parties will almost certainly be regarded by some as little more than a caricature of the real issues which divide the antagonists. It is not so far from the truth, however, that it will not be recognized by anyone with experience of the British Labour Party since, say, 1959 or – in more recent years – of the New Democratic Party in Canada.

¹² Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (3rd ed., London, 1950), 167Google Scholar.

¹³ Ibid, 170–1.

¹⁴ Crosland, C. A. R., The Future of Socialism (London, 1956), 97Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Capital, I, chap. 1, sec. 4.

¹⁶ For the view that the welfare state is properly understood as merely a necessary elaboration of traditional liberal social relationships, see my “The Political Thought of T. H. Green,” unpublished ma dissertation, University of Toronto, 1960. I am rather inclined to the view once expressed by my colleague, Professor David Kirk, that “the welfare state is a sewage system for draining off the resentment of the working classes.”

¹⁷ I do not pretend to be familiar with all aspects of modern economic analysis, and this view may very well be unfair. Certainly there is a good deal of economic writing, particularly in Eastern Europe, which does attempt to re-examine the basis of modern capitalism. But among democratic socialists these kinds of questions do not generally appear to be asked. See, however, Taylor, Charles, The Pattern of Politics (Toronto, 1970)Google Scholar; Miliband, Ralph, The State in Capitalist Society (London, 1969)Google Scholar; and McLeod, Jack, “Post-Capitalist Society,” in Lloyd, Trevor and McLeod, Jack, eds., Agenda 1970: Proposals for a Creative Politics (Toronto, 1968)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ It may be argued, of course, that the economic system is a product of values derived from other sources, and on that account not as fundamental as I have suggested. But people do not design their own economic system; rather they live and work within one which is already established. To that extent we may say that they are determined by forces beyond their control. In any case it appears that one's view of this question, that is to say whether or not one is an economic determinist, cannot be finally settled by argument alone. Those who wish to say that economic institutions are not as important as other institutions are free to do so, and to seek ways of combating the very considerable historical evidence to the contrary.

¹⁹ This formulation of the socialist end, together with the description of contemporary capitalism which follows it, is taken from the founding statement of the London, England, New Party Club, adopted June 21, 1961, and endorsed on that occasion by a number of people who have since joined the faculty of several Canadian universities as well as having found their way into the councils of the New Democratic Party.

²⁰ It may be argued that adopting this procedure necessarily restricts the analysis, since very powerful objections to capitalism have been developed by people who do not regard themselves as socialists. I cannot see why this should create a difficulty. To be a critic of contemporary society is one thing. To be moved as well to replace that society ultimately with something different is another. The point is that those who call themselves socialists, and who on that account proclaim their adherence at least to the idea of moving forward from our present arrangements, do have a common set of shared beliefs which are too often overlooked.

²¹ This is the source of the peculiar agreement which is often found between socialists and conservatives, and which is manifested in Canada in Gad Horowitz' characterization of the red tory. See his review of Grant's, GeorgeLament for a Nation, “Tories, Socialists and the Demise of Canada,” Canadian Dimension, May–June 1965, 12–15Google Scholar. It is never clear whether Professor Grant is fundamentally a socialist or fundamentally a conservative. See, for example, his “An Ethic of Community,” in Oliver, Michael, ed., Social Purpose for Canada (Toronto, 1961), 3–26Google Scholar.

²² It may be that we would be farther ahead if we regarded the conservative as a liberal with a peculiar predilection for collective activity. In the case of Burke it would then be argued that the importance of the collectivity was no more than a device to sustain the threatened hegemony of bourgeois values. See Macpherson, C. B., “Edmund Burke,” Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, series III, 53, section II (1959), 19–26Google Scholar.

²³ I have spent some time looking for the single word which would convey the meaning I have in mind, since the ideas I wish to develop depend very heavily on what choices are made at this stage of the argument. I am well aware that the word friendship may not be wholly satisfactory as an expression of what appears to me to be the common aspiration of socialists, but I have been unable to find an adequate alternative. Even trying to define friendship presents difficulties. The conventional dictionary definition (love, other than familial or sexual love) does not appear to take us very far, nor, unfortunately, does the very extensive discussion of the concept in Book VIII of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. It is clear that friendship does not mean the same thing to all people. Some regard it as an intensely personal thing, and therefore quite inappropriate as a way of characterizing a general social value. If, however, such people can force themselves to take the meaning they usually associate with the word and imagine it as generally applicable between all people, what follows should be clear enough.

²⁴ Both the Christian socialist and classical communist requirement was for a condition of “from each according to his ability and to each according to his need” which clearly does not imply intellectual, physical, or economic equality.

²⁵ It is essential to have a precise meaning of the word abundance if this application of the idea of friendship is to be properly understood. Conventional economic analysis evidently regards complete abundance as unattainable, on the ground that consumer wants can never be entirely satisfied. Quite apart from the assumptions which this view makes about the most fundamental motivations for human behaviour – which are treated in the next several paragraphs – it has often been pointed out that such an analysis also assumes an equal ordering of wants for different commodities (see, for example, Galbraith, J. K., The Affluent Society (London, 1958), 115–18Google Scholar). Yet it is clear that individuals do regard the satisfaction of particular wants as having greater importance. The existence of abundance is therefore not simply measured by a scale which indicates an excess of available goods over the largest imaginable demand; it depends ultimately on the evaluations people make of what is important to them and how much they literally need for their satisfaction. Thus in a society where, customarily, individuals put the satisfaction of the wants of others ahead of their own, where, that is to say, people were habitually willing to make sacrifices for each other, it seems reasonable to claim that abundance would exist, since the objectivity of the word is entirely a function of common agreement in the society on the essential ends of life. But this view of the relationship one has with others is surely precisely that which the idea of friendship conveys. It may therefore be said that in a society in which friendship was the dominant social value there would be abundance or, which is really the point, there would be thought to be abundance. This does not necessarily imply, of course, a bare subsistence level of material well-being.

²⁶ This argument may usefully be compared with Professor Lewis' discussion of the viability of non-material rewards in any modern economy. See Lewis, W. Arthur, The Theory of Economic Growth (Homewood, Ill., 1955), 57–60Google Scholar.

²⁷ An example of this kind of argument may be seen in Michels' analysis of the experience of the German Social Democratic Party, which led him to reject the possibility of the achievement of socialism on the ground that the “iron law of oligarchy” made the pure democratic structure of a socialist society incapable of attainment. See Michels, Robert, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden, and Paul, Cedar (London, 1915Google Scholar). But it appears (see especially Part IV, chap. 4) that his demonstration of the natural inclination of leaders to perpetuate oligarchy depends upon the prior assumption of the natural selfishness of human beings.

²⁸ As an example, it might be claimed that the party system as we know it would cease to exist, and that representative institutions (if they were preserved) would be populated by individual members of parliament speaking primarily for their own constituents. To the extent that the parliamentary system of government fosters cohesive legislative parties primarily as a consequence of the greater demands which the industrial age makes upon governments, the likely decrease in governmental activity which the advent of a socialist society would entail might easily lead to this development. In any case, it has been argued that the modern party system is a direct consequence of the requirements and circumstances of capitalist democracy, and in particular of the conflict between social classes which is said to be typical of such a society. See C. B. Mapherson, “The Role of Party Systems in Democracy,” paper presented to the Third Congress of the International Political Science Association, Stockholm, 1955. Since in the conception of socialism being developed here the significance of social classes would entirely disappear once a dominant value of friendship had been achieved, it may also be said that at least our kind of party system would disappear. An alternative possibility might be a party system with no observable ideological distinction between the parties, there being no basis in the society for ideological division. On balance, however, this seems even more unlikely since in a society in which the dominant social value was friendship there could be little of the conflict normally associated with any multiple party system. There appears to be no limit, other than one's imagination, to the extensions which might be made to the analysis working from the line of reasoning which has been laid out here.

²⁹ See above, p. 645.

³⁰ It may be argued that the gulf between proponents of extra-parliamentary agitation and those who favour electoral politics is founded on more than merely a different assessment of what is required to create a socialist society. Some of the former may well be discouraged by what they regard as the unfairness of the rules of the electoral game. To the extent that partisan opinion is nowhere in Canada faithfully reflected in the composition of the legislature such a criticism has considerable force, but it is hardly unanswerable. More serious is the claim that electoral politics can never achieve the socialist end because democratic governments are always forced to compromise with the system and are unable to legislate for the millenium. I am not at all persuaded that this conflict is the source of the difficulty. It seems to me much more likely that the problem lies in a failure to think out fully the necessary conditions for a successful program of extra-parliamentary agitation. As I have suggested, the two schools of thought require each other's help, since neither can expect to achieve its end without the active co-operation of the other. Short of claiming, therefore, that one or the other school is perhaps not really seeking the end of a socialist society – which would, I think, disqualify it as a legitimate socialist option – it seems to me clear that the two branches of the modern democratic left cannot be seen in any other way than as two inseparable tactics of a single overall strategy.

³¹ This observation may be regarded as altogether too elementary. My intention, however, is only to underline the distinction – which appears to me essential for the kind of socialism I am discussing – between democratic and non-democratic politics. If participation is thought of as a principal element in the development of a socialist society (and I do not see how that can be avoided) it is entirely possible that this aspect of the argument could be extended to consider the relevance of a whole range of institutions and processes in which people are now merely ordered about. I have no doubt that the need for greater individual participation in decisions which affect our lives could easily be derived from the main lines of the argument, and might even be required by it, but its pursuit would necessitate a rather more lengthy treatment than was intended for this paper.

³² It is probably important to recognize that I have deliberately avoided a discussion of the role of public ownership in the development of a socialist society because it is not clear to me that by itself public ownership has much to do with socialism. Certainly, a strong case can be made that it is entirely a bourgeois conception, and specifically the product of advanced capitalist society where greater stress is laid on the accountability of the powerful. Unless, however, assumptions are made about “human nature” of the kind which have already been shown to be untenable, there is no reason why it should not be conceded that people are capable of using their privately owned goods in a public way, that is to say, in a friendly, sharing way. Such a pattern of behaviour is what might be expected of a society in which friendship was the dominant social value. But if all people owned privately yet habitually shared their goods it seems likely that the concept of ownership would have lost much of its meaning if it had not disappeared entirely. Thus to insist upon public ownership as an essential element of a socialist society is to claim that we will always live in a society where ownership as such is relevant, which is very close to saying that we will never achieve a socialist society in the sense in which it has been described in this paper. It is clear, of course, that public ownership will be an indispensable tool for engineering the transformation, because its relevance is very obviously a function of the extent to which private ownership remains an important and cherished characteristic of our society. But in the long run it can never be more than one among many instruments which are available to a democratic socialist government for creating and developing institutions which will foster the growth of the value of friendship.