1 The figure of approximately 7.000 warheads has wide currency. For a confirmation of this figure see the answer by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to a question by Senator Symington, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Sub-Committee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad and the Sub-Committee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate. 93rd. Congress, 2nd session, on U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe and U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Doctrines and Policies. March 7. 14. and April 4, 1974, Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1974, 199. (U.S. Senate. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.)

2 U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st session. December 2, 1973. U.S. Security Issues in Europe: Burden Sharing and Offset, MBFR and Nuclear Weapons. Staff Report prepared for the Sub-Committee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington: G.P.O., 1973. 14. (U.S. Senate, U.S. Security Issues in Europe.)

3 Statement of Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1974 Defense Budget and the FY 1974–78 Program, April 10, 1973, 27. (Richardson, FY 1974 Posture Statement.)

4 The Theatre Nuclear Force Posture in Europe. Report to Congress by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. Excerpted in Survival 17 (1975), 238. Some estimates quoting the figure of 7,000 warheads in Europe include naval weapons; see U.S. Senate, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. On the other hand, others exclude naval weapons from the estimate; see U.S. Senate, U.S. Security Issues in Europe, 13. In either case, the overall general scale of the theatre nuclear stockpile is not much affected. British and French warheads are not included in these estimates.

5 Currently, the aircraft of Strategic Air Command (SAC), the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) and the SLBMs are available; however, a greater number of possibilities would be created by the full development of the “cruise missile.” For a useful discussion of the cruise missile, see Burt, Richard, “The Cruise Missile and Arms Control,” Survival 18 (1976), 10–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has stated that the yields of the weapons inventory in Europe range from sub-kiloton to megaton levels, with an average yield of less than four kilotons. U.S. Senate. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 198.

7 See, for example, the evidence of General Goodpaster, as SACEUR, before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, February 19, 1974. To Consider NATO Matters. Hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Congress of the United States, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, February 19, 1974. U.S.G.P.O., 1975. Also, evidence of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, U.S. Senate, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 155.

8 The implications of asymmetries between Warsaw Pact and NATO theatre nuclear weapon doctrines, deployments and operational characteristics are not considered here. It is doubtful if there exists any substantial mutual understanding, tacit or otherwise, as to what constitutes “tactical use,” although these matters have arisen both within the context of The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Mutual Force Reductions (MFR) negotiations in Vienna. For some discussion of these issues see Canby, Steven L., “Damping Nuclear Counterforce Incentives: Correcting NATO's Inferiority in Conventional Military Strength,” Orbis 19 (1975), 47–71Google Scholar; S. T. Cohen and W. C. Lyons, “A Comparison of U.S. Allied and Soviet Tactical Nuclear Force Capabilities and Policies,” ibid., 72–92; Record, Jeffrey (with the assistance of Anderson, T. I.), U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1974), 37–44.Google Scholar

9 There already exists an extensive literature discussing the implications of “mini-nukes.” A positive view is taken of the possibilities of a modernized TNW arsenal by Karber, Philip A., “Nuclear Weapons and ‘Flexible Response,’” Orbis 14 (1970), 284–97Google Scholar; Gray, Colin S., “Mini-nukes and Strategy,” International Journal 29 (1973), 216–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Polk, J. H., “The Realities of Tactical Nuclear Warfare,” Orbis 17 (1973), 439–62Google Scholar; W. S. Bennet, R. R. Sandoval, and R. G. Shreffler, “A Credible Nuclear Emphasis Defense for NATO,” ibid., 463–79; Lawrence, Robert M., “On Tactical Nuclear War,” Parts 1 and 2, Revue Générale Militaire (January 1971), 46–59Google Scholar; (February 1971), 237–61. A negative view can be found in Record, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 62–67; Canby, Steven, “The Alliance and Europe: Part IV, Military Doctrine and Technology,” Adelphi Papers 109 (1974–75), 2–6Google Scholar; Brenner, Michael J., “Tactical Nuclear Strategy and European Defence: A Critical Reappraisal,” International Affairs 51 (1975), 23–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar: Morton H. Halperin, U.S. Senate, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 20–21; Paul Warnke, ibid., 53–61.

10 U.S. Senate, U.S. Security Issues in Europe, 19.

11 Four major documents have been adopted as a result of the work of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). In 1969, political guidelines were adopted governing consultation procedures in circumstances in which recourse to nuclear weapons might be contemplated, and governing the possible initial defensive tactical use of nuclear weapons. In 1970, political guidelines covering the possible use of atomic demolition munitions (ADMs) were accepted, as was a document entitled “Concepts for the Role of Theatre Nuclear Strike Forces in ACE.” The “Concepts” document was subsequently revised in 1972, and, currently, the NPG is engaged in studies of the possible follow-on use of theatre nuclear weapons. Little has been written on the NPG: however, see Wiegele, Thomas C., “Nuclear Consultation Processes in NATO,” Orbis 16 (1972). 462–87Google Scholar; Seim, Harvey B., “Nuclear Policy Making in NATO,” NATO Review 21 (1973), 11–13Google Scholar: Krone, Robert M., “NATO Nuclear Policy Making,” in Lovell, J. P. and Kronenberg, P. S. (eds.), New Civil-Military Relations (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), 193–227.Google Scholar Also, two unpublished papers by this author: “The Nuclear Planning Group: A Profile,” 1975; and “The Evolution of the Nuclear Planning Group 1967–1974,” 1976.

12 On the assumptions of “Carte Blanche” which included the explosion of 335 weapons, casualties of 1.7m killed and 3.5m wounded were calculated. Osgood, R. E., NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 126.Google Scholar

13 Evidence of General Goodpaster before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, June 29, 1973. Military Applications of Nuclear Technology, Pt. 2. Hearings before Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Subcommittee on Military Applications), May 27, June 29, 1973, 62. Report to Congress by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Moorer, Admiral Thomas H.. United States Military Posture for the Fiscal Year 1975. March, 1974, 77–79.Google Scholar

14 Two succinct discussions questioning the defensive credibility of theatre nuclear weapons deployed by NATO can be found in Heisenberg, Wolfgang, “The Alliance and Europe: Part I: Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons.” Adelphi Papers 96 (1973)Google Scholar; and Record, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 45–54.

15 The question of vulnerability has been raised by, among others. Heisenberg, “The Alliance and Europe, Part I,” 16–17; Record. U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 52. Administration spokesmen during the last two years have emphasized steps taken to reduce vulnerability. For example, Schlesinger. Theatre Nuclear Force Posture, 239.

16 Cliffe, Trevor, “Military Technology and the European Balance.” Adelphi Papers 89 (1972), 6.Google Scholar

17 A study done on behalf of the UN secretary-general on the effects of tactical nuclear war in Europe came to very pessimistic conclusions as to the amount of destruction and large number of casualties which would occur. These conclusions were based on the assumption that the weapons used would be in the range of five to fifty kt., with an average yield of thirty kt. The study thought that the conclusions as to casualties and destruction would not be fundamentally altered if the use of cleaner, lower-yield weapons in the range of one to ten kt. was assumed. Report of the Secretary-General on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for states of the acquisition and further development of these weapons. U.N. General Assembly, October 10, 1967, A/6858. Admittedly, the term “mini-nuke” is applied usually to a class of weapons with sub-kiloton yields but. nevertheless, widespread use of such weapons would still result in massive destruction.

18 A number of critics have suggested that NATO has, or with reasonable effort, could acquire an effective conventional defence that would not require resort to TNWs. See, for example, Enthoven, Alain C. and Smith, K. Wayne, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). chap. 4, 117–64.Google ScholarLawrence, Richard D. and Record, Jeffrey, U.S. Force Structure in NATO: An Alternative (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974)Google Scholar; Canby “The Alliance and Europe: Part IV.” 1–42.

19 The Times, London, May 31, 1969. Heisenberg, “The Alliance and Europe: Part I,” 3. An account of the development of the guidelines is contained in my unpublished paper “The Evolution of the Nuclear Planning Group 1967–74.”

20 M. J. Brenner, “Tactical Nuclear Strategy,” 27. With due respect to Brenner, a recent Senate report indicates that within the plans for selective use provision for demonstration use exists. However nothing is stated as to the scale of such demonstration use. U.S. Senate, U.S. Security Issues in Europe, 21.

21 Brown, Neville, European Security 1972–80 (London: Royal United Services Institution for Defence Studies, 1970), 70.Google Scholar

22 Beaufre, A., Stratégic pour Demain (Paris: Plon, 1972), 126.Google Scholar

23 Manlio Brosio, speech to the Assembly of the Western European Union. WEU Assembly Proceedings, 14th Ordinary Session, First Part. October 1968, Official Reports of Debates, Sixth Sitting, October 17, 1968, 206.

24 Brodie, Bernard. Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 51.Google Scholar Also, War and Politics (London: Cassell, 1974), 400–06.

25 Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, 30–32.

26 Heisenberg, “The Alliance and Europe: Part I,” 5.

27 Schlesinger, U.S. Senate, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 199.

28 Of course, the Soviet Union may wish to make an issue of FBS without really considering them to be a genuine strategic threat. For a recent discussion of the forward-based systems see, Nerlich, Uwe, “The Alliance and Europe: Part V: Nuclear Weapons and East-West Negotiations,” Adelphi Papers 120 (1975–76).Google Scholar

29 Heisenberg, “The Alliance and Europe: Part I,” 6.

30 Brosio, speech to WEU Assembly, 207.

31 For example, Richardson, FY 1974 Posture Statement. 28. Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975–1979 Defense Program, March 4, 1974. 82. (Schlesinger, FY 1975 Posture Statement.)

32 Heisenberg, “The Alliance and Europe: Part I,” 6.

33 Interestingly many of those who question flexible response suggest strengthening the theatre nuclear posture of the alliance; whereas those critical of TNWs frequently suggest strengthening the conventional option in order to make flexible response more credible. For references see n. 9.

34 Hunt, Kenneth, “The Alliance and Europe: Part II: Defence with Fewer Men,” Adelphi Papers 98 (1973), 18.Google Scholar

35 A number of US commentators have suggested that a substantial reduction in the number of theatre nuclear weapons deployed in Europe is possible. See the evidence of Morton H. Halperin; Paul Warnke; and Alain C. Enthoven, U.S. Senate. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. Also, Record, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 55–70.

36 These possibilities are discussed in Cliffe, “Military Technology,” 7–22; Morse, John H., “New Weapons Technologies: Implications for NATO.” Orbis 19 (1975), 497–513Google Scholar; Richard Burt, “New Weapons Technologies and European Security,” ibid., 514–32.

37 For example, Schlesinger, U.S. Senate, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 153.

38 Davis, Lynn Etheridge, “Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine,” Adelphi Papers 121 (1975–76), 5.Google Scholar

39 Important statements by Schlesinger on the new doctrine can be found in U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies. Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Arms Control. International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Senate. 93rd Congress, 2nd session, March 4, 1974. U.S.G.P.O. 1974. Also, Briefing on Counterforce Attacks. Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd session. September 11. 1974. U.S.G.P.O. 1975. See also reference in Davis, “Limited Nuclear Options.”

40 Schlesinger, FY 1975 Posture Statement, 82.

41 For references see n. 9.

42 Schlesinger, Theatre Nuclear Posture, 235.

43 Heisenberg, “The Alliance and Europe: Part I,” 13.

44 Beaufre, Stratégie, 127.

45 Brosio, speech to WEU Assembly, 206. More recently US spokesmen have reiterated this point. E.g., Schlesinger, Theatre Nuclear Posture, 236–37.

46 Several critics of the current TNW posture have argued that their contribution to deterrence in Europe could be achieved with far fewer weapons than presently deployed and of a type that could be drawn back from the front lines. For example, see references in n. 35.

47 Heisenberg, “The Alliance and Europe: Part I,” 13.

48 Current American concern with the survivability of TNWs is indicated in Schlesinger, Theatre Nuclear Posture, 239.

49 For an argument parallel to this see, Gray, Colin S., “Deterrence and Defence in Europe: Revising NATO's Theatre Nuclear Posture,” Royal United Services Institution Journal (December 1974), 7–10.Google Scholar

50 Ibid., 4.

51 I am indebted to Philip Windsor for this point.

52 Sinnreich, R. H., “NATO's Doctrinal Dilemma,” Orbis 19 (1975), 466.Google Scholar