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State Autonomy and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of Deep Seabed Mining*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon
Affiliation:
University of Western Ontario

Abstract

The article assesses the utility of Eric Nordlinger's statist approach in explaining Canada's policies on deep seabed mining at the United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. Nordlinger argues that government decision-makers in liberal democratic societies enjoy considerable autonomy in translating their preferences into public policies even when opposition is mounted by major groups outside government circles. Nordlinger's thesis on state autonomy is useful in explaining Canada's deep seabed mining policies since government decision-makers determined policy outcomes. Nevertheless, the approach requires important modifications to enhance its relevance to the Canadian parliamentary system. It needs to distinguish between politicians and government bureaucrats, to identify the sources of their policy preferences and to recognize provincial involvement.

Résumé

Cette étude s'interroge sur la pertinence de la perspective étatiste qu'utilise Eric Nordlinger pour expliquer la politique d'exploitation des ressources minieres en mer profonde à l'occasion de la Troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la Mer. Nordlinger soutient que dans une démocratic libérale, les responsables du gouvernement jouissent d'une autonomie considérable. Ainsi peuvent-ils faire jouer leurs préférences en ce qui a trait aux priorités à faire valoir en matière publique, et ce. même lorsqu'ils affrontent l'opposition de groupes importants extérieurs aux cercles gouvernementaux. La thèse de Nordlinger peut servir à expliquer la politique canadienne d'exploitation minière en mer profonde puisque ce sont les responsables du gouvernement qui la déterminent. Cependant cette perspective doit être modifiée de faÇon importante si on veut l'appliquer au système parlementaire canadien. Entre autres, il convient de distinguer clairement les politiciens et les fonctionnaires, d'identifier les sources de leurs préférences respectives et de reconnaître le rôle que jouent les provinces.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1988

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References

1 The statist approach is reflected in the following recent works on Canadian foreign policy: Nossal, Kim Richard, “Analysing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 39 (1983–1984), 122;CrossRefGoogle ScholarNossal, Kim Richard, The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1985);Google ScholarKirton, John and Dimock, Blair, “Domestic Access to Government in the Canadian Foreign Policy Process 1968–1982,” International Journal 39 (1983–1984), 6898;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Dewitt, David and Kirton, John, Canada as a Principal Power (Toronto: Wiley, 1983)Google Scholar. Tom Keating provides a concise discussion of recent works in this area in “The State, the Public, and the Making of Canadian Foreign Policy,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Montreal, 1985.

2 They included the Legal Advisor, Director of the Bureau of Legal Affairs and Legal Operations Division from External Affairs as well as Alan Beesley, the working head of the Canadian delegation, even when he was not serving in one of the above-mentioned positions.

3 Nordlinger, Eric A., On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 201Google Scholar.

4 Ibid., 11.

5 Krasner, Stephen D., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 13Google Scholar.

6 Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)Google Scholar.

7 Nordlinger's explanation of why certain policy options are given higher priority than others is similar to, although less comprehensive than, Graham Allison's governmental politics model. The latter depicts politicians and bureaucrats, each with their own sets of objectives, bargaining to affect policy outcomes. See Allison, , Essence of Decision, 144–89Google Scholar.

8 This concept of pluralism has permeated much of the literature in the field. For examples see Truman, David, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951)Google Scholar, Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961)Google Scholar, and Bentley, Arthur F., The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressure (Evanston, Illinois: Principia Press, 1949)Google Scholar. More recently, several prominent proponents of pluralism have revised their earlier positions. Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom now contend that business groups play a qualitatively different role and enjoy greater power than do other interest groups. See Dahl, Robert and Lindblom, Charles, Politics, Economics and Welfare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976)Google Scholar, xxxvi.

9 Examples of this debate include Nossal, “Analysing the Domestic Sources of Canadian Foreign Policy”; and Cranford Pratt, “Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus,” International Journal 39 (1983–1984), 99135CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Some of this discussion of the interaction of governmental actors in the process of formulating Canada's policies on deep seabed mining appears in Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth, “Deep Seabed Mining: A Hotbed for Governmental Politics?,” International Journal 41 (1985–1986), 7294CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 By 1976, the negotiating texts on the law of the sea included two provisions which represented major extensions of coastal state jurisdiction: a 12-mile territorial sea, and the 200-mile exclusive economic zone.

12 Hage, Robert E., “The United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea: A Canadian Retrospective,” Behind the Headlines 40 (1983), 16Google Scholar.

13 Nordlinger, , On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, 130–32Google Scholar.

14 Confidential interview with a member of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Law of the Sea, Ottawa, 1983.

15 Ibid.

16 These views were expressed in meetings with members of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Law of the Sea and in briefs sent to the secretary of state for external affairs.

17 Nordlinger, , On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, 118Google Scholar.

18 Ibid., 92–94.

19 Confidential interviews with members of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Law of the Sea, Ottawa, 1983.

20 Ibid.

21 Nordlinger, , On the Autonomy of the Democratic State, 38Google Scholar.

22 Ibid.

23 Gold, David A., Lo, Clarence Y. H., and Wright, Erik Olin, “Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State,” Monthly Review 27 (1975), 2943CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 This view is effectively illustrated by Miliband, Ralph in The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 22Google Scholar, who writes “the ‘ruling class’ of capitalist society is that class which runs and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society.” However, Miliband himself goes beyond the confines of a traditional instrumentalist perspective in arguing that the state must be able to distance itself from the dominant class, especially when that class is divided and when national emergencies demand effective action.

25 Poulantzas, Nicos, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973), 301Google Scholar. For reviews of the debates between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas see Holloway, John and Picciotto, Sol, State and Capital: A Marxist Debate (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), 315;Google Scholar and Held, David, “Introduction: Central Perspectives on the Modern State,” in Held, David et al. (eds.), States and Societies (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), 3234Google Scholar.

26 According to Kim Nossal, provincial governments have become more involved with foreign policy issues for four major reasons: constitutional interests, socio-economic interests, functional interests, and bureaucratic impetus. See Nossal, , The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy, 191–99Google Scholar.

27 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Federalism and International Relations (Ottawa: 1968), 4445Google Scholar.

28 While not relevant to Canada's policies on deep seabed mining, the potential significance of public opinion cannot be ignored in all cases. Denis Stairs notes that public opinion has become more salient to the foreign policy-making process in recent years. See Stairs, Denis, “Public Opinion and External Affairs: Reflections on the Domestication of Canadian Foreign Policy,” International Journal 33 (1977–78), 144–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Tom Keating raises a similar criticism of Nordlinger's work and subsequently points out that the emphasis placed on the statist approach by several scholars of Canadian foreign policy has resulted in an unduly narrow focus which overlooks the importance of societal support to successful foreign policy. See Keating, , “The State, the Public, and the Making of Canadian Foreign Policy,” 20, 25Google Scholar.

30 Krasner, Stephen D., “A Statist Interpretation of American Oil Policy toward the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly 94 (1979), 79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar