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A Reply to “Comment on ‘Energy Politics in Canada, 1980–1981: Threat Power in a Sequential Game’“

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Patrick James
Patrick James
Affiliation:
Florida State University
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Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , March 1993 , pp. 65 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1993

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References

1 Church, Jeffrey, “Comment on ‘Energy Politics in Canada, 1980–1981: Threat Power in a Sequential Game,” this Journal 26 (1993), 61–63.Google Scholar

2 Tirole, Jean, The Theory of Industrial Organization (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 433.Google Scholar

3 For more detailed explanations of this game, see Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean, Game Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), 369–74Google Scholar; Kreps, David M., A Course in Microeconomic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 536–37Google Scholar; and Ordeshook, Peter C., Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 451–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 One promising area is constitutional politics in the era of executive federalism. When the federal government puts forward a constitutional initiative under such conditions, it may be challenged by the provinces, which seek favourable revisions of a common document. Thus there is greater potential for the structure of the game to remain relatively stable across iterations, a crucial consideration in the CSP. For an initial treatment of the CSP and constitutional politics, see Patrick James, “Atlantic or Hudson Bay?: The Government of Canada and the Chain Store Paradox,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Boston, 1991.

5 Church, , “Comment on ‘Energy Politics in Canada,’” 63.Google Scholar

6 For an introduction to the contributions of rational choice to the study of politics, see Booth, William James, James, Patrick and Meadwell, Hudson, eds., Politics and Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).Google Scholar

7 Church, , “Comment on ‘Energy Politics in Canada,’” 61–63.Google Scholar

8 Helliwell, J. F. and McRae, R. N., “Resolving the Energy Conflict: From the National Energy Program to the Energy Agreements,” Canadian Public Policy 8 (1982), 18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar