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Recruitment to Nationalism: New Politics or Normal Politics?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

William P. Irvine
Affiliation:
Queen's University

Abstract

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1972

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References

1 See, among others, Wade, Mason, The French Canadians, 1760–1945 (Toronto, 1956)Google Scholar, and Garigue, Phillippe, L'Option politique du Canada Francois (Montreal, 1963).Google Scholar

2 Normandeau, André, “Un théorie économique de la revolution au Québec,” Cité Libre, XV (1964), 914Google Scholar; Ouellet, Fernand, “Les Fondements historiques de l'option separatiste dans le Québec,” Canadian Historical Review, XLIII (1962), 185203Google Scholar; and Breton, Albert, “The Economics of Nationalism,” Journal of Political Economy, LXXII (1964), 3552.Google Scholar

3 Burnham, Walter Dean and Sprague, John, “Additive and Multiplicative Models of the Voting Universe: the case of Pennsylvania, 1960–1968,” American Political Science Review, LXIV (June, 1970), 484–90.Google Scholar

4 Ibid.. Burnham and Sprague compared voting for Wallace and voting for the Democrats in Pennsylvania. They further report (in n. 26) that their students found confirmation of this model in comparing Wallace and Democratic support in Georgia and comparing support for the Créditistes with support for the Conservatives in Quebec in 1962. Earlier, it had also been reported that a multiplicative model fit voting for Allende in Chile in 1952; see Soares, Glaucio A.D. and Hamblin, Robert, “Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952,” American Political Science Review, LXI (1967), 1053–65.Google Scholar

5 Smelser, Neil J., Theory of Collective Behavior (London, 1962), 1314.Google Scholar

6 Ibid., 15–18.

7 Pinard, Maurice, The Rise of a Third Party (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1971), 245–7.Google Scholar

8 Barber, James David, The Lawmakers (New Haven, Conn., 1965), 1015.Google Scholar

9 The data were made available to me by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and were generated for the Commission by the Groupe de recherches sociales. The data examined in this paper represent a subsample of the total national sample.

10 Pinard, Rise of a Third Party, 186–9.

11 The advantage of casting models in symbolic form is that it suggests analogies to other models. Equation (3) is identical to my rendering of Barber's in equation (2) and also to Atkinson's motivation theory. Atkinson, John W., “Some General Implications of Conceptual Developments in the Study of Achievement-Oriented Behaviour,” Human Motivation: a Symposium, ed. Jones, Marshall R. (Lincoln, Neb., 1965), 331.Google Scholar The variables do not correspond precisely but the parallel is sufficiently striking to suggest that this is a useful avenue to search for a general theory of the motivation of unusual behaviour.

12 Geertz, Clifford, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” Ideology and Discontent, ed. Apter, D. (New York, 1964), 4776.Google Scholar

13 Philip Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” Ideology and Discontent, ed. D. Apter, 207–14.

14 Compare the structure of ECON in the appendix with that of Pinard's IEG in Pinard, Rise of a Third Party, 271–2.

15 Ibid., 241. See the discussion of retreatist and rebellious alienation and the literature there cited.

16 Laurin, Camille, Ma Traversée du Quebec (Montreal, 1970), 71–9Google Scholar; and Chamber-Land, Paul, “De la Damnation à la liberté,” Les Québécois, ed. Pris, Parti (Paris, 1967).Google Scholar

17 Irvine, William P., “Black Power and ‘Maîtres chez nous,»” paper presented to the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St John's, Newfoundland, 1971, p. 11.Google Scholar

18 Marx, Gary T., Protest and Prejudice (New York, 1969), 82–3.Google Scholar

19 For a broader consideration of this aspect of “personalization” on the nature of ideology see Lane, Robert, Political Ideology (New York, 1962), 307–10.Google Scholar

20 This is the same as the approach taken in Soares and Hamblin, “Socio-economic Variables,” 1056–7.

21 These occur primarily because “owners” and “managers” are lumped in the same category. The barber shop owner thus receives the same status as a corporate vice-president and a superior status to his colleague who cuts hair in the other chair.

22 Guindon, Hubert, “Social Unrest, Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution,” Queen's Quarterly, LXXI (1964), 150–62Google Scholar; Guindon, , “Two Cultures: and an Essay in Nationalism, Class and Ethnic Tension,” Contemporary Canada, Leach, R.H., ed. (Durham, NC, 1967), 3359.Google Scholar

23 Dion, Leon, “The Origin and Character of the Nationalism of Growth,” Canadian Forum, XLIII (1963–4), 229–33.Google Scholar

24 Evidence on this point is rather unsatisfactory. Piaget and Weil put the crucial period for the development of a sense of homeland at about 10 or 11 years of age. Adelson and O'Neil find 15 to be the age at which broad identification with community norms and a sense of obligation to them appears. Certainly, Lambert and Klineberg failed to pick up frequent references to ethnicity when asking 14-year-old French Canadians (or any other young people) “Who are you?” On these points, see Jean Piaget, assisted by Weil, Anne-Marie, “The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with other Countries,” International Social Science Bulletin, III (1951), 561–78Google Scholar, Joseph Adelson and O'neil, Robert P., “Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of Community,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, IV (1966), 295306Google Scholar; and Lambert, W.E. and Klineberg, O., Children's Views of Foreign Peoples (New York, 1967), 53–8Google Scholar and passim. See also Johnstone, John C., Young People's Images of Canadian Society (Ottawa, 1969), 34–6Google Scholar, who finds that 17 is the age at which French-Canadians begin to see English-Canadians as being closer to Americans than to French Canadians. See also p. 29 and pp. 42–3.

25 No one in the group is younger than 20 years of age since no one younger than that was sampled. The median age of the group is just over 30 years of age.

26 The median age for this group is somewhat over 50 years old.

27 See n. 16. Fanon's statement is in his The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Farrington, C. (New York, 1968).Google Scholar

28 On the notion that the political agitator is trying to compensate for damaged self-esteem see: Lasswell, Harold D., Power and Personality, Viking, ed. (New York, 1962), 2094.Google Scholar

29 It just barely missed entering that equation. It would have been the next variable entered and its coefficient would have had an F score of 1.98 where a score of 2.21 was needed for significance at the 5 per cent level.

30 Guindon, “Social Unrest, Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution,” 158–162.

31 This is not a statistical artifact. There is as much variation in each of these variables in the blue collar strata as in the white collar strata.

32 This is an adaptation of “item-total” correlation analysis used in psychological test construction. See Nunnally, J.C., Psychometric Theory (New York, 1967), 261–3.Google Scholar

33 Note that it is the older white collar whose nationalism is least related to separatism.