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“Political-Discourse” Analysis and the Debate Over Canada's Lobbying Legislation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Andrew Stark
Andrew Stark
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Abstract

Recently, students of public policy making in North America have added the analysis of “political discourse” to the tools of their trade. According to the “political discourse” school, the extent to which policy ideas gain acceptability cannot always be explained rationally in terms of their logical or empirical validity, nor instrumentally in terms of the interests they serve. Often, their careers must be accounted for, at least in part, by a detailed exploration of their ideological assumptions and appeal, and their rhetorical structure and persuasiveness. Despite its many plausible and promising features, this type of analysis has, to date, rarely been performed in specific instances of policy discourse. The author presents a “political-discourse” analysis of the 1985–1988 debate over Canada's Bill C-82, “An Act Respecting the Registration of Lobbyists.” That debate brought together some of Canada's most factually informed and instrumentally motivated policy actors. Nevertheless, the participants uniformly based their arguments on broad assumptions unsubstantiated by empirical analysis, and advanced those arguments in the rhetoric of the public good and democratic theory. The author concludes that underlying the two basic positions taken in debate over C-82—support for a regime of substantial disclosure of lobbying activity on the one hand, and opposition to disclosure on the other—were two competing sets of assumptions concerning the nature and workings of the faculties of reason and perception in politics.

Résumé

Récemment, les observateurs de la formation des politiques publiques en Amérique du nord ont ajouté à leurs méthodes d'investigation celle de l'analyse du discours politique. Selon l'école du discours politique, le degré d'appui que les idées politiques parviennent à obtenir ne peut toujours être expliqué ni rationnellement, sur la seule base de leur validité logique ou empirique, ni fonctionnellement, sur la seule base des intérêts qu'elles servent, Souvent, les causes de leur fortune doivent être recherchées au moins en partie dans un examen détaillé des attraits de leurs postulats idéologiques, de leur structure rhétorique et de leur force de persuasion. Jusqu'à aujourd'hui, ce type d'analyse du discours n'a été que rarement appliqué à l'étude d'une politique, en dépit de son caractère plausible et prometteur. Dans cette étude, l'auteur offre une analyse du discours politique lors du débat de 1985–1988 sur le projet de loi fédéral C-82, « Loi concernant l'enregistrement des lobbyistes ». Ce débat a mis en scène certains des acteurs politiques canadiens les mieux informés, intéressés et motivés. Pourtant, les participants au débat ont invariablement fondé leurs arguments sur de vastes postulats non fondés empiriquement. et les ont défendu à partir d'une rhétorique du bien public et de la théorie démocratique. L'auteur conclut en montrant combien les deux positions fondamentales prises lors du débat sur C-82—soit d'une part un régime de divulgation substantielle des activités de lobbying, d'autre part un opposition à cette divulgation obligatoire—, étaient, en fait, des idéologies en concurrence sur la nature et le fonctionnemenat des facultés de la raison et de la perception en politique.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 25 , Issue 3 , September 1992 , pp. 513 - 534
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1992

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References

1 Moore, Mark, “What Sort of Ideas Become Public Ideas?.” in Reich, Robert B., ed., The Power of Public Ideas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1990). 79.Google Scholar

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4 Reich, Robert B., “Introduction,” in Reich, , ed., The Power of Public Ideas, 4, 6.Google Scholar

5 Heymann, “How Government Expresses Public Ideas,” 99.

6 See, for example, Quirk, Paul J., “Deregulation and the Politics of Ideas in Congress,” in Mansbridge, Jane J., ed., Beyond Self-interest (ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press, 1990), 183–199Google Scholar, and Steven Kelman, “Congress and Public Spirit: A Commentary,” in ibid., 200–06.

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8 Ibid., 90, 91.

9 As William Stanbury has pointed out, lobbyists making presentations on behalf of the private interests they represent are very much aware that they must de-emphasize those interests, and make their case to government in the language of the public interest, if they are to succeed. As the debate over C-82 showed, lobbyists act the same way when they represent their own interests. See Stanbury, W. T., Business-Government Relations in Canada (Toronto: Nelson, 1988), 396–407.Google Scholar

10 Roe, Emery M., “Narrative Analysis for the Policy Analyst: A Case Study of the 1980–1982 Medfly Controversy in California,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 8 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 251. For my purposes here, “narrative analysis” need not be distinguished from “public-discourse” analysis.

11 In light of my focus on the debate itself, and since much of that debate took place in advance of the legislation having been drafted, it is also more efficient to refer to its relevant sections where necessary in the course of the discussion, rather than summarize its many features at this point.

12 See, for example, Kwavnick, David, “Interest Group Demands and the Federal Political System: Two Canadian Case Studies,” in Pross, A. Paul, ed., Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1975Google Scholar); Brown-John, Lloyd, “Comprehensive Regulatory Consultation in Canada's Food-Processing Industry, Canadian Public Administration 28 (1985), 70–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schwartz, Mildred A., “Politics and Moral Causes in Canada and the United States,” Comparative Social Research 4 (1981), 65–90Google Scholar; Teichman, Judith, “Businessmen and Politics in the Process of Economic Development: Argentina and Canada,” this Journal 15 (1982), 47–66Google Scholar; Coleman, William D., “Analysing the Associative Action of Business: Policy Advocacy and Policy Participation,” Canadian Public Administration 28 (1985), 413–433CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Thompson, Fred and Stanbury, William T., The Political Economy of Interest Groups in the Legislative Process in Canada, Occasional Paper No. 9 (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979).Google Scholar

13 See, for example, Gillies, James, Where Business Fails: Business-Government Relations at the Federal Level in Canada (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981Google Scholar); Gibbons, Kenneth M. and Rowat, Donald C., eds., Political Corruption in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1985)Google Scholar; Thorburn, Hugh G., Interest Groups in the Canadian Federal System, Collected Research Studies/Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada No. 69 (Toronto: Univerisity of Toronto Press for Supply and Services Canada, 1985), 14, 60Google Scholar; Pross, A. Paul, Group Politics and Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford, 1986), chap. 11Google Scholar; Mahon, Rianne, “Canadian Public Policy: The Unequal Structure of Representation,” in Panitch, Leo, ed., The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 164–198Google Scholar; and Presthus, Robert, Elite Accommodation in canadian Politics (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973).Google Scholar

14 An exception is Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy, 262–66.

15 Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on Elections, Privileges and Procedure, First Report (January 1987), 9, 23, hereafter cited as House Committee on Elections

16 Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on Elections, Minutes, May 29, 1986, 14:8. Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Legislative and Constitutional Affairs, Minutes, August 23, 1988, 93:13, 17, hereafter cited as Senate Committee.

17 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, February 12, 1987, 3357. Hereafter cited as Hansard.

18 See also Hansard, July 25, 1988, 17922.

19 See Cooper, George, QC, “Regulation of Lobbyists: Should the Legal Profession be Concerned?,”paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Bar Association,August 20, 1986,13–14.Google Scholar

20 House Committee on Elections, Minutes, April 22, 1986, 4:10, 11.

21 Hansard, July 25, 1988, 17928.

22 House Committee on Elections, Minutes, May 6, 1986, 6:18.

23 Ibid., April 24, 1986, 5:11.

24 Canadian Bar Association, “Brief Submitted to the Standing Committee on Elections Privileges and Procedure, ”May 14, 1986, 8. See also Senate, Debates, July 27, 1988, 4144, and Senate Committee, Minutes, August 24, 1988, 95:8.

25 Cooper, “Regulation of Lobbyists,” 4, and Senate Committee, Minutes, August 15, 1988, 90:20; August 18, 1988, 92:8. See also Pross, Group Politics, 264.

26 See, for example, Hansard, September 9, 1985, 6399–6402 (emphasis mine).

27 Hansard, March 8, 1988, 13495; House of Commons Legislative Committee on Bill C-82, Minutes, April 12, 1988; 1:33, hereafter cited as House Legislative Committee, and Senate, Debates, July 26, 1988, 4126.

28 See Public Affairs International, “A Response to 'Lobbying and the Registration of Paid Lobbyists,” March 1986, 8; Cooper, “Regulation of Lobbyists,” 11–12, and Senate Committee, Minutes, August 24, 1988, 85:8.

29 Senate Committee, Minutes, September 1, 1988, 97:23.

30 The Hon. Marc Lalonde, PC, QC, “Lobbying and the Government Decision Process,” address to the Rotary Club of Montreal, April 12, 1987, 5.

31 Cooper, “Regulation of Lobbyists,” 5. See also Public Affairs International, “Response,” 2.

32 See Senate Committee, Minutes, August 8, 1988, 90:9.

33 Hansard, July 25, 1988, 17930, and March 8, 1988, 13517. See also House Legislative Committee, Minutes, April 19, 1988, 2:7.

34 See Hansard, March 8, 1988, 13501, and March 14, 1988, 13682.

35 Lobbying and the Registration of Paid Lobbyists, 2. See also Institute of Association Executives, “Brief Submitted to the Hon. Michel Cote in Response to the Discussion Paper Entitled ‘Lobbying and the Registration of Paid Lobbyists,’” February 1986, 1, and Canadian Bar Association, “Brief,” 3.

36 Senate Committee, Minutes, August 15, 1988, 90:17, and September 1, 1988, 97:24.

37 “Subject matter” as defined by the legislation consists of the conjunction of two pieces of information: the “type of governmental activity” being influenced—the making of law and regulations, the design of policies and programmes, orthe awarding of grants and other benefits, etc.—and the “area of concern” — “social policy,” “taxation,” “privatization,” and so forth.

38 Discussion in this section is confined to arguments made concerning the registration of legal practitioners because much of the argumentation advanced by lawyers, discussed below, applies as well to accountants; lawyers were much more visible than were other professionals in the debate; and they were more likely as a profession to be affected by legislation.

39 House Legislative Committee, Minutes, April 19, 1988, 2:30.

40 Senate Committee, Minutes, August 15, 1988, 90:6.

41 See ibid., August 24, 1988, 95:3.

42 House Committee on Elections, Minutes, May 20, 1986, 10:9, 10:14.

43 House Legislative Committee, Minutes, April 19, 1988, 2:25.

44 Lalonde, “Lobbying and the Governmental Decision-Process,” 6.

45 House Committee on Elections, Minutes, May 20, 1986, 10:13, 10:14; see also House Legislative Committee, Minutes, April 19, 1988, 2:22, 2:29.

46 Senate Committee, Minutes, August 23, 1988, 93:26, 17; 23.

47 Ibid., August 24, 1988, 95:10, 95:17.

48 Ibid., August 18, 1988, 92:26, 12, 24, and House Legislative Committee, Minutes, April 19, 1988, 2:10.

49 Senate Committee, Minutes, August 23, 1988, 93:26, 17.

50 House Committee on Elections, Minutes, May 20, 1986, 10:18.

51 That is, in such instances the officeholder must be apprised of the subject-matter in much greater detail than is ever required by the legislation, which stipulates that it be stated only in the most general terms—for example, as a “policy” regarding “taxation.” See Senate Committee, Minutes, August 15, 1988, 90:5.

52 House Legislative Committee, Minutes, April 12, 1988, 1:53, 1:66. See also House Standing Committee, Minutes, April 24, 1986, 5:12, and May 6, 1986, 6:11.

53 See, for example, Hansard, July 25, 1988, 17923.

54 Hansard, July 25, 1988, 17923.

55 House Legislative Committee, Minutes, April 19, 1988, 2:8. See also ibid., April 12, 1988, 1:29; 1:42; Hansard, March 8, 1988, 13502.

56 See Pross, Group Politics, 115.

57 House Committee on Elections, Minutes, April 24, 1986, 5:7; see also the brief of the Institute of Association Executives, 4.

58 Variations of this argument are frequently made or suggested in scholarly analyses of trade-association behaviour. See, for example, Coleman, William D., “Canadian Business and the State,” in Banting, Keith, ed., The State and Economic Interests, Collected Research Studies/Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada No. 32 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for Supply and Services Canada, 1986), 255Google Scholar, and Litvak, I. A., “National Trade Associations: Business-Government Intermediaries,” Business Quarterly (Autumn 1982), 42.Google Scholar

59 Robert Wells, QC, speaking of the Canadian Bar Association itself, and quoted in Alan Lutfy, “The Lawyer as Lobbyist,” paper, March 1986, 2; see also Hansard, March 14, 1988, 13681.

60 See Pyrcz, Gregory, “Pressure Groups,” in Pocklington, T. C., ed., Liberal Democracy in Canada and the U.S. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 350.Google Scholar

61 And in any case, as one senator opposed to umbrella-group inclusion asserted, it is impossible to ascertain “at what stage the conveying of a bright idea might turn into an attempt to influence” (see Senate, Debates, September 8, 1988, 4316).

62 Many hired guns accepted as given their inclusion under some form of regime. See, for example, House Committee on Elections, Minutes, April 24, 1986, and May 22, 1986.

63 Ibid., May 6, 1986, 6:11.

64 The only significant argument mounted against the inclusion of hired guns in Tier I was equity-based. Small businesses, it was argued, are required more often than are large businesses to retain hired guns, for unlike large businesses they are unlikely to be able to afford a full-time lobbying staff. As a result, the subject matter of their dealings with government will, under the legislation, be registrable, while those of competing larger concerns, which employ in-house staff, will not be (House Legislative Committee, Minutes, April 19, 1988, 2:8, and Senate Committee, Minutes, August 18, 1988, 92:2). The force of this argument is mitigated by the fact that lobbying undertaken by any employee of a small business who is not a full-time lobbyist—from the president down—is not covered by the legislation; conversely, large businesses—indeed, business umbrella-groups—often retain hired guns (Senate Committee, Minutes, August 18, 1988, 92:29, 92:33, 35, 36).

65 See, for example, Hansard, February 12, 1987, 3383.

66 See, for example, ibid., July 25, 1988, 17920.

67 Majone, “Policy Analysis and Public Deliberation,” 177, 158.

68 Ibid., 158, and Heymann, “How Government Expresses Public Ideas,” 106.