¹ On the popularity of the federal solution see Beloff, M., “The ‘Federal Solution’ in its Application to Europe, Asia and Africa,” Political Studies, 1, 2 (June 1953)Google Scholar, reprinted in The Great Powers (London, 1959), and Watts, R. L., New Federations (Oxford, 1966), 3–7.Google Scholar

² The most notable studies have been, Carnell, F. G., “Political Implications of Federalism in New States,” in Hicks, U. K.et al., Federalism and Economic Growth (London, 1961)Google Scholar; Riker, W. H., Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston, 1964)Google Scholar; Watts, New Federations; Etzioni, A., Political Unification (New York, 1965)Google Scholar; and Franck, T. M., ed., Why Federations Fail (New York, 1968).Google Scholar In addition, more general studies of political integration which have contributed substantially to this area include Deutsch, K. W.et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957)Google Scholar; Haas, E. B. and Schmitter, P. C., “Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America,” International Organisation, XVIII, 4 (autumn 1964)Google Scholar, reprinted in International Political Communities: An Anthology (New York, 1966); Segal, A., “The Integration of Developing Countries: Some Thoughts on East Africa and Central America,” Journal of Common Market Studies, V, 3 (March 1967)Google Scholar; Nye, J. S., “Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration,” International Organisation, XIX, 4 (Autumn 1965)Google Scholar and Nye, , Pan-Africanism and East African Integration (Cambridge, Mass., 1966)Google Scholar; and Hazelwood, A., ed., African Integration and Disintegration (London, 1967).Google Scholar

³ The effects of inequalities in size between units are discussed in more detail, with particular reference to intergovernmental fiscal relations, in May, R. J., Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment (Oxford, 1969).Google Scholar

⁴ This follows Vile's, M. J. C. “definition” of federalism in The Structure of American Federalism (London, 1961), 199.Google Scholar

⁵ These are discussed in some detail in Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment, part one.

⁶ Compare Wheare's, K. C. statement of the “federal principle” in Federal Government (4th ed., London, 1963), 10.Google Scholar “By the federal principle I mean the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent.”

⁷ C. D. Tarlton has also drawn attention to this aspect of traditional federal theory. See “Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation,” Journal of Politics, 27, 4 (Nov. 1965), and “Federalism, Political Energy and Entropy: Implications of an Analogy,” Western Political Quarterly, xx, 4 (Dec. 1967).

⁸ Among the more interesting contributions in this area are Clark, J. P., The Rise of a New Federalism (New York, 1938)Google Scholar; Birch, A. H., Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation in Canada, Australia and the United States (Oxford, 1955)Google Scholar; Anderson, W., Intergovernmental Relations in Review (Minneapolis, 1960)Google Scholar; and Leach, R. H., Interstate Relations in Australia (Lexington, 1965).Google Scholar

⁹ Compare Vile, M. J. C.: “Federalism and Labour Regulations in the United States and Australia,” Political Science Quarterly, LXXI, 2 (June 1956)Google Scholar : “… constitutional provisions have not prevented the development of labour conditions which are politically essential; they have merely channelled the political forces along a certain route to the achievement of these standards.”

¹⁰ For an example of this see R. J. May, Financing the Small States in Australian Federalism, forthcoming, chap. 7.

¹¹ Compare V. O. Key on the initiation of federal grant programs: “The spearhead of the movement for federal aid for a particular governmental function is usually a nationally organised pressure group whose cause would benefit by the proposed legislation. It enlists the support of associations with allied interests. Generally the proposal is brought to the attention of state legislatures which may direct resolutions to Congress supporting or opposing the proposition. If the bill concerns a service already being rendered in any of the states, the administrators concerned are likely to be in the vanguard of the movement for federal legislation. What Congress can accomplish through the device of the grant-in-aid is limited to those policies which state legislatures will accept, but the acceptability of a policy is to a large extent determined before its adoption by Congress. The situation does not involve acquiescence by the state legislature in the federal policy solely as the result of Congressional pressure, but rather Congress and the state legislatures respond to the same political demands.” The Administration of Federal Grants to the States (Chicago, 1937), 4–5. See also Grodzins, M., The American System (Chicago, 1966).Google Scholar

¹² This is, of course, a simplification. For one thing, population and total resources do not necessarily go together; if inequalities in wealth between units are pronounced, a unit with a relatively small population could have a relatively large share of the total wealth and a unit with a large population a small share (such is or was the case in Pakistan, Rhodesia, and Nyasaland, and to a certain extent in the French African federations and Yugoslavia). For another thing, per capita wealth may be a poor index of “state of advancement” if the total wealth of a unit is distributed very unequally (examples of this are Northern Rhodesia in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Borneo states in Malaysia). The simplifications made here, however, appear to meet the general case and will be used without further qualification. Statistical details of inequalities between units in federal systems are given in Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment.

¹³ For simplicity it will be assumed that we are dealing with federations formed by the aggregation of existing states. In some federations formed by disaggregation, however, the strength of the regional tendencies which made federation necessary in fact may be reduced, in some directions at least, simply with the passage of time and increasing interdependence of units after federation. When this happens the effects of centralizing forces will be similar to those of integration in federations by aggregation, so the analysis is not strictly confined to the latter.

¹⁴ For a general discussion of the economics of integration, see Balassa, B., Theory of Economic Integration (London, 1962)Google Scholar, and Hirschman, A. O., The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven, 1958)Google Scholar, chap. 10. For a more specific discussion of resource allocation in federal countries, see Scott, A. D., “The Economic Goals of Federal Finance,” Public Finance, XIX, 3 (1964)Google Scholar, and May, Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment, 37–43.

¹⁵ For example, see Williamson, J. G., “Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, XIII, 4 (July 1965)Google Scholar part II; Byé, M., “Customs Unions and National Interests,” International Economic Papers, 3 (1953)Google Scholar; United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe in 1954 (Geneva, 1955)Google Scholar; Myrdal, G., Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London, 1957)Google Scholar, chap. 3; Hughes, R. B., “Interregional Income Differences: Self-Perpetuation,” Southern Economic Journal, XXII (July 1961)Google Scholar; Dell, S., Trade Blocs and Common Markets (London, 1963)Google Scholar, chap. 6; Barzanti, S., The Underdeveloped Areas within the Common Market (Princeton, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. chap. VI.

¹⁶ Compare Johnson's, H. G. comment: “The fact that a unit is demonstrably better off than it used to be does not prevent it from cherishing the notion that it would be still better off had it not been obliged to make a sacrifice!” “Symposium on the Report of the Trade and Tariffs Commission (Crofts Report): Comment,” Social and Economic Studies, 9, 1 (March 1960), 4.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Kirkman, W. P. has commented on British policy: “… the Conservative Government was obsessed with the federal concept and kept on creating federations in a positive frenzy.” Unscrambling an Empire (London, 1966), 133.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The power potential of a government is determined by the constitutional and other rules of the game in the federation and the government's bargaining capabilities (cf. p. 74). These concepts are considered in greater detail in Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment, chap. 1.

¹⁹ In the extreme case attempts by small units to resist the dominant influence of large units may lead to a situation in which the safeguards given to the small units at federation are permanently denied and federalism gives way to a unitary state (e.g., Burma and Indonesia).

²⁰ A more detailed analysis of most of the federations listed here is contained in Federalism and Fiscal Adjustment.