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Continuity and Change in the 1993 Canadian General Election*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Mikael Antony Swayze
Mikael Antony Swayze
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Abstract

This research note considers the complex relationship between the electoral and party systems in Canada from 1921 to 1993. By drawing on Douglas Rae's theoretical model, the note demonstrates that the electoral system exerts a powerful influence on the party system and makes the case that important regional information is often washed out in national-level results. Furthermore, a novel approach is taken to the measurement of regional data in a federal election—a comparison of the indices of fragmentation of the regions and the country provide an interesting explanation for some of the stunning changes in parliamentary representation in 1993. In interpreting the 1993 Canadian general election in this framework, the author argues that although the results in parliament seem to indicate momentous changes in Canadian politics, the voting patterns are, nonetheless, consistent with Canadian political history.

Résumé

Cette note se penche sur la relation complexe entre le mode de scrutin et l'évolution des partis politiques au Canada de 1921 à 1993. S'inspirant du modèle théorique élaboré par Douglas Rae, elle démontre que le mode de scrutin exerce une influence déterminante sur l'évolution des partis et soutient que des données régionales importantes sont souvent perdues dans la foulée des résultats nationaux. De plus, une approche novatrice est appliquée à l'évolution des résultats régionaux d'une élection fédérale, c'est-à-dire la comparaison des « indices de fragmentation » des régions et ceux de l'ensemble du pays, ce qui donne une explication intéressante de certains des changements extraordinaires que nous avons connus dans la représentation parlementaire en 1993. Dans l'interprétation des élections générates de 1993, l'auteur affirme que, malgré l'ampleur des changements au système politique canadien que laissent entrevoir les résultats, le vote de l'électorat s'inscrit dans la continuité de l'histoire politique du Canada.

Type
Note
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 29 , Issue 3 , September 1996 , pp. 555 - 566
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1996

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References

1 See, for instance, Leduc, Lawrence, “Performance of the Electoral System in Recent Canadian and British Elections: Advancing the Case for Electoral Reform,” in Holler, M. J., ed., The Logic of Multiparty Systems (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).Google Scholar

2 Cairns, Alan C., “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921–1965,” this Journal 1 (1968), 55–80.Google Scholar

3 In particular, Lovink, J. A. A., “On Analysing the Impact of the Electoral System on the Party System in Canada,” this Journal 3 (1970), 497–516Google Scholar; Cairns, Alan C., “A Reply to J. A. A. Lovink, ‘On Analysing the Impact of the Electoral System on the Party System in Canada,’” this Journal 3 (1970), 517–21Google Scholar; Wiseman, Nelson, “Cairns Revisited—The Electoral and Party System in Canada,” in White, Graham and Fox, Paul, eds., Politics: Canada (7th ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 265–74Google Scholar; and Wiseman, Nelson, “Further Reflections on Cairns’ Thesis: The Electoral and Party System in Canada,” in White, Graham and Fox, Paul, eds., Politics: Canada (8th ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1995), 272–81.Google Scholar

4 Rae, Douglas, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971Google Scholar; originally published in 1967).

5 Of particular interest in this regard is Rae's observation that Canada differs sharply from other plurality-rule polities in being the only one which regularly fails to produce legislative two-party competition. In Rae's words, “the Canadian exceptions have a fairly obvious explanation: the intense hostility between overlapping regional, cultural, and linguistic groups produced a strong base of support for locally strong minority parties” (ibid., 94).

6 I include both anglophone and “allophone” electors in this designation.

7 Or, in the words of Laxer, James: “it may help to think of Parliament as representing the three new principalities that now constitute the country. These principalities can be called: Pacificia (including British Columbia and Alberta, the fiefdom of the Reform party); the Republic of Quebec (dominated by the Bloc Québécois); and Federal Canada (the eastern Prairies, Ontario, and the Atlantic provinces—ruled by the Chretien Liberals)” (“Tune in Tomorrow for a Regional Jousting Match,” The Toronto Star, January 16, 1994Google Scholar, E3).

8 Wiseman, “Cairns Revisited” and “Further Reflections on Cairns.”

9 I accept as a first premise that there ought to be a close relationship between the votes of the electorate and the resulting parliament. Most advocates of the plurality rule emphasize one-party governance, stability and decisiveness, rather than mathematical correlations as virtues of the plurality system (see Blais, André, “The Debate over Electoral Systems,” International Political Science Review 12 [1991], 240–43)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, few of the advocates of the plurality rule would argue that there should not be some relationship between votes cast and parties elected.

10 See “Appendix F” in Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 194. Over the period 1945–1965 he found Canadian values of Fe =.66, Fp =.52. That compares with US Fe =.50, Fp =.48; Australia, Fe = 56, Fp =.49; Great Britain, Fe =.58, Fp =.52; Denmark, Fe =.75, Fe =.74; West Germany Fe =.73, Fp =.69. The Canadian values show the highest degree of defragmentation of any nation in the study, at a rate nearly double the nearest nation, Australia.

11 This argument was updated by Wiseman in “Further Reflections on Cairns.”

12 The international data for non-PR systems yield a relationship y = 1.2x−6.3. Thus, y = x at 31.5 per cent. Canadian data seem to conform to the international trend for systems of our type.

13 All of these data presume a linear relationship. In reality, the lines are far from linear, but that is part of the point. They should be. In other words, if a system is relatively proportional, the points will lie along a 45-degree line and show definite linearity. The fact that many of these scattergrams do not demonstrate this property (and in some cases show a degree of linearity vertically) further emphasizes the perversity of the current system. Further details on these scattergrams are available from the author.

14 William Irvine examines the case for the importance of the electoral system to policy formulation, among other things, in parties. His discussion is particularly good. See Irvine, William, Does Canada Need a New Electoral System? (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1979), 11–52.Google Scholar

15 This measure takes the form: index = (Σ|Vi−Si|)/n, where Si = seat share, Vi = vote share and n = number of parties competing in the election.

16 Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 84.

17 Ibid., 85–86.