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23 Ibid., 31. At the nadir of Ottawa's relative strength, in 1970, central-government employment as a proportion of total state employment was still higher in Canada than in West Germany, Switzerland and the United States. See Pommerehne, Werner W., “Quantitative Aspects of Federalism: A Study of Six Countries,” in Oates, Wallace E. (ed.), The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism (Toronto: D. C. Heath, 1977), Table 15–20.Google Scholar

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55 Trevor Price, “The Philosophy of Local Government Reform in Ontario,”, paper delivered at the 1982 meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association.

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61 Cairns, “Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism,” 717.

62 Nordlinger, Eric A., On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), 21;Google Scholar see also 140–41, 193–94.

63 Black and Cairns, “A Different Perspective,” 40.

64 Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, 79–102, especially 90–91.

65 In 1980, resource revenues accounted for less than 3 per cent of gross general revenue in all provinces except British Columbia (12.5%), Saskatchewan (28.6%), and Alberta (51.4%): Statistics Canada, Provincial Government Finance, text table 1. See also Anthony Scott, “Who Should Get Natural Resource Revenues?” in Scott, Anthony (ed.), Natural Resource Revenues: A Test of Federalism (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1976), 19, 41–42Google Scholar, and, for an historical view, Neill, Robin. “The Politics and Economics of Development in Ontario,” Ontario History 70 (1978), 281–90.Google Scholar

66 Maxwell and Pestieau, Economic Realities, Table 11.

67 The importance of market access in periods of slack demand may give some pause to enthusiastic nationalizers: see Michael Shafer, “Capturing the Mineral Multinationals: Advantage or Disadvantage?” International Organization 37(1983), 93–119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In the present context it is interesting to note that the central government now more surely controls access to resource markets. Its power relative to the provinces, and perceived responsibility, should increase in recessionary times.

68 See, however, Grace Skogstad, “Supervising the Regulators: Producer-Controlled Marketing Boards,” paper delivered at the 1983 meeting of the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, for an interesting attempt to explain the formation and evolution of supply management boards according to federal-provincial dynamics.

69 Rosenfeld, “Canadian Government Expenditures.” Table 4.2.6: Pommerehne, “Quantitative Aspects of Federalism,” Table 15–17.

70 Lithwick, N. H., “Regional Policy: The Embodiment of Contradictions,” in Doern, G. Bruce (ed.), How Ottawa Spends Your Tax Dollars 1982 (Toronto: Lorimer, 1982), 131–46.Google Scholar

71 Canadian Paper Analyst, April 1978, 2: values for other firms ranged between 25 per cent and 45 per cent.

72 Canada, Statistics Canada, cat. 61–207, Corporation Financial Stntistics 1980. Table 2B, and cat. 61–208, Corporation Taxation Statistics 1980, Table 2: the figures are for the primary forest industry, the wood industries, and the paper and allied products industry.

73 Where they are significant, resource revenues can allow lower taxation arid easier borrowing, so providing less visible extraction by the state and giving civil servants and politicians more autonomy to make uneconomic investments and to distribute benefits to favoured individuals and classes: see McMillan, M. L. and Norrie, K. H., “Province-Building vs. a Rentier Society,” Canadian Public Policy 6 (1980), 213–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This occurs in Alberta and arguably took place earlier in central Canada: see Neill, “Politics and Economics of Development in Ontario.” It is easy to see the bureaucratic interest in such activity, but not the interest of the supposedly dominant resource bourgeoisie, and in this regard closer attention to the service and construction sectors may be warranted. The point remains, however, that even if some provincial governments are especially interested in resource firms, the converse is not necessarily true.

74 Cairns, “The Other Crisis of Canadian Federalism,” 191.

75 Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union. 52–53; Simeon, “Current Constitutional Issues,” in' Ontario Economic Council, Intergovernmental Relations (Toronto: OEC, 1977), 18.Google Scholar It should be noted in fairness that Simeon, despite persistent portrayals of this fundamental opposition, has taken care usually to trace a distinct “Quebec nation-building” strand in Canadian federalism.

76 Maxwell and Pestieau, Economic Realities, 83.

77 Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism, 81.

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84 Savoie, Donald J., Federal-Provincial Collaboration (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

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86 Urquhart, “The Complexity of Community-Building in Canada.”

87 Whalley, John, “The Impact of Federal and Provincial Policies on the Canadian Economic Union:Google Scholar A Theoretical and Empirical Overview,” and “The Impact of Federal and Provincial Policies on the Canadian Economic Union: Federal Policies,” papers delivered at the Workshop on Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union, London, Ontario, December 1981. There is roomfor debate about whether all central policies with differential regional effects create “barriers,” or whether the policies must be overtly and intentionally discriminatory to count. This definitional question will affect the relative magnitude of the distortions found. Our view is that regional effects are measurable and are brought to national decision-makers' attention through a variety of mechanisms, so they have entered the policy calculus and all should be counted.

88 As Courchene has recognized, Ottawa can use any surplus generated through the removal of interprovincial trade barriers to attack regional disparities: “In effect it means that Ottawa will be able to do the very things that it wants to prevent the provinces from doing, namely to engage in policies that will alter relative prices across regions.” See his “Historical and Analytical Perspectives Relating to the Canadian Economic Union,” paper delivered at the Workshop on Federalism and the Canadian Economic Union, London, Ontario, December 1981, 48.

89 Tennant, Paul. “The NDPGovernment of British Columbia: Unaided Politicians in an Unaided Cabinet,” Canadian Public Policy 3 (1977), 489–503CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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91 Another causal fallacy occurs when the concept's evolutionary and developmental connotations stimulate anthropomorphisms, as when authors describe “the desire of provincial societies to develop unhindered” or the “maturation” of the provinces. See Evenson, Jeff and Simeon, Richard, “The Roots of Discontent,” in Institute of Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Council of Canada, Workshop on the Political Economy of Confederation (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1979), 176Google Scholar: Chandler and Chandler, Public Policy and Provincial Politics, 196. If understood as a shorthand for complex internal processes, such statements are not too misleading; but when provinces become people, change is easily misrepresented—to be inevitable or irreversible, for instance.

92 McMillan, and Norrie, , “Province-Building vs. A Rentier Society,” 214 (emphasis added).Google Scholar

93 Ibid.; Breton, Raymond, “Regionalism in Canada,” in Cameron, David M. (ed.). Regionalism tindSiipranationiilism (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy and Policy Studies Institute. 1981), 57–79.Google Scholar

94 Chandler and Chandler, Public Policy ami Provincial Politics, 292.

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