1 Scott, James C., Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972), 109–12Google Scholar.

2 Lemarchand, René and Legg, Keith, “Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis,” Comparative Politics 4 (1972), 148–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Scott, Comparative Political Corruption.

3 Key, V. O., Southern Politics (New York: Knopf, 1949)Google Scholar; Landé, Carl H., Leaders, Factions, and Parties—The Structure of Philippine Politics (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies—Yale University, 1965)Google Scholar.

4 Landé, Leaders, Factions and Parties, 1.

5 Haruhiro Fukui, “Japan: Factionalism in a Dominant-Party System,” and Belloni, Frank P., “Factionalism, the Party System, and Italian Politics,” both in Belloni, Frank P. and Beller, Dennis C. (eds.), Factional Politics: Political Parties and Factionalism in Comparative Perspective (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1978), 43–72 and 73–108Google Scholar.

6 Rokkan, Stein, Citizens Elections Parties (New York: David McKay, 1970)Google Scholar.

7 This is, basically, the Michigan model of voting behaviour. The standard statements are Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E., and Stokes, Donald E., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960)Google Scholar, and Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966)Google Scholar.

8 Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, chap. 6. For a brilliant analysis of this process in the American context see Hays, Samuel P., “Political Parties and the Community—Society Continuum,” in Chambers, William Nisbet and Burnham, Walter Dean (eds.), The American Party Systems (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

9 Garvin, Tom, “Continuity and Change in Irish Electoral Politics 1923–1969,” Economic and Social Review 3 (1972), 372Google Scholar; Chubb, Basil, “‘Going About Persecuting Civil Servants’: The Role of the Irish Parliamentary Representative,” Political Studies 11 (1963), 272–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bax, Mart, “Patronage Irish Style: Irish Politicians as Brokers,” Sociologische Gids 17 (1970), 179–91Google Scholar.

10 As part of my ongoing research on Irish politics I have conducted extensive interviews with members of the Irish political elite. This began in 1973 and has continued, intermittently, through 1979. Included have been politicians (winners and losers), party officials, activists, and informed observers. To protect the confidentiality of these conversations I have not identified my respondents but this interview material provides the basis for many of the substantive observations reported below. The analysis of electoral returns begins with the 1948 general election because that was the first election for which official, constituency-by-constituency returns were published. The argument in this article draws on chap. 6 of my Party and Parish Pump (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, forthcoming).

11 Chubb, Basil, The Government and Politics of Ireland (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970)Google Scholar.

12 For accounts and examples of how the system works see MacKenzie, W. J. M., Free Elections (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958)Google Scholar, chap. 8. Briefly, voters rank order all the candidates (listed alphabetically, not by party, on the ballot paper) and the determination of the result proceeds through a series of counts. A quota is fixed by formula and those whose first preferences exceed it are automatically elected. Any surplus they have is distributed to the next indicated preference, and then candidates at the bottom of the tally are progressively eliminated until the several seats in the constituency are filled.

13 Rose, Richard and Urwin, Derek, “Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes,” Comparative Political Studies 2 (1968), 7–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Rose, Richard, “Comparability in Electoral Studies,” in his Electoral Behaviour: A Comparative Handbook (New York: The Free Press, 1974), 17Google Scholar.

15 Manning, Maurice, Irish Political Parties (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1972)Google Scholar, provides a basic account of the parties' positions. For an analysis of survey data that reveals the electorate's inability to discriminate amongst the parties in the ideological terms that order most other European party systems see Inglehart, Ronald and Klingemann, Hans D., “Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension Among Western Mass Publics,” in Budge, Ian, et al. (eds.). Party Identification and Beyond (London: John Wiley, 1976), 243–73. See also n. 27 belowGoogle Scholar.

16 This ignores the problem of what social differences may have marked the origins of the party system. On that issue see Garvin, Tom, “Political Cleavages, Party Politics and Urbanization in Ireland: The Case of the Periphery-Dominated Centre,” European Journal of Political Research 2 (1974), 307–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Carty, R. K., “Social Cleavages and Party Systems: A Reconsideration of the Irish Case,” European Journal of Political Research 4 (1976), 195–203CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and for a skillful assessment of the aggregate data available, Garvin, Tom, “The Destiny of the Soldiers: Tradition and Modernity in the Politics of De Valera's Ireland,” Political Studies 26 (1978), 328–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 Party strength in Dáil Eireann (measured in terms of the percentage of seats held) has been quite stable. The standard deviations for the three main parties (1932–73) are: Fianna Fáil 3.26; Fine Gael 5.81; Labour 3.09. By comparison, party strength in the Canadian House of Commons has varied much more despite a similar two and one-half party system. The standard deviations (1935–1968) are: Liberal 16.4; Conservative 17.6; CCF-NDP 3.1.

18 Between 1932 and 1977 the average number ranged from 1.5 to 2.7 with the mean just over 2.

19 Carty, R. K., “Partisan Allegiance and Parochial Association” (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1976), 196–98Google Scholar.

20 Ibid.

21 There have been no systematic studies of Irish party identification based on survey data collected for that purpose. For a preliminary assessment using limited material see Inglehart and Klingemann, “Party Identification.” For the judgment of the country's premier political scientist see Chubb, Basil, “The Electoral System” in Penniman, Howard R. (ed.), Ireland at the Polls (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 31Google Scholar.

22 The redistribution before the 1977 general election so altered the electoral map that comparability is extremely difficult and the most recent election has been excluded from the tables that follow.

23 Basil Chubb, “The Electoral System”; and his “Analysis of Results,” in Nealon, Ted, Guide to the 21st Dáil and Seanad (Dublin: Platform Press, 1977), 129–32Google Scholar. For an account of the 1977 contest see Farrell, Brian, “The Irish General Election, 1977,” Parliamentary Affairs 31 (1978), 22–36Google Scholar.

24 In 1977 a Labour seat in Limerick was lost to an Independent Labour candidate who had previously been an official candidate but was denied a 1977 nomination in a local internal party struggle. He was admitted into the parliamentary party after his election.

25 The cleavage that divides the parties does not correspond to any underlying social or economic division. John H. Whyte, “Ireland: Politics Without Social Bases,” in Rose, Electoral Behavior, 619–51.

26 Carty, “Partisan Allegiance and Parochial Association,” 123–24.

27 There are often spirited, if exaggerated, differences as to the best means to achieve desired ends but by any comparative standard there are no significant differences as to the ultimate goals. A Gallup survey reported in the now defunct magazine Nusight (December 1969) discovered that only 30 per cent of Irish electors could see any difference between the parties.

28 On the system's proportionality see Rae, Douglas, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 110–11. As Table 1 (above) reports, only about 11 per cent of the seats moved among the parties overthe 1948–1973 periodGoogle Scholar.

29 For a diachronic analysis of this process see Carty, R. K., “Politicians and Electoral Laws: An Anthropology of Party Competition in Ireland,” Political Studies 28 (1980), 550–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Peter Mair and Michael Laver, “Proportionality, P.R. and S.T.V. in Ireland,” and Gallagher, Michael, “Disproportionality in a Proportional Representation System: The Irish Experience,” both in Political Studies 23 (1975), 491–500 and 501–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 Chubb, “Analysis of the Results.”

32 Bax, Mart, Harpstrings and Confessions: An Anthropological Study of Politics in Rural Ireland (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1976)Google Scholar; for a popular view see Keane, John B., Letters of a Successful T.D. (Cork: Mercier Press, 1967)Google Scholar.

33 The Fianna Fáil government elected in 1977 announced that it intended future revisions to be conducted by an impartial commission. Given that the critical factor is the size of the constituencies it is difficult to imagine how such a body would make impartial decisions.

34 Interview evidence makes it clear the candidate involved (sensibly) insisted on being the sole candidate nominated.

35 Chubb, “The Electoral System.” My interviews suggest all politicians start from this position in making their electoral calculations.

36 One or two cases of internal battles hurting a party's chances occur in every election, evidence of how close to the surface such intraparty conflicts are.

37 For a case study see Carty, “Politicians and Electoral Laws.”

38 Brian Farrell and Maurice Manning, “The Election” in Penniman, Ireland at the Polls, 139.

39 This conception of electoral appeals flows from the logic of the Michigan model of voting behaviour. Irish party secretaries all understand it instinctively and articulate the model, without the jargon, in interviews.

40 The coalition parties used polling effectively in 1973 but allowed themselves to be outpolled by Fianna Fáil in 1977. Public attitude and opinion polling is now an integral part of the parties' National Office activity.

41 Cf. Tables 3–8 in Richard Sinnott, “The Electorate,” in Penniman, Ireland at the Polls, 62.

42 Chubb, “The Electoral System,” 26.

43 For a detailed description of a recent campaign see Farrell and Manning, “The Election.”

44 Sinnott, “The Electorate,” makes this point clearly. See especially the data comparing voter's party assessments and voting intentions in Tables 3–7, 58.

45 Carty, “Partisan Allegiance and Parochial Association,” 141.

46 S. Rokkan reports the same “defeatism among voters for the opposition parties” in Norway where elections became “simply opportunities for registering loyalties to particular parties.” See his “Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism,” in Dahl, Robert A. (ed.), Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 105Google Scholar.

47 Interviews with candidates and constituency level party activists.

48 The Labour Party, Annual Report ’69 (Dublin), 15.

49 Cohan, A. S., McKinlay, R. D., and Mughan, Anthony, “The Used Vote and Electoral Outcomes: The Irish General Election of 1973,” British Journal of Political Science 5 (1975), 363–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland, chap. 1; Chubb, “Society and the Political System,” in Penniman, Ireland at the Polls; Sacks, Paul Martin, The Donegal Mafia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976)Google Scholar, chap. 2.

51 Schmitt, David. The Irony of Irish Democracy (Lexington: Heath, 1973)Google Scholar; Raven, John and Whelan, C. T., “Irish Adults' Perceptions of Their Civic Institutions and Their Own Role in Relation to Them,” in Raven, , et al., Political Culture in Ireland (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1976), 7–84Google Scholar.

52 Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, 104–09.

53 For nonincumbents, technical matters, such as ballot order, also seem to have some influence, see Robson, Christopher and Walsh, Brendan M., Alphabetical Voting: A Study of the 1973 General Election in the Republic of Ireland (Dublin: Economic and Social Research Institute, 1973), 18–19Google Scholar.

54 Case studies are reported in Bax, Harpstrings and Confessions; Sacks, The Donegal Mafia; Carty, “Politicians and Electoral Laws.”

55 Cited in Chubb, “‘Going About Persecuting Civil Servants,’” 282.

56 Bax, Harpstrings and Confessions; Catty, “Politicians and Electoral Laws.”

57 On this distinction see Boissevain, J., “Patrons as Brokers,” Sociologische Gids 16 (1968), 379–86Google Scholar.

58 The concept of imaginary patronage is taken from Sacks, The Donegal Mafia, 7–8. It refers to politicians who pretend to “obtain” grants, pensions, and so forth for constituents who have a statutory right to them. In aiding voters to deal with a remote and impersonal bureaucracy the politician is providing a real and valued service.

59 Nealon, Ted, Ireland: A Parliamentary Directory, 1973–74 (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1974), 121Google Scholar.

60 The evidence in Robson and Walsh, Alphabetical Voting, 20–24, suggests incumbents continue to do much better at the polls than their challengers.

61 Carty, “Politicians and Electoral Laws.”

62 Landé, Leaders, Factions and Parties, describes the classic case of parties based on local notables.

63 Of all the party dissidents only Neil Blaney, in the border country of Donegal, won re-election. He did so by constantly invoking the republican traditions of Fianna Fáil, claiming the party had deserted him rather than vice versa.

64 Party frontbenchers, as national figures, are often able to use that prestige and status to maintain their local position.

65 Sacks, P., “Bailiwicks, Locality, and Religion: Three Elements in an Irish Dáil Constituency Election,” Economic and Social Review 1 (1970), 531–54Google Scholar.

66 Carty, “Politicians and Electoral Laws.” For individual Labour candidates this may be a sensible strategy where it is clear the party can only win one seat.

67 A former general secretary of one of the parties told me that local T.D.s particularly disliked their national leaders coming into the constituency during by-elections because their presence would often encourage the deputies' local opponents who would then have to be dealt with.

68 Bax, “Patronage Irish Style,” 187–90.

69 Interview, May 15, 1973.

70 Farrell and Manning, “The Election.”

71 Farrell, Brian, “Irish Government Re-Observed,” Economic and Social Review 6 (1975), 412Google Scholar.

72 Curtis, Gerald L., Election Campaigning Japanese Style (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971)Google Scholar; Wertman, Douglas, “The Italian Electoral Process: The Elections of June 1976,” in Penniman, Howard R. (ed.), Italy at the Polls (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 41–79Google Scholar.

73 Key, Southern Politics, 434–42.

74 Fianna Fáil, anticipating partisan advantage, has twice tried to do this by sponsoring constitutional referenda to change the electoral system to a British plurality one. Both referenda failed because the voters understand that such a system would not allow them to combine partisanship with brokerage.

75 For an interesting American study that illustrates much the same point see Kelley, S., Ayres, R. E., and Bowen, W. G., “Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First,” American Political Science Review 61 (1967), 359–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar.