¹ The Politics of the European Communist States (New York, 1967), 2–3.

² I am employing the term “contestation” in the broad sense in which Dahl, Robert (unlike Ionescu) has used it in his recent book, Polyarchy (New Haven, 1971), 9.Google Scholar Ionescu applies the term to fundamental or “structural” opposition to a regime or system, while Dahl gives it a more general meaning similar to that intended by Bertrand de Jouvenel in his article, “The Means of Contestation.” “Contestation” there refers to a variety of forms of disagreements. For both Ionescu's and de Jouvenel's use of the term see Government and Opposition, I (1966), 240–50 and 155–74 respectively.

³ See Kirchheimer, Otto, “The Vanishing Opposition,” Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, ed. Dahl, Robert A. (New Haven, 1966), 237Google Scholar; and Robert A. Dahl, “Patterns of Opposition,” Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, 342—3.

⁴ The Intellectual Origins of the Prague Spring (Cambridge, 1971), 13.

⁵ Machonin, Pavel, ed., Československá Společnost (Bratislava, 1969), 159–61, 241–64, 599–607.Google Scholar (Contrary to Ernest Gellner's belief, expressed in his review in New Society, August 5, 1971, the book, published after the Soviet invasion, is available in Czechoslovak bookshops. I acquired my own copy in Prague quite recently. Professor Gellner rightly laments the absence of an English translation but fails to mention that the book contains a reasonably detailed summary in English.) Cf. Dahl, Polyarchy, 81–104. This is, of course, what De Toqueville clearly realized.

⁶ The last public opinion survey in Czechoslovakia (in 1968) revealed that while only five per cent opted for the return of capitalism and nine per cent expressed no opinion, eighty-six per cent were in favour of the further development of socialism. Cited in Kohout, Pavel, A us dem Tagebuch eines Konterrevolutionärs (Luzern, 1969), 165.Google Scholar

⁷ In Kundera, Milan, ed., Reden zum IV. Kongress des Tschechoslowakischen Schriftstellerverbandes (Frankfurt, 1968), 107–25.Google Scholar

⁸ Ibid., 126

⁹ See Degras, Jane, ed., The Communist International, 1919—43: Documents, Vol. 1 (London, 1956), 121, 130–2, 134, 171.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Aron, Raymond, “Can the party alone run a one-party state?,” Government and Opposition, II (1967)Google Scholar, cited in Ionescu, Politics of Communist States, 45.

¹¹ Kusin, in my view, confuses matters by insisting that the initiative for reform did not come from inside the party. See Intellectual Origins, 119.

¹² See Brown, A.H., “Pluralistic Trends in Czechoslovakia,” Soviet Studies, XVII (1966), 453–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; or his “Political Change in Czechoslovakia,” Government and Opposition, IV (1969), 169—94. See also Skilling, H. Gordon, “Background to the Study of Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe,” Government and Opposition, III (1968), 294–324CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Jancar, Barbara, “The Case for a Loyal Opposition under Communism: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia,” Orbis, XII (1968), 415–40.Google Scholar

¹³ Brown, , “Pluralistic Trends in Czechoslovakia,” Soviet Studies, XVII (1966), 460.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Jancar, , “The Case for a Loyal Opposition under Communism,” Orbis, XII (1968), 431Google Scholar, where the term is used to characterize the alliance between the solidly entrenched Slovak party with force and law behind it and the diverse and dispersed Czech groups, lacking institutional backing.

¹⁵ Of the eleven members composing the Presidium of the Central Committee between April 1968 and the Soviet invasion in August, only three can be regarded as progressivists: František Kriegel, Josef Smrkovský, and Josef Špaček. The others were moderates like Dubček, Jan Piller, and Oldřich Černik, or conservatives like Oldřich Švestka, Drahomir Kolder, or Vasil Bilák. But there were shades of differences even within these general categories.

¹⁸ For an interesting account of the formation of opinion groups during this period, see “Documents: Czechoslovakia – Before the Invasion,” Survey, 69 (1968), 22–33. The possibility that conservative party functionaries encouraged this “liberalization” in the hope that it would eventually play into their own hands, providing them with a welcome pretext for reversing the development, cannot be ruled out. See Mandler, Emanuel, “With the Party against the Party,” in Student, May 7, 1968.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Intellectual Origins, 19–27.

¹⁸ Ibid., 121.

¹⁹ Politics of States, 271–90.

²⁰ In “Culture and Political Development,” American Political Science Review, LXIII (1969), 379–97.

²¹ “Political Organization and Social Structure,” Socialní Structura Socialistické Společnosti, ed. Machonin, Pavel (Prague, 1966), 642–58.Google Scholar

²² “The Party and Changes in Social Structure,” ibid., 660–72.

²³ In “We talk about Democracy in Politics,” Reporter, the weekly of the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists, March 6–13, 1968.

²⁴ “What do we understand by Democratization?” in the Slovak Communist daily, Pravda, Oct. 26, 1968.Google Scholar On the conflicts inherent in the liberalization of Communist policy generally, see Lowenthal, Richard, “Development versus Utopia in Communist Policy,” Survey 74/75 (1970), 3–27.Google Scholar

²⁵ Cited in Kusin, Intellectual Origins, 119.

²⁶ Polyarchy, 2.

²⁷ See Zinner, Paul E., Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918–48 (New York, 1963), 19.Google Scholar

²⁸ See Taborský, Edward, Naše Novà (Ústava [Our new constitution] (Prague, 1948), 83.Google Scholar

²⁹ See Kerner, Robert J., ed., Czechoslovakia (Berkeley, 1944), 165.Google Scholar

³⁰ See Taborský, Edward, Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948–60 (Princeton, 1961) 119–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The category “hegemonic party system” was, as far as I am aware, first introduced by the Polish sociologist Jerzy Wiatr. He applied it to the Polish party system in which several parties and political groupings co-exist with the Communist party without challenging its directive political role. Their function is limited to the expression and representation of interests and opinions of various segments of society – they do not compete for political power. See Wiatr, , “One Party Systems: the Concept and Issue for Comparative Studies,” Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems eds. Allardt, E. and Littunen, Y. (Helsinki 1964)Google Scholar, and “Elements of Pluralism in the Polish Political System,” Polish Sociological Bulletin, I (1966).

³¹ “Background to the Study of Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe,” 297–8. Skilling distinguishes four types of opposition within communist systems of Eastern Europe: (1) “integral opposition,” overt or covert disloyalty and resistance to the existing socialist regime; (2) “factional opposition,” personal rivalry within the highest organs of party and government with or without the support of broader social and political groupings; (3) “fundamental opposition,” dissent that is frequently associated with (2), but which entails disagreement over broader issues of party policy; and (4) “specific opposition,” criticism which overtly takes the form of dissent on specific issues without questioning basic policies or existing authority structures within party or government.

³² A movement which first arose among factory workers in the Ostrava region and rapidly spread over other industrial areas took on the form of “Committees for the Defence of Free Speech.” See “Documents: Czechoslovakia,” Survey, 69 (1968), 30.

³³ “Background to the Study of Opposition,” 299.

³⁴ “Problems of Political Leadership and the New Economic System,” World Marxist Review, VIII (1965), 76–81.

³⁵ All references to the Action Programme are to the English translation in Remington, R.A., ed., Winter in Prague, Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis (Cambridge, Mass., 1969)Google Scholar, Document 16, esp. 98–111. The Action Programme had a rather mixed reception, though within party circles it was received favourably on the whole. Radoslav Selucký, a prominent Czech economist, expressed the prevailing mood. After voicing a number of criticisms he judged the Programme to be “a good thing,” and urged the speedy institutionalization of its proposals. (“The Programme of Democratic Regeneration of Socialist Czecho-slovakia” in the Czech trade union daily Práce, April 11, 1968.) See also an article by Jaroslav Kozel, then the new ideological secretary of the party, in Rudé Právo, May 16, 1968, “On Current Questions of Ideological-Political Work,” where he insists that reasoned argument is the only acceptable method of gaining support and confidence for the party.

³⁶ Remington, Winter in Prague, 110–11.

³⁷ Ibid., 103–4.

³⁸ Ibid., 100.

³⁹ Jiři Pelikan's edition of the transcript of the Fourteenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (subsequently declared illegal under Soviet pressure) contains the draft party statutes in two versions, the earlier providing for the publication of the views of minority factions in the party, and the later, more cautious formulation. The Secret Vysočany Congress (London, 1970).

⁴⁰ Aus dem Tagebuch, 139.

⁴¹ “On the Subject of Opposition,” Literarní Listy, April 4, 1968.

⁴² Verbotene Horizonte – Prag zwischen zwei Wintern (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1969), 89.

⁴³ Cited by Blackwell, Vera, in “Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads,” Survey, 68 (1968), 79.Google ScholarKalivoda, Robert in his closely reasoned article, “Democratization and Critical Thinking,” Literarní Listy, May 2 and 9, 1968Google Scholar, did advocate various forms of direct democracy, but he was almost a lone voice in the wilderness.

⁴⁴ Demokratischer Sozialismns (Hamburg, 1968); for the interview with Rudi Dutschke, see 9–11.

⁴⁵ Volby v Pluralitních Demokraciích [Elections in pluralist democracies] (Prague, 1968), 5–7 and 26–7.

⁴⁶ Sozialismus, 55, 77, 105; Volby, 256, 261.

⁴⁷ Sozialismus, 53 and 79; see also Volby, 25, 271, 284.

⁴⁸ Sozialismus, 54; Volby, 18, 263.

⁴⁹ Sozialismus, 56–8, 86; Volby, 18, 265, 276.

⁵⁰ Sozialismus, 61–2; Volby, 241, 269, 286.

⁵¹ Sozialismus, 78, 87.

⁵² Sozialismus, 79; Volby, 284–5.

⁵³ “The Case for a Loyal Opposition under Communism,” 415. The “opponentism,” or non-institutionalized opposition, of Catholics in Poland or of ethnic and interest groups in Yugoslavia might be cited as examples of opposition under Communism.

⁵⁴ This point is brought out rather clearly in a discussion between Jiěinský, Zdeněk and Klokočka, Vladimir, “The Adaptation of the Political System to the Needs of our Society,” Rudé Právo, May 30, 1968.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford, 1962).

⁵⁶ “Totalitarianism and Rationality,” American Political Science Review, 50 (1956), 761.

⁵⁷ “Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems,” ibid., 63, (1969), 403.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Fibich, J., “Institutional Alienation and the Freedom of Man,” Filosofia, 6 (1967)Google Scholar, transl. in Czechoslovak Press Survey, 2026, Radio Free Europe Research, March 11, 1968, 1–8; or Machonin, Pavel, “The New Unity of Society,” Rudé Právo, March 7, 1968Google Scholar; or the discussions “We talk about Democracy in Politics,” in Reporter, March 6–13, 1968; and “Party, Class, Society,” in the Slovak Communist daily Pravda, December 21 and 22, 1967, cited earlier.

⁵⁹ Marxism and the Human Individual (New York, 1970), 206.

⁶⁰ It is, of course, not suggested that there was an identity of views; nonetheless, some themes, or a variation of themes, showed a greater frequency than others. Thus there was generally a more lively concern for the creation or reform of parliamentary institutions than for more direct workers’ control in industrial management. Ivan Sviták was expressing a minority opinion when he warned against the rise of technocracy at the expense of democracy. The prevailing consensus was in favour of some sort of fusion or co-existence between electoral contestation and parliamentary democracy on the one hand, and professional expertise in industrial and civil administration on the other. Surprisingly little was written in support of enhancing the status of the ordinary Worker except to use his legendary virtues, proclaimed by the institutional ideology, as a device for keeping the intellectuals in their place. But the legend was wearing thin and the sound of the voices demanding a redefinition of the concept of “working-class rule” grew more strident, penetrating even the editorial walls of the party ideological journal, Nová Mysl, where Zdeněk Valenta in an article, “The Working Class and the Intelligentsia,” observes that the working class is in the process of entering a new phase in which the original “proletariat” has ceased to exist as a result of technological, economic, and sociological changes. (Nová Mysl, 2 (1968), 198–210.) See also on this point a polemical exchange between Zdeněk Šumbera and Klofáč, Jaroslav in Kitlturní Tvorba, 50 (1967)Google Scholar and Rudé Právo, January 17, and February 14, 1968. I hope to discuss the nature of this ideological reappraisal at greater length in a separate article.

⁶¹ I am indebted to my colleague Richard Vernon for having drawn my attention to Marx's occasional references to “strata parties.”