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Time Pressure and War Initiation: Some Linkages*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

T.V. Paul
T.V. Paul
Affiliation:
McGill University
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Abstract

This article examines the linkages by which time pressure influences national decision makers to initiate wars. It is argued that time pressure matters most significantly as an intervening variable at the decision-maker level in conjunction with system and subsystem level variables, such as changes in relative strike capability and alliance relationships, and state level variables like military strategy and doctrine. Most studies treat time pressure as having relevance during an acute crisis; in this article, time pressure is viewed as having an intermediate-term significance, that is, prior to the escalation phase or during the early phase of a crisis. It is shown that independent variables such as relative capability, alliance relationships and military doctrines are most likely to be associated with war initiation when they are mediated by time pressure. The article also distinguishes between immediate time pressure—that occurs during the escalation phase of a crisis—and intermediate time pressure, which can happen prior to, and at the onset phase of a crisis.

Résumé

On cherche dans cet article à analyser les liens grâce auxquels la variable temporelle influence les dirigeants nationaux dans leur decision de déclarer la guerre. On constate que le temps est une importante variable d'intervention au niveau décisionnel, en conjonction avec d'autres systémes ou sous-systémes de variables,tels que le potentiel d'attaque et les alliances, ainsi que des variables au niveau de l'Etat comme la stratégie militaire et les ideologies. La plupart des études antérieures considerent la variable temporelle comme étant de toute première importance pour les decisions prises lors de crises aigues, tandis que cet article fait du temps une variable intermédiaire. On montre que des variables independantes comme les ressources, les alliances ainsi que les strategies militaires, sont associees aux préparatifs guerriers par l'intermédiaire du temps. On essaie aussi de distinguer entre les pressions temporelles immédiates—celles qui surgissent lors de l'escalade de la crise—et les pressions intermédiates qui précèdent la crise ou coincident avec son émergence.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , June 1995 , pp. 255 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1995

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