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What are the primary bearers of truth?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Peter Hanks
Peter Hanks*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, 831 Heller Hall, Minneapolis, MN55455, USA
*
*Email: pwhanks@umn.edu
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Abstract

According to the traditional account of propositional content, propositions are the primary bearers of truth. Here I argue that acts of predication are the primary bearers of truth. Propositions are types of these actions, and they inherit their truth-conditions from their tokens. Against this, many philosophers think that it is a category mistake to say that actions are true or false. Furthermore, even if we grant that token acts of predication have truth-conditions, there are reasons for doubting that types of these actions also have truth-conditions. I respond to these objections in this paper. I also clarify what it means for propositions to inherit truth-conditions from token acts of predication.

Keywords

truthpropositionspredicationtypesinheritance
Type
On Act- and Language-Based Conceptions of Propositions
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 558 - 574
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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