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Williamson on necessitism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jeremy Goodman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, NYU, New York, NY, USA.

Abstract

I critically discuss some of the main arguments of Modal Logic as Metaphysics, present a different way of thinking about the issues raised by those arguments, and briefly discuss some broader issues about the role of higher-order logic in metaphysics.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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References

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