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Roger A. Shiner. Freedom of Commercial Expressionn. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003. Pp. xxiv + 3555.

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Roger A. Shiner. Freedom of Commercial Expressionn. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003. Pp. xxiv + 3555.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

L.W. Sumner*
Affiliation:
University of Toronto, Toronto, ONMS 1A1, Canada

Abstract

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Type
Critical Notice
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2005

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References

1 The paper was subsequently published as ‘Freedom of Commercial Expression', in Waluchow, W.J. ed., Free Expression (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994)Google Scholar.

2 All in-text page references (in parentheses) are to this work.

3 R. v. Keegstra, (1990) 3 S.C.R. 697; R. v. Butler, (1992) 1 S.C.R. 452.

4 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, (1989) 1 S.C.R. 927, at 969-70.

5 These implications have been noted in Kent|Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech (Princeton: Princeton University Press date???), 20-1.

6 On the question of liberty, see R. v. Malmo-Levine, (2003) SCC 74, paras. 84-9. On the question of security, see Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), (2005) SCC 35, paras 204-7.

7 Keegstra,845

8 R. v. Oakes, (1986) 1 S.C.R. 103.

9 Keegstra, 787. Dickson also observed that hate propaganda ‘strays some distance from the spirit of s. 2(b)’ (766) and that it is ‘distant from the core of free expression values’ (787).

10 Keegstra, 766

11 Keegstra, 767

12 ‘To become transfixed with categorization schemes risks losing the advantage associated with this sensitive examination of free expression principles, and I would be loath to sanction such a result’ (Keegstra, 767).

13 Keegstra, 785,765 respectively

14 Butler, 509; cf. 500

15 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), (1996) 3S.C.R. 480, at 512-13

16 Keegstra, 841

17 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), (1995) 3 S.C.R. 199, at 347

18 R. v. Lucas, (1998) 1 S.C.R. 439, at 488

19 E.g., La Forest in RJR-MacDonald, 279

20 Irwin Toy, 976

21 Incidentally, Shiner sometimes seems to slide into associating commercial expression particularly with corporate advertising: ‘If freedom of expression is thought primarily to protect the normative position of those who express, or speak, then the typical expresser in the case of commercial expression is a corporation, and not a natural person’ (168). But this association neglects the fact that many advertisements are posted or circulated by natural rather than artificial persons, as well as the fact that many such persons have incorporated themselves for legal reasons but remain otherwise entirely natural. While most advertising, and especially the most visible forms of advertising, may be corporate in the stronger sense Shiner intends, not all of it is.

22 Mill, John Stuart On Liberty,’ in Robson, J.M. ed., Essays on Politics and Society (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1977), 223Google Scholar

23 On Liberty,’ 225-6

24 Ibid.

25 On Liberty,’ 276

26 On Liberty,’ 292