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Reid on the moral sense

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Rebecca Copenhaver*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lewis & Clark College, 0615 SW Palatine Hill Road, Portland, OR, 97219-7899, USA

Abstract

Some interpret Reid's notion of a moral sense as merely analogical. Others understand it as a species of acquired perception. To understand Reid's account of the moral sense, we must draw from his theory of perception and his theory of aesthetic experience, each of which illuminate the nature and operation of the moral faculty. I argue that, on Reid's view, the moral faculty is neither affective nor rational, but representational. It is a discrete, basic, capacity for representing the real moral properties of humans and human conduct.

Type
Moral Theory
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2011

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References

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