Feminist theory, whether specifically philosophical or not, has been integrative in a number of ways. In epistemology and metaphysics it has attacked dualisms and dichotomies and tried to show that mind and body, reason and emotion, civilization and nature are neither separate nor separable; in ethics, we have agreed that rules, principles and justice must be tempered with a sense of caring and community; and, more generally, we have been at pains not to draw too sharp lines between philosophy and psychology, history and anthropology, literary theory and sociology.

The relationship of philosophy to science is a matter of long historical dispute. Philosophy has been described variously as the mother, the queen or the handmaiden of science, depending on whether the philosopher’s role was perceived as that of giving birth to science, of regulating and legitimating scientific discourse or of clearing the conceptual underbrush in the way of scientific advance. This essay, by contrast, is grounded on a conception of philosophy and science as partners or sisters, perhaps even as Siamese twin sisters, both proceeding from the same impulse to understand ourselves and the world and to change both for the better. Occasionally relations between philosophy and science have been marred by sibling rivalry, with each sister claiming the right to control and limit the pretensions of the other. In fact, however, philosophy and science are interdependent and ultimately inseparable. To borrow a famous slogan from another context: science without philosophy is blind; philosophy without science is empty.

In recent decades in North American social and moral philosophy, alongside the development and discussion of widely influential theories of justice, taken as Rawls takes it as the ‘first virtue of social institutions,’ there has been a counter-movement gathering strength, one coming from some interesting sources. For some of the most outspoken of the diverse group who have in a variety of ways been challenging the assumed supremacy of justice among the moral and social virtues are members of those sections of society whom one might have expected to be especially aware of the supreme importance of justice, namely blacks and women. Those who have only recently won recognition of their equal rights, who have only recently seen the correction or partial correction of long-standing racist and sexist injustices to their race and sex, are among the philosophers now suggesting that justice is only one virtue among many, and one that may need the presence of the others in order to deliver its own undenied value. Among these philosophers of the philosophical counterculture, as it were - but an increasingly large counterculture - I include Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Stocker, Lawrence Blum, Michael Slote, Laurence Thomas, Claudia Card, Alison Jaggar, Susan Wolf and a whole group of men and women, myself included, who have been influenced by the writings of Harvard educational psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose book In a Different Voice (Harvard 1982; hereafter D.V.) caused a considerable stir both in the popular press and, more slowly, in the philosophical journals.

In the past three decades scholars in virtually every humanistic and social scientific research discipline, and in some natural sciences (especially the life sciences), have drawn attention to quite striking instances of gender bias in the modes of practice and theorizing typical of traditional fields of research. They generally begin by identifying explicit androcentric biases in definitions of the subject domains appropriate to specific scientific fields. Their primary targets, in this connection, have been research that leaves women out altogether (e.g., anthropological research that has arbitrarily and, as it turns out, falsely characterized subsistence systems and political structures exclusively in terms of male activities; [see Slocum 1975]), research that ignores women’s contributions or victimization (e.g., in the definition of literary or artistic canons and historical traditions), and research that conceptualizes its subject, male or female, human or non-human, in explicitly gender biased terms (e.g., models of animal behaviour that project onto it the gender-specific attributes of particular human societies and models of human psychological development that take exclusively male patterns of development as the norm and characterize distinctive female patterns as ‘deviant’; see Harraway 1978 and Gilligan 1982, respectively).

Carol Gilligan heard a ‘distinct moral language’ in the voices of women who were subjects in her studies of moral reasoning. Though herself a developmental psychologist, Gilligan has put her mark on contemporary feminist moral philosophy by daring to claim the competence of this voice and the worth of its message. Her book, In a Different Voice, which one theorist has aptly described as a best-seller, explored the concern with care and relationships which Gilligan discerned in the moral reasoning of women and contrasted it with the orientation toward justice and rights which she found to typify the moral reasoning of men.

Contemporary society is in the grip of contractual thinking. Realities are interpreted in contractual terms, and goals are formulated in terms of rational contracts. The leading current conceptions of rationality begin with assumptions that human beings are independent, self-interested or mutually disinterested, individuals; they then typically argue that it is often rational for human beings to enter into contractual relationships with each other.

A careful, theoretical clarification of gender roles has only recently begun in social and political philosophy. It is the aim of the following piece to reveal that an analysis of women’s traditional position - her distinctive activities, labor and surrounding sense of ‘mine’ - can not only make valuable contributions towards clarifying traditional property disputes, but may even provide elements for a new conception of ownership. By way of illustration, the article focusses on the influential work of John Rawls and argues that - when Rawls’s own analysis and principles of justice are supplemented by an account of what is here called ‘reproductive labor’ - his theory in fact tends to a form of democratic socialism. Stated somewhat differently, my aim is to shift the terms of the property debate as posed by Rawls from within his own position. I hope to show that the real ownership question which now emerges is no longer whether ‘justice as fairness’ countenances a private property or socialist form of democracy, but what precise form such a socialism should take.

In After Virtue Alasdair MacIntyre argues that moral argument in modern civilization is inherently ideological in character. The parties at odds present their conclusions as objective truths, but in reality each relies on premises that he or she cannot rationally justify to the other. Since moral language wraps non-rational choices in the illusion of objectivity, it is unavoidably manipulative in function. In both personal relations and political affairs we employ the. language of morality in order to have our way, to get others to serve our ends.

In one of Marge Piercy’s poems, ‘For Strong Women,’ we find the following verse:

A strong woman is a woman in whose head

a voice is repeating, I told you so,

ugly, bad girl, bitch, nag, shrill, witch,

ballbuster, nobody will ever love you back,

why aren’t you feminine, why aren’t

you soft, why aren’t you quiet,

why aren’t you dead?

Similarly, we might say that a moral woman is a woman in whose head a voice is repeating words like ‘immature,’ ‘pathological,’ ‘inadequate,’ ‘immoral,’ ‘evil.’ What I explore in this paper are various ways in which a woman’s moral voice and her sense of moral integrity can be twisted and destroyed by patriarchal ideology and lived experience.

Kathryn Morgan’s paper, ‘Women and Moral Madness,’ is a rich compound of example and analysis, which deserves to be influential in moral theory. My rejoinder can be understood as having one main point. I take her analysis of moral madness to be profoundly helpful, and I claim that it implies an understanding of the human person which can be made more precise if we also pay attention to moral sanity. My paper, then, accepts Morgan’s work as fundamental, and attempts to contribute to its further development. I begin with some preliminary observations before proposing my main idea. My subtitle identifies an example which illustrates the main point, and concludes the paper.

Kathryn Morgan has introduced us to a typology of ‘the ways in which women’s moral voice and her sense of moral integrity are twisted and destroyed by patriarchal ideology and lived experience.’ She claims that this experience can induce in women ‘a sense of confusion and genuine moral madness.’

I am in agreement with much of what Morgan says. However, I suspect that some others might find her case less convincing than I for the reason that she supports her claims by an appeal to classical philosophical literature and what we might loosely call ‘sociological observations.’ One can imagine the easy retort—‘Yes, well, it’s true that Aristotle, Aquinas, Rousseau and Kant did say those silly things about women, but their remarks were mere asides and no one takes them seriously in this matter any more anyway.

New technology in human reproduction has provoked wide ranging arguments about the desirability and moral justifiability of many of these efforts. Authors of biomedical ethics have ventured into the field to offer the insight of moral theory to these complex moral problems of contemporary life. I believe, however, that the moral theories most widely endorsed today are problematic and that a new approach to ethics is necessary if we are to address the concerns and perspectives identified by feminist theorists in our considerations of such topics. Hence, I propose to look at one particular technique in the growing repertoire of new reproductive technologies, in vitro fertilization (IVF), in order to consider the insight which the mainstream approaches to moral theory have offered to this debate, and to see the difference made by a feminist approach to ethics.

This paper will explore some moral and conceptual aspects of the practice of surrogate motherhood. Although I put forward a number of criticisms of existing ideas about this subject, I do not claim to offer a fully developed position. Instead what I have tried to do is to call into question what seem to be some generally accepted assumptions about surrogate motherhood, and to lend plausibility to my view that surrogate motherhood may be morally troubling for reasons not always fully recognized by other writers on this issue. These reasons go beyond the fairly obvious consequentialist concerns (already well discussed in the press) about its effects on the persons - particularly the child — involved. A concern for the well being of a child produced by a surrogate is, I believe, entirely justified, but my focus in this paper will be upon the surrogate mother herself.

How important is self-knowledge in moral life? What kind of self-knowledge, if any, is necessary for full moral agency? What kinds of self-knowledge are there? What is ‘full moral agency’? Despite the great proliferation of theories about the self in psychology in this century, questions like these have not been addressed very often in recent literature on ethics in the Anglo-American tradition. And, although in 1958 Anscombe recommended that we stop doing moral philosophy altogether until we have a better moral psychology, the main response to this suggestion has been a renewed interest in the virtues. Another approach to these problems can be found in feminist ethics, with its interest in caring relations. In this paper I shall describe a few of the connections between caring and self-knowledge. I shall then compare the insights generated by this approach with the views of two authors, who work from radically opposed frameworks, Richard Brandt and Charles Taylor. Both have produced interesting, but completely different descriptions of self-knowledge and its place in moral life.

The contemporary Women’s Movement has generated major new theories of the social construction of gender and male power. The feminist attack on the masculinist assumptions of cognitive psychology, psychoanalysis and most of the other academic disciplines has raised questions about some basic assumptions of those fields. For example, feminist economists have questioned the public/private split of much of mainstream economics, that ignores the social necessity of women’s unpaid housework and childcare. Feminist psychologists have challenged cognitive and psychoanalytic categories of human moral and gender development arguing that they are biased toward the development of male children rather than female children. Feminist anthropologists have argued that sex/gender systems, based on the male exchange of women in marriage, have socially produced gender differences in sexuality and parenting skills which have perpetuated different historical and cultural forms of male dominance. Feminist philosophers and theorists have suggested that we must reject the idea of a gender-free epistemological standpoint from which to understand the world. Finally radical feminists have argued that the liberal state permits a pornography industry that sexually objectifies women, thus legitimizing male violence against women.

Assumptions about what it is to be human are implicit in most philosophical reflections upon ethical and epistemological issues. Although such assumptions are not usually elaborated into a comprehensive theory of human nature, they are nonetheless influential in beliefs about what kinds of problem are worthy of consideration, and in judgments about the adequacy of proposed solutions. Claims to the effect that one should not be swayed by feelings and loyalties in the making of moral decisions, for example, presuppose that human beings are creatures whose nature is amenable to guidance by reason rather than emotion and are creatures capable of living well when they act as impartially as possible. Analogously, claims to the effect that knowledge, to merit that title, should be acquired out of independent cognitive endeavour uncluttered by opinion and hearsay, suggest that human beings are creatures who can come to know their environment through their own unaided efforts. And claims to the effect that knowledge, once acquired, is timelessly and universally true depend upon assumptions about the constancy and uniformity of human nature across historical and cultural boundaries.

Feminist philosophy, along with, and as a part of, feminist thought more generally, is rapidly developing and will, and rightly, become an increasing force in our cultural life. The essays in this rich and varied volume contribute to this. They have a cluster of salient features in common that is generally characteristic of feminist philosophy and contrasts markedly with most other philosophy as presently practiced. I refer here to the fact that feminist philosophy is more receptive than more traditional modes of philosophizing to currents of thought coming from a very considerable number of often quite different sources, less defensively adversarial and more tolerant of a lack of closure in philosophical thought.