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Democratic Deliberations, Equality of Influence, and Pragmatism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Judith Baker
Judith Baker*
Affiliation:
York University
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Extract

Democracy is committed to procedures of decision-making which express the values of both political equality and truth. One current program, that of strong or deliberative democracy, explicitly defends institutions which reflect the dual commitments to truth and equality. Like many other political theorists, however, deliberative democrats do not address the issue of a minority group which always loses the vote. The presumption is that free and equal deliberation by agents who think in terms of the common good is sufficient for political equality. I will argue, however, that the proposed deliberative procedures do not preclude persistent failure for a minority, and that this problem should lead us to acknowledge that power relations can underpin decision-making arrangements even within the ideal framework of deliberative democracy. Political equality and effective political equality seem to come apart.

In order to come closer to the idea of effective political equality, this paper will look at the notion of equality of influence. It may seem tautological, and so redundant, to argue that political egalitarians and particularly deliberative democrats need to recognize equality of influence.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 24: Pragmatism , 1998 , pp. 253 - 272
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1998

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References

1 Guinier, “No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality,” Virginia Law Review 77, 8 (1991): 1413–1514.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Waldron, “Rights and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited,” NOMOS 32, Majorities and Minorities, ed. Chapman, John and Wertheimer, Alan (New York: New York University Press, 1990), 64.Google Scholar

3 Manin, “A Sketch of a Theory of Political Deliberation,” Political Theory 15, 3 (1987): 359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality,” University of San Francisco Law Review 22 (1987): 9.Google Scholar

5 Ibid., 17.

6 Richardson, “Democratic Deliberation about Ends,” unpublished draft.

7 Williams, Voice, Trust and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton University Press, forthcoming). I have greatly benefitted from reading Williams's defense of group representation.

8 Cf. Comments of Putnam, Hilary to Peirce's Cambridge Conference lectures, in Reasoning and the Logic of Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992): 555-57.Google Scholar

9 Shklar, The Faces of Injustice.

10 The account of Misak's views comes from private discussions with Misak. Cf. her “Pragmatism, Empiricism and Morality,” in Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value, ed. Lovibond, S. and Williams, S. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996)Google Scholar and The True, the Just and the Good: A Pragmatist View (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

11 Both objections have indeed been voiced in private discussion by Melissa Williams and Cheryl Misak.