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Administrative Discretion and the Spirit of Legality: From Theory to Practice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Geneviève Cartier
Geneviève Cartier
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, Université de Sherbrooke, genevieve.cartier@usherbrooke.ca
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Abstract

This article focuses on the relationship between administrative discretion and the rule of law, showing that administrative discretion properly conceived is not only compatible with a particular understanding of the principle of the rule of law but could also become a vehicle allowing the executive to express its commitment to that principle. In the author's view, this is possible if, first, discretion is conceived through the metaphor of a dialogue between rulers and ruled; and, second, we endorse a substantive understanding of the rule of law that views all three constituents of the state – legislative, judicial, and executive branches – as involved in the project of preventing arbitrary action by public powers. The article explores these dynamics in the concrete setting of the author's experience as associate dean of a law school, in order both to see how the theoretical model of dialogue translates into practice and to identify the particular aspects of the theory that might require further inquiry and empirical research.

Résumé

Cet article examine la relation entre la discrétion administrative et la primauté du droit. L'auteure démontre comment la discrétion administrative, conçue correctement, est non seulement compatible avec une compréhension particulière du principe de la primauté du droit, mais peut aussi devenir un véhicule permettant au pouvoir exécutif d'exprimer son engagement envers ce principe. Selon l'auteure, ceci est possible, premièrement, si la discrétion est conçue selon la métaphore du «dialogue» entre le dirigeant et le dirigé et, deuxièmement, si une compréhension substantive de la primauté du droit est mise de l'avant, à savoir une définition qui considère les trois éléments constitutifs de l'État (les sphères législative, judiciaire et exécutive) comme étant impliqués dans la prévention des actions arbitraires de la part des pouvoirs publics. L'auteure explore ces dynamiques dans le contexte concret de ses expériences en tant que vice-doyenne d'une faculté de droit. Elle cherche à comprendre comment le modèle théorique du dialogue fonctionne dans la pratique et à identifier les aspects particuliers de la théorie qui pourraient nécessiter plus d'étude et de recherche empirique.

Keywords

discrétion administrativeprimauté du droitdialoguepouvoirDiceyadministrative discretionrule of lawdialoguepowerDicey
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law and Society / La Revue Canadienne Droit et Société , Volume 24 , Issue 3: The Dilemmas of Discretion/Dilemmes Discrétionnaires , December 2009 , pp. 313 - 335
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 2009

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References

1 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 [Baker].

2 Davis, Kenneth Culp, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 4Google Scholar.

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6 Dyzenhaus, David, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Part I summarizes ideas I have explored in detail in previous work; see, e.g., Cartier, Geneviève, “La discrétion administrative: une occasion de dialogue entre citoyens et tribunaux?” in Citizenship and Citizen Participation in the Administration of Justice, ed. Coughlan, S.G. and Russel, D. (Montreal: Thémis, 2001), 233Google Scholar; Cartier, Geneviève, “Reconceiving Discretion: From Discretion as Power to Discretion as Dialogue (SJD thesis, University of Toronto, 2004)Google Scholar; Cartier, Geneviève, “The Baker Effect: A New Interface Between the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Administrative Law—The Case of Discretion,” in The Unity of Public Law, ed. Dyzenhaus, David (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 61Google Scholar; and Cartier, Geneviève, “Administrative Discretion as Dialogue: A Response to John Willis (Or: From Theology to Secularization),” University of Toronto Law Journal 55 (2005), 629CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 [1959] S.C.R. 121 [Roncarelli].

9 An Act Respecting Alcoholic Liquor, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 255, s. 35.

10 Roncarelli at 167.

11 Ibid. at 164.

12 Ibid., quoting Ashby et al., [1934] O.R. 421 at 428, 3 D.L.R. 565, 62 C.C.C. 132. If the act was purely administrative and the result of an unfettered discretion, “it would seem to follow that [the Liquor Commission] was not bound to give the appellant an opportunity to be heard before deciding to cancel and that the Court cannot be called upon to determine whether there existed sufficient grounds for his decision.” Ibid. at 168.

13 Fuller, Lon L., The Morality of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), 192Google Scholar; see also 204.

14 Ibid., 233.

15 To give but two illustrations: Thorne's Hardware Ltd. v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 106; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 [Suresh].

16 Roncarelli was a contested decision: not only were there three dissenting judges, but three sets of opinions were submitted by the majority judges. Martland J., writing for Kerwin and Locke JJ., should formally be viewed as the dominant opinion, but Rand J.'s judgment, with Judson J. concurring, has been so considered.

17 The power to cancel was expressly conferred on the Liquor Commission, and no general overriding power of supervision was found to exist that would have supported the action of the premier in such a case.

18 Roncarelli at 140.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid. at 142.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Nicholson v. Haldimand–Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 [Nicholson].

24 See note 1 above.

25 Although the duality remained for some time with respect to the applicable model of procedure: “natural justice” in the case of quasi-judicial decisions and “procedural fairness” in the case of discretionary decisions.

26 As we shall see below, more than 20 years after Nicholson, the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh endorsed a view of procedural constraints that seemed to fall back on a power view of discretion.

27 Immigration Regulations, S.O.R./78-172, as am. by S.O.R./93-44, s. 52.1.

28 For an analysis of the evolution of the review approaches that developed in administrative law see Cartier, “The Baker Effect.”

29 “It is … inaccurate to speak of a rigid dichotomy of ‘discretionary’ or ‘non-discretionary’ decisions. Most administrative decisions involve the exercise of implicit discretion in relation to many aspects of decision making.… In addition, there is no easy distinction between interpretation and the exercise of discretion; interpreting legal rules involves considerable discretion to clarify, fill in gaps, and make choices among various options.” Baker at para. 54.

30 Ibid. at para. 56.

31 The effects of the recent reappraisal of the standards of review effectuated by the Supreme Court in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, still need to be assessed, but the fundamental shift brought about by Baker concerning the need to review discretion on a standard of reasonableness was not inherently questioned in that decision.

32 Baker at para. 65.

33 Ibid. at para. 73.

34 The decision of the Supreme Court in Suresh (see note 15 above), however, suggests that the law/discretion dichotomy has not entirely disappeared from the legal landscape. The case is discussed below.

35 Baker at para. 43.

36 Further discussion of this argument can be found in Dyzenhaus, David and Fox-Decent, Evan, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v. Canada,” University of Toronto Law Journal 51 (2001), 193CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 Fuller, , Morality of Law, 192, 204Google Scholar.

38 Dyzenhaus, and Fox-Decent, , “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction,” 204Google Scholar.

39 Ibid., 218.

40 See generally Handler, Joel, The Conditions of Discretion: Autonomy, Community, Democracy (New York: Russell Sage, 1986)Google Scholar.

41 See also Sossin, Lorne, “An Intimate Approach to Fairness, Impartiality and Reasonableness in Administrative Law,” Queen's Law Journal 27 (2002), 842Google Scholar.

42 Handler, Joel, “Dependent People, the State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community,” U.C.L.A. Law Review 35 (1988), 1066Google Scholar, citing Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Truth and Method (1975), 162Google Scholar.

43 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].

44 As we shall see in our discussion of Suresh below, however, the power model has not totally disappeared from Canadian law.

45 Nedelsky, Jennifer, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1 (1989), 7Google Scholar.

46 See also Mullan, David J., “The Role of the Judiciary in the Review of Administrative Policy Decisions: Issues of Legality,” in The Judiciary as Third Branch of Government: Manifestations and Challenges to Legitimacy, ed. Mossman, Mary Jane and Otis, Ghislain (Montreal: Thémis, 2000), 313Google Scholar (arguing that Roncarelli never had the impact it should have had in the few years that followed, in that a number of judicial pronouncements seemed to give the executive a free hand).

47 See note 15 above.

48 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, ss. 53(1)(b), 53(1)(c).

49 The effects of the events of September 11, 2001, on the law of judicial review and on the conception of the rule of law has generated an important literature. For an early and substantial contribution see generally the essays collected in Daniels, Ronald J., Macklem, Patrick, and Roach, Kent, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada's Anti-terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 Baker at para. 65.

51 C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, might be one such example.

52 Davis, , Discretionary Justice, 27Google Scholar.

53 Ibid., 33, quoting Wade, E.C.S. and Phillips, G. Godfrey, Constitutional Law, 7th ed. by Wade, E.C.S. and Bradley, A.W. (London: Longmans, 1965), 67Google Scholar.

54 Dicey, A.V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1959)Google Scholar [Law of the Constitution].

55 For an appraisal of the influence and significance of Dicey on the British constitution, see, among others, Foley, Michael, The Politics of the Constitution (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), ch. 2Google Scholar.

56 Dicey, , Law of the Constitution, 202Google Scholar.

57 Ibid., 188.

58 Ibid., 408; see also 381.

59 Ibid., 406.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., 408.

62 Ibid., 409.

63 Ibid., 411.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., 413.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid., 414.

69 Ibid., 413

70 Dicey, A.V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1927), xxxviiiGoogle Scholar.

71 Ibid., xxxix.

72 Dicey, , Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., 195Google Scholar.

73 See, e.g., Robson, W.A., Justice and Administrative Law: A Study of the British Constitution, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1951), 451Google Scholar; SirJennings, Ivor, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed. (London: University of London Press, 1959)Google Scholar. See also, more recently, Harlow, Carol and Rawlings, Richard, Law and Administration, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1997), 37ffGoogle Scholar.

74 David Dyzenhaus makes a similar point in Constitution of Law, 56–57, 123; see also Dyzenhaus, David, “The Puzzle of Martial Law,” University of Toronto Law Journal 59 (2009), 35–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

75 Dicey, , Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., 414 [emphasis added]Google Scholar.

76 Ibid., 40.

77 Ibid., 62 81–82.

78 Dyzenhaus, , Constitution of Law, 2Google Scholar.

79 Ibid., 5.

80 Ibid., 18.

81 Ibid., 8.

82 Dyzenhaus, David, “Form and Substance in the Rule of Law: A Democratic Justification for Judicial Review?” in Judicial Review and the Constitution, ed. Forsyth, C.F. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), 170Google Scholar. Although determining the fundamental principles that constitute the rule of law is a controversial task, Dyzenhaus's suggestion is a good starting point for the purposes of our discussion.

83 See Introduction above.

84 Another illuminating experience can be drawn from Macdonald, R.A., “Office Politics,” University of Toronto Law Journal 40 (1990), 419CrossRefGoogle Scholar.