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Steven M. Wise and the Common Law Case for Animal Rights: Full Steam Ahead

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2017

Daniel Davison-Vecchione  and
Kate Pambos
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Abstract

This article examines Steven M. Wise’s arguments in favour of rationally extending fundamental rights at common law to other animals, as well as the 2014 and 2017 decisions of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, which rejected the possibility of extending common law personhood to a chimpanzee on social contract grounds. The article argues that extending the common law rights to liberty and bodily integrity to animals whose cognitive characteristics indicate an interest in self-determination is both morally correct and legally feasible, since this interest is what said common law rights exist to protect. Moreover, the arguments from reciprocity and community membership adopted by the New York Court fail to provide a philosophically sound basis for denying nonhuman rights, nor does conceptualising rights and duties in terms of social contract necessarily preclude nonhuman emancipation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , August 2017 , pp. 287 - 309
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2017 

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References

1. Richard A Posner, “Book Review: Rattling the Cage” (2000) 110 Yale LJ 527 at 527.

2. Ibid.

3. For further information on these cases, see online at: https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/litigation/.

4. People of the State of New York, ex rel The Nonhuman Rights Project, on behalf of Tommy v Thomas C Lavery, [2014] 124 AD 3d 148 [Tommy].

5. Ibid at 150.

6. Ibid at 151-52.

7. The Nonhuman Rights Project, on behalf of Hercules and Leo v Samuel L Stanley Jr and State University of New York at Stony Brook, [2015] 152736/15 Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County: IAS Part 12, online at: https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/content/uploads/Judge-Jaffes-Decision-7-30-15.pdf. In New York State, the Supreme Court is the lowest court [Hercules & Leo].

8. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Lavery (2017) NY Slip Op 04574, online at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_04574.htm. At the time of writing, the opinion is not yet published in the Official Reports [Tommy & Kiko].

9. Ibid at 1.

10. Ibid at 2.

11. This is a variant of the ‘argument from marginal cases’, discussed below in detail.

12. Supra note 8 at 2.

13. Wise, Steven M, Rattling the Cage: Towards Legal Rights for Animals (Basic Books, 2000).Google Scholar

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20. For general examples, see Wise, supra note 13 at chs 2-4; Singer, supra note 17 at ch 5.

21. Such historical overviews typically discuss the Judeo-Christian view that God granted humanity “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and every living thing that moveth upon the earth” (Genesis 1:28). Other frequently covered historical perspectives include those of Aristotle and Descartes. See Aristotle, A Treatise on Government, bk I, ch VIII, translated by William Ellis (JM Dent & Sons, 1912) at 1256b; René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, translated by Elizabeth Haldane & GRT Ross (Yale University Press, 1996) at 36.

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26. Tommy, supra note 4; Tommy & Kiko, supra note 8.

27. Wise, supra note 14 at 45.

28. Randy E Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton University Press, 2005) at ch 10. For an opposing interpretation (that the Ninth Amendment was intended as interpretative safeguard for the States against federal power) see Kurt T Lash, “The Lost Original Interpretation of the Ninth Amendment” (2003) 83 Texas L Rev 331.

29. For the academic standpoint that judicial review in English law is based on constitutional principles at common law rather Parliamentary intention, see the following: John Laws, “Law and Democracy” (1995) P L 72; Douglas E Edin, “From Ambiguity to Legality: The Future of English Judicial Review” (2004) 52 Am J Comp L 386.

30. [1987] AC 514 (HL) at 53.

31. [1995] 4 All ER 400 (QB) at 421.

32. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Simms, [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL) at 130.

33. [1998] AC 539 (HL) at 387.

34. For a general exploration by Wise of the history of habeas corpus and its use to grant legal personhood to those deprived of it, see Steven M Wise, Though the Heavens May Fall: The Landmark Trial That Led to the End of Human Slavery (Da Capo Press, 2006).

35. (1772), 98 ER 499.

36. Ibid at 510.

37. For a critical view of English common law in respect of slavery, see Colin Bobb-Simple, “English Common Law, Slavery, and Human Rights” (2007) 13 Texas Wesleyan L Rev 659.

38. Moore v Macduff (1955), 309 NY 35 at 43; Whitford v Panama Railroad Company (1861), 23 NY 465 at 467-68.

39. (1891), 141 US 250 at 250.

40. (1996), 422 Mass 590 at 595.

41. (1914), 211 NY 125 at 129-30.

42. Ibid.

43. (1986), 67 NY 2d 485 at 493.

44. Ibid at 494.

45. Wise, supra note 14 at 32-33.

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49. See Supra note 35.

50. See Supra note 43.

51. Dworkin, Gerald, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 1988) at 108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52. As Wise has acknowledged to one of the authors in private conversation, questions as to whether a being possesses autonomy touch on fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind, such as what it means to have a mind and how one can know whether a mind exists. As he put it, this requires a certain modesty in how the NhRP argues its positions on the autonomy of animals: even if we do not know for certain whether a given nonhuman has an autonomous self, as we would take certain outwardly observable characteristics as indicative of autonomy in humans, we ought to treat them as indicative of autonomy in nonhumans as well.

53. Alasdair Cochrane, “Do Animal Have an Interest in Liberty?” (2009) 57 Pol Stud 660 at 668.

54. Ibid.

55. In Re Young (1961), 211 NYS 2d 621 at 626. For a general overview of equality and non-discrimination at common law, see Note, “The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law: (1989) 102 Harv L Rev 1993.

56. Romer v Evans (1996), 517 US 620 at 633.

57. Wise, supra note 13 at 131-34.

58. Ibid at 181.

59. Supra note 4.

60. See, for example, Rivers, supra note 43 at 493. For the Memorandum of Law submitted by the NhRP, see online at: https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/content/uploads/Memorandum-of-Law-Tommy-Case.pdf.

61. Supra note 4 at 151.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid at 152.

64. Tommy & Kiko, supra note 8.

65. Ibid at 2.

66. Epstein, Richard A, “Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights” in Sunstein, Cass & Nussbaum, Martha, eds, Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2006) 143 at 150–52.Google Scholar

67. Ibid at 151.

68. Ibid.

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70. Ibid at 57-58.

71. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1917) 26 Yale L J 710 at 746-47.

72. Wise, supra note 13 at 25-26.

73. Supra note 4 at n 3.

74. Carl Cohen, “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research” (1986) 315(14) New England J Medicine 865 at 866.

75. Scruton, Roger, Animal Rights and Wrongs, 3rd ed (Metro Books, 2000) at 55.Google Scholar

76. For an in-depth analysis, see Nathan Nobis, “Carl Cohen’s ‘Kind’ Arguments for Animal Rights and Against Human Rights” (2004) 21(1) J App Phil 43 at 47-51.

77. Ibid at 53.

78. Ibid at 50.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid at 51.

81. Ibid.

82. Epstein, supra note 66 at 151; Posner, supra note 69 at 57-58.

83. Anderson, Elizabeth, “Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life” in Sunstein, Cass & Nussbaum, Martha, eds, Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2006) 277 at 284.Google Scholar

84. Ibid.

85. Supra note 8 at 2.

86. Supra note 83 at 284-85

87. Donaldson, Sue & Kymlicka, Will, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford University Press, 2013).Google Scholar

88. Ibid at chs 4-5.

89. Ibid at ch 7.

90. Ibid at ch 6.

91. Ibid at 55-56.

92. Ibid at 57.

93. Ibid at 57-58.

94. Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, “Animals and the Frontiers of Citizenship” (2014) 34(2) Oxford J Legal Stud 201 at 213-14.

95. For a recent study, see Julie Urbanik & Mary Morgan, “A Tale of Tails: The Place of Dog Parks in the Urban Imaginary” (2013) 44 Geoforum 292.

96. Kymlicka & Donaldson, supra note 94 at 207.

97. Neale, Bren, “Introduction: Young Children’s Citizenship” in Neale, Bren, ed, Young Children’s Citizenship: Ideas into Practice (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2004) at 15.Google Scholar

98. Kymlicka & Donaldson, supra note 94 at 208.

99. Epstein, supra note 66 at 154-55.

100. Donaldson & Kymlicka, supra note 87 at 40.

101. Ibid at 49.

102. Regan, supra note 48 at 276.

103. Ibid at 279.

104. Wise, supra note 14 at 32.

105. Epstein, supra note 66 at 155.

106. Wise, supra note 14 at 33-34.

107. Steven M Wise, “Rattling the Cage Defended” (2002) 43 BCL Rev 623 at 650-51.

108. For another recent overview of the Third Judicial Department’s use of social contract theory to deny nonhuman rights, which focuses more on canonical social contract theorists (e.g. Hobbes, Locke) and the specific academic authorities on which the Court relied, see Craig Ewasiuk, “Escape Routes: The Possibility of Habeas Corpus Protection for Animals under Modern Social Contract Theory” (2017) 48(2) Colum HR L Rev 69.

109. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed (Harvard University Press, 1999) at 448.

110. Ibid.

111. Supra note 4.

112. Rawls, supra note 109 at 17.

113. Ibid at 11.

114. Ibid at 13.

115. For another author who poses this question, see Mark Bernstein, “Contractualism and Animals” (1997) 86(1) Phil Studies 49.

116. Regan, supra note 48 at 163-74.

117. Ibid at 173.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid. Bernstein, supra note 115 also observes at 59-61 that claiming that the original contractors would possess the general knowledge that it would be unlikely that they could ever ‘become’ nonhumans is open to a charge of cultural bias, as there are religious belief systems in which a human consciousness can be incarnated within a nonhuman and vice versa.

120. The authors thank Craig Ewasiuk for bringing this point to their attention.

121. Barry, Brian, Theories of Justice (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) at 204.Google Scholar

122. Rawls, supra note 109 at 11.

123. Ibid.

124. Mark Rowlands, “Contractarianism and Animal Rights” (1997) 14(3) J App Phil 235 at 239.

125. Ibid at 243.

126. As should be evident from this section, the authors do not believe in karmic reincarnation.

127. The sanctuary in question is Save the Chimps in Fort Pierce, Florida. For the NhRP’s statement of facts relevant to chimpanzee physical, mental, and social well-being, see their appellate brief here at 4-31: https://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/content/uploads/8.-Appellate-Brief-Filed-with-Court-Tommys-Appeal1.pdf.

128. In England & Wales, the relevant rules are those under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.

129. Rowlands, supra note 124 at 236.

130. Bernstein, supra note 115 at 57.

131. Rawls, supra note 109 at 18.

132. Bernstein, supra note 115 at 66-67.

133. Ibid at 66.

134. Posner, supra note 1 at 528.

135. Ibid at 532.

136. Aero Spark Plug v BG Corporation (1942), 130 F 2d 290 at 295; Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Transaction Publishers, 1970) at 166.

137. Ibid.

138. Rowlands, supra note 124 at 245.

139. Naturally, this obstacle does not apply to rights created by legislation, since these do not need to be justified by precedent.

140. This is precisely why the non-UK title of his book, Unlocking the Cage, is Drawing the Line.

141. Robert RM Verchick, “A New Species of Rights” (2001) 89 Cal L Rev 207 at 214.

142. BV Harris, “Government ‘Third Source’ Action and Common Law Constitutionalism” (2010) 126 Law Q Rev 373 at 398.

143. Ibid at 389.

144. For a comprehensive overview of these differences, see PS Atiyah & Robert S Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (Clarendon Press, 1987).

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147. Robert Kagan, “On Surveying the Whole Legal Forest” (2003) 28 Law & Soc Inquiry 833 at 866.

148. Marc Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change” (1974) 9 Law & Soc’y Rev 95 at 100.

149. Mark Tushnet, “Some Legacies of ‘Brown v. Board of Education’” (2004) 90(6) Va L Rev 1693 at 1697.

150. Steven M Wise, “Nonhuman Rights to Personhood” (2013) 30 Pace Environ L Rev 1278 at 1288-90.

151. For a recognition of this difference in legal culture in the context of advocating further welfare regulation in the UK, see Mike Radford, Animal Welfare Law in Britain: Regulation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2001) at 104.

152. Tommy, supra note 4; Tommy & Kiko, supra note 8.

153. Singer, supra note 17.

154. Supra note 7 at 32-33.