Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-x4r87 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-27T17:00:51.705Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Excused Necessity in Western Legal Philosophy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2015

Khalid Ghanayim
Get access

Extract

Should a person in a life-threatening situation have a defence when he saves his life by causing death to a person who was not involved in creating the life-threatening situation? Viz., does the perpetrator have an excused necessity defence that negates imposing the punishment? This issue - excused necessity defence - has fascinated the legal world since antiquity and has been described as one of the most complicated issues in criminal law. The well-known case is the “plank of Carneades” or “two men and the plank”. Two men, A and B, are shipwrecked on the high seas; as their strength ebbs and they are about to drown, they see a wooden plank that is just large enough to support only one of them. A reaches the plank first and grabs it, but B, faced with the prospect of certain death, pushes A off the plank, resulting in the death of A by drowning. B then grabs the plank and manages to save his own life. Should B have a defence if he is prosecuted for pushing A off the plank in these circumstances?

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , January 2006 , pp. 31 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

This research was made possible through a grant from the Government of Canada: Canadian Studies Faculty Research Award Program, The Israel Association for Canadian Studies and Halbert Exchange Program, and The Minerva Foundation. I would like to thank Klaus Bernsmann, George Fletcher, Randal Graham and Richard Bronaugh for their questions, criticism and fruitful remarks. Special thanks to Kaye Joachim and the staff of Bora Laskin library, University of Toronto, who supported my research, and to Avinoam Sharon for translating the paper into English.

1. As in German, Austrian, Swiss, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Japanese, South-Korean, Israeli and (perhaps) Canadian law. See Ghanayim, K., “Excused Necessity: A Defence in Criminal Code” [unpublished, copy with author].Google Scholar

2. As in the Scandinavian legal systems; see Ghanayim, supra note 1.

3. This is the case in English law; see Ghanayim, supra note 1.

4. See Aichele, A., “Was ist und wozu taugt das Brett des Karneades” (2003) 11 Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 245 Google Scholar; Weiglin, E., “Das Brett des Karneades” (1942) 88 GS 116 Google Scholar; Küper, W., Immanuel Kant und das Brett des Karneades (Heidelberg: Müller, 1999)Google Scholar; Hruschka, J., “On The History of Justification and Excuse in Cases of Necessity” in Festschrift for Summers—Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994) 337.Google Scholar

5. See Cicero, , On Duties, ed. by Griffin, M.T. & Aktins, E.M. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) Book III, para. 89 at 134 Google Scholar; Dyck, A.R., A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996) at 612.Google Scholar

6. See Küper, supra note 4.

7. Hruschka, supra note 4 at 339.

8. See Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 62a. On Judaism and Islam see K. Ghanayim, “Excused Necessity in Eastern Legal Philosophy” [unpublished, copy with author].

9. See Ibsen, Henrik, Peer Gynt, trans. by Watts, Peter (London: 1966) Act Five at 165 Google Scholar.

10. See Janka, K., Der strafrechtliche Notstand (Erlangen: Deichert, 1878) 34ff.Google Scholar

11. See Rabe, K., Die Entwicklung des Notstandes von der Aufklärungszeit bis zum Reichsstrafgesetzbuch (Hannover: Göttingen Universität Dissertation, 1930) 10 Google Scholar; Janka, supra note 10 at 49ff; W. Küper, “Notstand I (strafrechtlich)” in A. Erler & Kaufmann, E. (Hrsg.), Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, Band III (Berlin: Schmidt, 1984) 1065f Google Scholar; Stammler, R, Darstellung der strafrechtlichen Bedeutung des Notstandes (Erlangen: Deichert, 1878) at 17–21 Google Scholar; Meissner, A., Die Interessenabwägungsformel in der Vorschrift über den rechtfertigenden Notstand (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990) at 73f Google Scholar; Bernsmann, K., “Entschuldigung” durch Notstand (Köln: Heymann, 1989) 259f Google Scholar; Cohen, D., “The Development of the Modern Doctrine of Necessity: A Comparative Critique” in Eser, A. & Fletcher, G. P., eds., Justification and Excuse: Comparative Perspectives (Huntington, NY: Juris, 1999) II (Freiburg: Eigenverlag Max-Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, 1988) 971 at 977Google Scholar.

12. On the approach of Thomas Aquinas, see Meissner, supra note 11 at 78f; Renzikowski, J., Notstand und Notwehr (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994) 192 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kohler, J., “Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie: Das Notrecht” (1914/15) 8 ARSP 411 at 414ffGoogle Scholar.

13. See Grotius, , De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (Paris: 1625)—Vom Recht des Krieges und des Friedens (Neuer deutscher Text und Einleitung von Schaetzel, Tübingen: Mohr, 1950), 2. Buch, 2. Kapitel, VI-IX, 149ff.Google Scholar

14. St. Thomas Aquinas recognized the state’s right to put people to death, as well as the right of self-defence. See Kohler, supra note 12 at 416ff. We should also mention the view of English scholars who rejected the necessity defence where it would involve the killing of a third party, because they reasoned that the sovereign could not abrogate a religious prohibition. Also see IVBlackstone, W., Commentaries, 16th ed. (London: Cadell, 1825) 30ffGoogle Scholar; and see Kant, I., The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. by Mary J.|Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 337.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See infra note 88 on Hobbes, who took the view that the State (the Law) is not religious, and is not bound by religious obligations. Therefore, Hobbes recognized necessity as a defence even when the defensive conduct involved taking a life.

15. See Küper, supra note 11 at 1065f; Janka, supra note 10 at 51ff; Stammler, supra note 11 at 21ff. The Catholic moralists did not accept necessity as a defence in the case of an abortion intended to save a woman’s life. They took the view that abortion is prohibited even when it is necessary in order to save the mother’s life, see Kohler, supra note 12 at 419.

16. See Hruschka, J., “Zurechnung und Notstand: Begriffsanalysen von Pufendorf bis Daries” in Schröder, J. (Hrsg.), Entwicklung der Methodenlehre in Rechtswissenschaft und Philosophie vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1998) 163.Google Scholar It should be noted that the writings of Hobbes and Bacon influenced Pufendorf.

17. See Hruschka, J., “Zur Interpretation von Pufendorfs Zurechnungs- und Notstandslehre in der Rechtslehre der Aufklärung” in M. Beetz/G. Cacciatore (Hrsg.), Die Hermeneutik im Zeitalter der Aufklärung (Köln: Boehlau 2000) 181ff.Google Scholar

18. See Jescheck, H-H., “Methoden der Vorbereitung und Durchführung der deutschen Strafrechtsreform” in Jescheck, (Hrsg.), Strafrechtsreform in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Italian (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1981) 11, 12fGoogle Scholar; Neumann, U., “Der strafrechtliche Nötigungsnotstand: Rechtfertigungs- oder Entschuldigungsgrund?, 1988 JA 329, 332Google Scholar; and Fletcher, G.P., Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1978) at 819ffGoogle Scholar.

19. Infra note 184.

20. See text belonging to infra notes 61-68.

21. See text belonging to infra notes 183-92.

22. See text in infra note 184 on excusing necessity.

23. See e.g., Brudner, A., “A Theory of Necessity” (1987) 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 339 at 352ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Klimchuk, D., “Necessity, Deterrence, and Standing” (2002) 8 Legal Theory 339 at 344ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ripstein, A., “In Extremis” (2005) 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 415.Google Scholar

24. See e.g., Weinrib, EJ., “Deterrence and Corrective Justice” (2002) 50 UCLA L Rev. 621 at 632ffGoogle Scholar.

25. See text belonging to infra notes 130 and 159.

26. These Utilitarian theories, in modern law sense like Bentham’s, are rejected by the philosophers like Kant; see text belonging to infra notes 154-56.

27. See Welzel, H., Die Naturrechtslehre Samuel Pufendorfs (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1958) 89f Google Scholar; Janka, supra note 10, 80ff; Rabe, supra note 11, 13ff; Hruschka, supra note 4, 337ff; Hruschka, supra note 16, 169ff.

28. See infra note 184 on sec. 35 of the German penal code.

29. See e.g., Gur-Arye, M., “Should a Criminal Code Distinguish between Justification and Excuse?” (1992) 5 Can. J. L. & Jur. 215 at 229 Google Scholar.

30. See Perron, W., “Die Stellung von Rechtfertigung und Eintschuldigung im System der Strafbarkeit” in Eser, A. & Nishihara, H. (Hrsg.), Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigung IV (Freiburg: Eigenverlag Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, 1995) 70 Google Scholar; A. Eser, “Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime” in A. Eser & G.P. Fletcher, eds., supra note 11 at 17, 24.

31. See Kremnitzer, M. & Ghanayim, K., “Proportionality and the Aggressor’s Culpability in Self-Defense” (2004) 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 875.Google Scholar

32. See BVerfGE 39, 1, 44; Hirsch, H-J, “Die Stellung von Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigung im Verbrechenssystem aus deutscher Sicht” in Eser, A. & Perron, W. (Hrsg.), Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigung III (Freiburg: Eigenverlag Max-Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, 1991) 39fGoogle Scholar; Onagi, A., Die Notstandsregelung im japanischen und deutschen Strafrecht im Vergleich (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993) 45.Google Scholar Also see Kant’s approach infra notes 94ff, according to which an act that inflicts harm to the life of the actor can be either justified (in circumstances of self-defence) or unlawful (in a case of necessity); there is no third option.

33. See also The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273, in regard to the problem in English law, which rejects necessity based upon an absence of reasonable expectation of normative conduct, due to the claim that exoneration could be taken to mean that the conduct is justified. Also see the problems associated with trying the case in American law, People v. Goetz, 68 NY 26 96 (1986).

34. On these distinction, see Eser, supra note 30 at 17; Hruschka, J., “Verhaltensregeln und Zurechnungsregeln” (1991) 22 Rechtstheorie 449 Google Scholar; Jescheck, H-H. & Weigend, Th., Lehrbuch des Strafrechts Allgemeiner Teil, 5. Aufl. (Berlin: Duncker & Homblot, 1996) 332-33Google Scholar; Fletcher, supra note 18 at 761; Fletcher, G.P., “Should intolerable conditions generate a justification or an excuse for escape?” (1979) 26 UCLA L. Rev. 1359 Google Scholar; see also Perka et. al. v. The Queen (1985) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 385; R. v. Ruzic, (2001) 153 C.C.C. (3d) 1.

35. Pufendorf’s theory is referred to as the “Legal Vacuum Theory.”

36. It should be noted that English thinkers like John Locke, French thinkers like Rousseau, American scholars like John Wise, and Italian scholars, as well, were influenced by Pufendorf. See Welzel, supra note 27 at 2f.

37. See text belonging to supra notes 10-15.

38. Pufendorf, S., On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law, ed. by Tully, James, trans. by Silverthorne, Michael (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) Book I, Ch. 5, para. 18.Google Scholar

39. See Welzel, supra note 27, 91; Küper, supra note 4, 31; see also text belonging to supra notes 11-15.

40. See Pufendorf, supra note 38, para. 18; and see Janka, supra note 10, 78ff; Welzel, supra note 27, 89ff; H., v. der Linde, , Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigung im Strafrecht? (Frankfurt a/M: Lang, 1988) 39.Google Scholar Pufendorf relied upon the doctrine of self-preservation as developed by Hobbes.

41. Pufendorf, supra note 38, Book I, Ch. 5, para. 18.

42. Ibid.

43. On the approach of Matthäus, see Janka, supra note 10 at 73ff. Also see the position of J.S.F. Böhmer, according to which the instinct of self-preservation negates culpability (the anti-social nature of culpability—qualitas des dolus iniuriosi), in other words, it is a defence of absence of culpability. See Küper, supra note 11 at 1066.

44. It must be noted that the view of Pufendorf “Law does not govern necessity” does not mean that necessity defence is not subject to the law or is not of interest for the law. According to Pufendorf, the law has to define the necessity defence and its scope, and than all cases that fall within the scope of the necessity defence can not constitute a criminal offence; these cases are outside the law and injusticiable. It means that necessity is a criminal law defence, but not one of justification, excuses or even defence negating the imposition of punishment for a committed offence.

45. US v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360.

46. The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273.

47. Pufendorf, supra note 38 at para. 20.

48. The term “can” does not imply a legal right or license, since Pufendorf does not see necessity as a justifying defence. According to Pufendorf, an act performed in a situation of necessity is performed in a legal vacuum. The actor has the physical ability to act, as opposed to the legal ability—in the sense of a right—to infringe the legally protected interests of others.

49. See Welzel, supra note 27 at 89ff; von der Linde, supra note 40 at 38f; Bernsmann, supra note 11 at 281f. Thomasius adopted Pufendorf’s approach in its entirety, but took the view that the survival instinct is not a doctrine that is based upon an absence of a reasonable expectation to face the danger, as Pufendorf believed, but upon the natural and religious right to physical survival; see Rabe, supra note 11 at 16; Janka, supra note 10 at 81. It is interesting to note that Pufendorf, supra note 38 at para. 24 extended the underlying rationale of necessity. While in the case of a danger to life, Pufendorf is of the opinion that the survival-instinct doctrine allows (not in sense of right) the actor to infringe any protected interest in order to save his life, in the case of property versus property he ex Presses the opinion that the actor can inflict harm upon another’s property in order to rescue his own, as the damaged property is not more valuable than the rescued property; see Welzel, supra note 27 at 92; Rabe, supra note 11 at 15; Janka, supra note 10 at 79.

50. Pufendorf, supra note 38 at para. 22.

51. Finkelstein, C.O., “Two men and the Plank” (2001) 7 Legal Theory 279.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52. Ibid at 280.

53. Also see Bernsmann, supra note 11 at 345.

54. See Kant, supra note 14 at para. 335.

55. Also see Bernsmann, supra note 11 at 338.

56. See Simpson, A.W.B., Cannibalism and the Common Law (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984) at 144–145.Google Scholar

57. See the German text of his book Über die Pflicht des Menschen und des Bürgers nach dem Gesetz der Natur (Frankfurt: Insel, 1994) at para. 11-13. The English translation renders these as “defence may rightly be made,” and “innocent self-defence.”

58. See Pufendorf, supra note 38 at para. 13.

59. See ibid. para. 23.

60. But see Pufendorf’s statements supra notes 47 and 50.

61. See Fichte, J.G., The Science of Rights, trans. by Kroeger, A.E. (London: Truebner, 1889) at 336ff.Google Scholar

62. Ibid. at 337.

63. Ibid. at 18.

64. Ibid. at 337.

65. Ibid. at 337.

66. On Kant’s approach, see text belonging to infra notes 81ff.

67. Fichte, supra note 61 at 337.

68. Ibid. at 337.

69. A similar approach was propounded by Oetker, F., “Notwehr und Notstand” in Festgabe für Frank, Band I (Tübingen: Mohr, 1930) 359, 368ffGoogle Scholar; Nagler, J., “Der Begriff der Rechtswidrigkeit” in Festgabe für Frank, Band I (Tübingen: Mohr, 1930) 339, 340ffGoogle Scholar, according to whom conduct performed in a situation of “excusing” necessity is not prohibited (unverboten); and see Conde, M., “Necessity Defined: A New Role In The Criminal Defense System” (1981) 29 UCLA L. Rev. 409 at 439ffGoogle Scholar, according to whom necessity is neither justification nor excuse; its apart as a kind of criminal defence, falling somewhere between the notion of justification and excuse. This is similar to the approach of Roman law and Cannon law, according to which necessitas non habet legem, in other words, necessity stands outside of the law.

70. On the role and importance of the nature of the defence, i.e., distinction between justification and excuses, see text belonging to supra notes 28-34.

71. See Rabe, supra note 11 at 38; Janka, supra note 10 at 90.

72. Also see Janka, ibid.

73. See supra note 46.

74. Also see A. v. Hirsch, , “Review Essay/Lifeboat Law” (1985) 4 Crim. Justice Ethics 88 at 91CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Other possible and acceptable understanding of Fichte is to say that a person in mortal danger is outside the law-protecting of his life; i.e. only his life lost the legal protection; all other legal interests enjoy the law protection. According to this understanding, all other legal interests fall within the social contract and enjoy his protection.

75. See also Klimchuk, supra note 23 at 342.

76. Also see Baumgarten, A., Notstand und Notwehr (Tübingen: Mohr, 1911) 29ffGoogle Scholar; Lenckner, Th., in Schönke/Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, 26. Aufl. (München: Beck, 2001) Vorbem sec. 32ff para. 8Google Scholar; Rabe, supra note 11 at 38; Perka et al. v. The Queen, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 396ff.

77. For example, sec. 6 of the Israeli Defamation Act.

78. One might say that the special obligations imposed on police, fire fighters etc. are an exception to the legal vacuum rule, so that these persons have to face the mortal dangers and can not be outside the law. According to this view, a person in mortal danger is in a legal vacuum, unless he is under special obligation to face the danger. But Fichte did not support this view. When Fichte discusses the shipwreck case, he did not differentiate between the Capitan of the ship, who is specially obliged to face mortal dangers arise from the sea, and other persons, like passengers. Fichte’s view is that every person in mortal danger is outside the law and there is no legal obligation imposed on him.

79. Also see Kant, supra note 14 at para. 334.

80. See infra note 159.

81. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 234-36.

82. According to Küper, supra note 4, Küper, W., “Es kann keine Not geben, welche, was unrecht ist, gesetzmässig macht”, in Festschrift für E.A. Wollf (Berlin: Springer, 1998) 285 at 289fCrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kant’s discussion appears in the Appendix (Anhang) rather than in the Ground Principles of the Law of Rights (Grundprinzipien der Rechtslehre) or their Introduction (Einleitung) is because, according to Kant, supra note 14 at para. 60, necessity doe not grant a right. It is an alleged right (vermeintliches Recht).

83. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 234.

84. The intention here is primarily to Grotius, who held that harm to property is justified in cases of necessity. On Grotius’s approach, see text belonging to supra note 13.

85. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 236.

86. As is pointed out by Wildt, A., “Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Moral bei Kant” (1997) 83 ARSP 159 at 161Google Scholar; Küper, supra note 4 at 3 at n. 4, the term “can” for Kant refers to normative “allowances” in the sense of “should”.

87. Gregor, translated the term Übel as ill.

88. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 235-36. A similar approach is found in Hobbes, Th., Leviathan, ed. by Oakeshott, M. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946) at 197 Google Scholar: “If a man, by the terror of present death, be compelled to do a fact against the law, he is totally excused; because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a law were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, If I do it not, I die presently; if I do it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing It, there is time of life gained; nature therefore compels him to the fact.”; also see Holmes, O. W., The Common Law (1881), ed. by Howe, M.D. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963) 40 Google Scholar, according to whom “[T]he law cannot prevent it by punishment, because a threat of death at some future time can never be a sufficiently powerful motive to make a man choose death now in order to avoid the threat.”

89. It is interesting to note Kant’ s approach to self-defence. Kant recognizes self-defence as an objective right that grants the victim the right to employ force. Kant rejects the view that the legislature can limit the scope of self-defence in cases of defence of life. Kant states in his lectures, Kant’s, Gesammelte Schriften, XXVII.2.2, p. 1374 (Naturrecht, FeyerabendGoogle Scholar) “If my life is possibly but not certainly endangered, the state cannot enact a moderating law [a law that forbids me to protect my life] because 1) the most severe punishment that the state can impose is not greater than the present evil. The law cannot prevent me from protecting my life. Such a law would be absurd. 2) Such a law would be unjust because if the state cannot protect me then it cannot issue commands.” In other words, according to Kant, self-defence is an objective right, and the legislature cannot restrict its scope, and if it purports to do so, the limitation is unjust. Moreover, such a prohibition lacks deterrent force.

90. Kant, Immanuel, Lectures on Ethics, ed. by Heath, P. & Schneewind, J.B., trans. by Heath, P. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) Part IVCrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kant on the metaphysics of morals: Vigilantus’s lecture notes, para. 599-600; and see Kant’s, Gesammeltec Schriften, XXVII.2.2, p. 1353 (Naturrecht, Feyerabend).Google Scholar

91. On the meaning and effect of this term, see text belonging to notes infra 161-64.

92. Kant’s Political Writings, ed. by Reiss, H. and trans. by Nisbet, H.H. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970)Google Scholar, On the common saying: ‘This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice’ at 61, 81-82.

93. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 236. ‘Unpunishable’ means that the perpetrator has a defence negating the punishment; the law grant an acquittal and there is no legal sanctions; i.e., there is no criminal record.

94. See supra note 83 and adjacent text.

95. Reflexion Nr. 7195, quoted in Küper, supra note 82 at 289 at n. 13.

96. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 230.

97. Ibid. at para. 213.

98. Also see Pawlik, M., “Die Notwehr nach Kant und Hegel” (2002) 114 ZStW 259, 274ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kant does not address the situation in which the assailant is not criminally responsible, for example, where he acts without any mental element, is not culpable, or even where there is no conduct, as where a foetus endangers a woman’s life, or the case of Siamese twins. It might be argued that Kant can accept, or at least does not reject the position that the actor has a right to defend himself in a situation of necessity. On a discussion of this issue in modern Anglo-American law, see Horder, J., “Self-Defence, Necessity and Duress: Understanding the Relationship” (1998) 11 Can. J. L. & Jur. 143 at 146Google Scholar; Smith, J.C., Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (London: Stevens 1989) at 78f Google Scholar; Kugler, I., “Necessity as a Justification in Re A (Children)” (2004) 68 J. Crim. L. 440 at 443CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 31, 875ff; Re A, (2000) 4 All E.R 961.

99. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 312.

100. Ibid.

101. Also see Immanuel Kant, supra note 90 at para. 515, according to whom: “If we take men in statu naturali, they are ex leges, under no legal order, and have no laws, only external power to keep them upright. Each exercises his own choice, without acknowledging any general freedom.” And see Ellis, E., “Provisional Right in Kant’s Rechtslehre” in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongress (Hrsg. von v. Gerhardt, R-P Horstmann, R. Schumacher, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), Band 4, 100, 101.Google Scholar

102. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 230.

103. Ibid. at para. 231.

104. Ibid. at para. 230-31.

105. Ibid. at para. 231.

106. Supra note 83.

107. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 235.

108. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 235. In his lectures on ethics, supra note 90 at para. 516, Kant distinguishes between the situation in which one person is already holding on to the plank and has saved himself, and the situation in which two people are approaching the plank. He states the opinion that “the existence of a permissive law, in the case where preservation of life for two people would depend on the possession of a thing. Can the other deprive a man who is already in possession of the thing, to ensure his own survival at the price of the other’s life? By right of nature this is never so, precisely because the one to be despoiled already has possession, and this thereby protecting his life; the other’s need can never give a coercive right, insofar as the ground of the action did not already rest beforehand on the legally valid right to coerce; for otherwise the other would already have had to possess the coercive right, and this is impossible. But the case is altered, if neither of the two was yet in possession of the thing, and both were endeavouring to seize possession of that whereby the life of one of them can be saved. In that case, no right subsists between them, whereby one could be coerced by the other, nor is there any means of preserving the natural urge to use force; if no concession is made, both lose their lives, whereas by the universal law the life of at least one of them should have been preserved; it is impossible, though, for either one to decide on employing the means to act in accordance with the principle; so force must be permitted, in order thereby to institute a right to preserve life. Here, too, therefore, the underlying maxim is that to institute a right, might precedes right, in accordance with a permissive law.” Only the first case, in which a person already has possession of the plank, appears in Kant’ s writings: In The Metaphysics of Morals and in “On the common saying: ‘This may be true in theory …’,” as is pointed out by Küper, supra note 4 at 36-43. Kant abandoned the distinction between the two situations, and argued that in both cases the actor has no right to save himself at the expense of the other. This conclusion derives from the distinction between self-defence, which grants a right to employ coercive force by right, and necessity, which does not grant such a right.

109. Also see Küper, supra note 4 at 4.

110. Kant’s Political Writings, supra note 92, “On the common saying: ‘This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice’” at 81.

111. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 235.

112. On Kant’s approach to self-defence, see Hruschka, J., “Die Notwehr im Zusammenhang von Kants Rechtslehre” (2003) 115 ZStW 201 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pawlik, supra note 98 at 266; Joerden, J.C., “Wahlfachklausur—Rechtsphilosophie: Das Notrecht” (1997) JuS 726 Google Scholar; Kühl, K., “Die Gebotene Verteidigung gegen provozierte Angriffe. Überlegungen aus Anlass der neuesten Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes zur Notwehrprovokation” in Festschrift für Bemmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997) 193, 195Google Scholar; Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 31 at 891.

113. For a different approach, according to which necessity, according to Kant, does not grant a subjective right of release from criminal responsibility by the court, see Rosen, A.D., Kant’s Theory of Justice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) at 104ffGoogle Scholar.

114. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 236.

115. Ibid. at para. 235.

116. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, Par II. Moral philosophy: Collins’s lectures notes, supra note 90 at para. 377ff; and see Kant’s, Gesammelte Schriften, XXVII.2.2, at 1509 (Moral, Mrongovius)Google Scholar; and see Mulholland, L.A., Kant’s System of Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) at 210ff.Google Scholar

117. Finkelstein, supra note 51 at 281 at n. 9.

118. See also R. v. Howe, 1987 A.C. 417, 432.

119. See Kremnitzer, M. & Ghanayim, K., “New Humanistic Trends in Israeli Criminal Law” in Festschrift für Eser (München: Beck, 2005) 513, 522-523Google Scholar; Ghanayim, supra note 1.

120. Also see Klimchuk, supra note 23 at 350.

121. See Weinrib, supra note 24 at 637.

122. Supra note 88.

123. See Küper, supra note 4 at 14; Hruschka, supra note 4 at 348; Mulholland, supra note 116 at 194; Rosen, supra note 113 at 90ff.

124. See Küper, supra note 4 at 16. Kohler, supra note 12 at 435; L. v. Bar, , Gesetz und Schuld im Strafrecht, Band III (Berlin: Keip, 1909) 235 Google Scholar; E. v. Chmielewski, , Grund der Straflosigkeit der Notstandshandlung (Breslau: Breslau Universität Dissertation, 1911) 13 Google Scholar view Kant’s approach to necessity as the basis for Feuerbach’s psychological coercion theory (psychologische Zwangstheorie) of punishment.

125. See Schild, W., “Anmerkungen zur Straf- und Verbrechensphilosophie Immanuel Kant” in Festschrift für Gitter (Wiesbaden: Chmielorz, 1995) 831 at 834ffGoogle Scholar.

126. Also see Kühl, K., “Freiheit und Solidarität bei den Notrechten” in Festschrift für H-J. Hirsch (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999) 259 at 265Google Scholar.

127. It has been noted that Kant changes the normally accepted term for self-defence, inculpatae tate-lae moderatio to ius inculpatae tatelae, i.e., he drops the word moderatio, which means “moderation.” Some interpret this to mean that Kant rejects proportionality in self-defence. In other words, a person has a right to self-defence even when the harm inflicted is disproportional. From this it would appear that the idea of social solidarity as a principle requiring proportionality does not form part of Kant’s jurisprudence. See Kant, supra note 14 at para. 453; also see Jorden, supra note 112 at 726f; Kühl, supra note 112 at 195; Hruschka, supra note 112 at 221f; Pawlik, M., Der rechtfertigende Notstand (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002) 19f CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pawlik, supra note 98 at 275; Hössl, D., “Recht und Zwangsbefugnis bei Kant” in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongress (Hrsg. von v. Gerhardt, R-P Horstmann, R Schumacher, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001) Band 4, 161ffGoogle Scholar; Byrd, Sh., “Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threats, Retribution in its Execution” (1989) 8 L. & Phil. 151 at 188CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fletcher, G., “Punishment and Self-defense” (1989) 8 L. & Phil. 201 at 210fCrossRefGoogle Scholar; according to Kant, the obligation to help others ex Presses a rational principle based upon the theory of wisdom. According to Kant, a person decides and acts rationally, and wisdom requires that we help one another. Kant proceeds from the assumption that a rational person voluntarily helps his fellow. Berlin, Isaiah was correct in noting, in his Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) at 153 Google Scholar, that “this is a counsel of perfection”.

128. See Küper, supra note 4 at 12f; Wright, RG., “Treating Persons as Ends in themselves: The Legal Implications of a Kantian Principle” (2002) 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 271 at 307ffGoogle Scholar; Weinrib, E.J., “Poverty and Property in Kant’s System” (2003) 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 795 at 799Google Scholar; Mulholland, supra note 116 at 188ff.

129. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 453.

130. Bockelmann, P., Hegels Notstandslehre (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1935) 8ffGoogle Scholar; see also Uniacke, S., “The Limits of Criminality: Kant on the Plank” in Tam, Henry, ed., Punishment, Excuse and Moral Development (Aldershot, UK: Avesbury, 1996) at 113, 114, 116, 120Google Scholar.

131. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 235ff. Therefore, the claim of Stammler, supra note 11 at 37, that the term “inculpabile” means “not wrongful” is incorrect. The causing of death in the Plank case is wrongful.

132. See also Fletcher, supra note 18 at 819.

133. Finkelstein, supra note 51 at 281 confuses justification, excuse and culpability. She writes: “Kant implicitly draws a distinction between the culpability of a deed and its punishability This distinction is variously ex Pressed as that between conduct rules and decision rules, or more familiarly, between justification and excuse. What someone does by right, or according to rules of conduct, he is justified in doing. A person who is excused, by contrast, has no such claim. He is merely shown mercy, but the act is still prohibited, and he is still guilty.” This approach confuses several ideas, and makes imprecise use of the concepts. Finkelstein is correct in stating that the distinction between justification and excuse is a distinction between conduct rule and decision rule. However, the culpability refers to the actor, not to the action. A defence of non-culpability is a decision rule. Under Anglo-American law, an excuse is a defence that negates the actor’s culpability.

134. See also Bockelmann, supra note 130, 5; Jakobs, G., Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 2. Aufl. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993) 409 Google Scholar at n. 2; H. v. Ferneck, , Die Rechtswidrigkeit, Band 2/1 (Jena: Fischer, 1905) 43 Google Scholar; Klimchuk, supra note 23 at 339.

135. On psychological culpability, see Ghanayim, supra note 1.

136. Genz, F., “Nachtrag zu dem Räsonnement des Herrn Professor Kant über das Verhältniss zwischen Theorie und Praxis” in Henrich, Dieter (Hrsg.), Kant—Genz— Rehberg: Über Theorie und Praxis (1793), (Frankfurt a/M 1967) 89ff, 106fGoogle Scholar. The translation is from Hruschka, supra note 4 at 338.

137. Hruschka, supra note 4 at 341. Therefore, the claim of Bockelmann, supra note 130 at 5; Fletcher, G.P., “The Psychotic Aggressor—A Generation Later” (1993) 27 Isr. L. Rev. 229 at 231Google Scholar, that the distinction between justification and excuse was not accepted in Kant’ s time would appear to be incorrect. As stated above, text belonging to note 17, philosophers distinguished between justifying defences and excusing defences, and between defences that negate punishment as opposed to situations that remove the act from the criminal sphere.

138. See Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, Part II. Moral Philosophy, supra note 90 at para. 295; Kant’s, Gesammelte|Schriften, XXVII.2.2, p. 1509 (Moral, Mrongovius)Google Scholar; Menzer, P., Eine Vorlesung Kants über Ethik (Berlin: Pan, 1924) 81 Google Scholar, and Kant’s, Gesammelte Schriften, XXVII.2.1, p. 570 Google Scholar (Metaphysik der Sitten, trans. by Vigilantius). Kant employs the term “Entschuldigung”, which means “Excuse”; in the translation by Vigilantius, supra note 90 at para. 570 the term “Entschuldigung” was imprecisely translated as “exculpation.”

139. Hruschka, supra note 4 at 342ff, and Joerden, supra note 112 at 727; and see Küper, W., “Tötungsverbot und Lebensnotstand” (1981) JuS 785 at 786.Google Scholar

140. Hruschka, supra note 4 at 346ff, and Joerden, supra note 112 at 727.

141. See Joerden, supra note 112 at 727.

142. Kant, supra note 14 at para. 236.

143. Hruschka, supra note 16 at 174 at n. 62; Hruschka, supra note 17 at 193.

144. Hruschka, supra note 17 at 193ff.

145. Hruschka, supra note 112 at 218. Here he joins the view that the actor fulfils all of the elements of the offence, but criminal responsibility is not imputed to the actor because of lack of deterrence; the approach in note 165.

146. Gentz, supra note 136 at 106.

147. See also J. Hruschka, supra note 34 at 449ff. Fletcher, supra note 124 at 231; On the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules, see Robinson, P., “Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication” (1990) 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 729.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

148. See supra note 88.

149. See Küper, supra note 4 at 48f; Ferneck, supra note 134 at 43; Mulholland, supra note 116 at 194; Klimchuk, supra note 23 at 340.

150. See Küper, supra note 4 at 49f; H. v. Ferneck, , Die Rechtswidrigkeit, Band 1 (Jena: Fischer, 1903) 312 Google Scholar, and supra note 134 at 43.

151. Janka, supra note 10 at 87f; Rabe, supra note 11 at 25; Meissner, supra note 11 at 85; Ripstein, supra note 23 at 426; Uniacke, supra note 130 at 114. It must be noted that according to Kant (and following the German system) the balance between the interests is one of quality, not quantity, i.e., it is the balance between life versus life. According to Kant, the balance between the life of one person against the life of 100 persons is the same as the balance between the life of one person against the life of other person. Another note is that Kant deal only with life-endangering situation, and not with dangerous situation to other legal interest, as limb and liberty; in a case of limb or liberty versus life, i.e., where a person save his own limb or liberty by killing innocent person, Kant will say that the law (the legal norm on murder or manslaughter) has a deter force; because the punishment threatened by the law (death) is greater than evil (danger of limb or liberty). It must be also noted that according to Kant, every legal norm has the normal (reasonable) deterrence in all cases (except in situation where the deterrence is zero, like in life-endangering situation); according to Kant, there is no 20% or 50% of legal norm deterrence. The deter effect of the norm by Kant deal with the law as abstract, i.e., the norm as a prohibition, and not with the deter effect of the norm in concrete situation. Criticism on Kant, see Uniacke, ibid. at 117-18. It must be also noted that this conclusion does not stay in conform to the consideration of escape which noted by Kant, supra note 90. It seems that the consideration of escape can not play any rule in punishment; that is, I think the reason, why Kant did not mention the consideration of escape in his book The Metaphysics of Morals.

152. On Kant’s theory of punishment, see Kant, supra note 14 at para. 331ff.

153. Ibid. at para. 331.

154. Ibid. at para. 331.

155. Kant, supra note 90 at para. 553.

156. Kant, , On the foundation of morality: A modern version of the Grundlegung, trans. with comm. by Liddell, Brendan E.A. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970) para. 428 at 156ffGoogle Scholar.

157. This is the conclusion of pure retribution theory of punishment. It is worth to note that according to scholars, Hegel is not a pure retributivist; on Hegel’s theory of punishment see Primorac, I., “Punishment as the Criminal Right” in (1980) 15 Hegel-Studien 187 at 193Google Scholar; Wood, A., Hegel’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) at 108 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Quinton, A.M., “On Punishment” in Acton, H.B., ed., The Philosophy of Punishment (London: Macmillan, 1969) at 55 Google Scholar; Merle, H-Ch., “Was ist Hegels Straftheorie” (2003) 11 Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 145 Google Scholar. See also Holmes, supra note 88 at 40. Hegel is of the opinion that when the actor averts the danger that threatens his life by means of taking the life of another who was not involved in creating the danger, the actor fulfils all of the elements of the offence, and it is therefore incumbent that we impose criminal liability. However, Hegel recognizes the situation of averting a mortal threat by inflicting property damage as justified. Hegel holds: “The particularity of the interests of the natural will, taken in their entirety as a single whole, is personal existence or life. In extreme danger and in conflict with rightful property of someone else, this life may claim (as a right, not a mercy) a right of distress, because in such a situation there is on the one hand an infinite injury to a man’s existence and the consequent loss of rights altogether, and on the other hand only an injury to a single restricted embodiment of freedom, and this implies a recognition both of right as such and also of the injured man’s capacity for rights, because the injury affects only this property of his.” Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of Right, trans. by Knox, (Oxford: 1942) at para. 127Google Scholar. Hegel is thought of as the spiritual father of necessity based upon utilitarian theory as a justifying defence in German, Swiss and Austrian law. See Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 34 at 354

158. See Küper, supra note 4 at 29 at n. 64; Meissner, supra note 11 at 84; Hruschka, supra note 4 at 348; Byrd, Sh., “Strafgerechtigkeit bei Kant” in Festschrift für Lampert (St. Ottilien: EOS, 1990) 137 Google Scholar; Hruschka, supra note 112 at 217f; Mulholland, supra note 116 at 194; See also Weinrib, supra note 24 at 638ff; Schmidhäuser, E., Vom Sinn der Strafe, 2. Aufl. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971) 52f Google Scholar; Altenhain, K., “Die Begründung der Strafe durch Kant und Feuerbach” in Festschrift für Keller (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003) 1ffGoogle Scholar; Klimchuk, supra note 23 at 345.

159. Rabe, supra note 11 at 25f; Janka, supra note 10 at 87f; Geyer, A., Lehre von der Notwehr (Jena: Mauke, 1857) 6 Google Scholar; Weiglin, supra note 4 at 89f; Bar, supra note 124 at 234; Stammler, supra note 11 at 45f; Finkelstein, supra note 51 at 281 at n. 9; and see Murphy, J.G., “Does Kant have a Theory of Punishment?” (1987) 87 Colum. L. Rev. 509 at 509ff.Google Scholar

160. See also Küper, supra note 4, 29 at n. 64; Meissner, supra note 11 at 84f; Hruschka, supra note 112 at 218; Byrd, supra note 158 at 137ff; Mulholland, supra note 116 at 194.

161. Meissner, supra note 11 at 85; Küper, supra note 4 at 49ff.

162. Kant, supra note 90 at para. 599-600.

163. See Hruschka, supra note 17 at 193ff.

164. Janka, supra note 10 at 85; Bockelmann, supra note 130 at 10ff.

165. See Byrd, supra note 127 at 188ff; Byrd, supra note 158 at 137ff; Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 31 at 890; Hruschka, supra note 112 at 218; Schild, supra note 125 at 834ff; Hill, T.E., “Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution?” (1997) 5 Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 291 Google Scholar; Rosen, supra note 113 at 90f, 104f; Hill, T.E., “Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment” (1999) 18 L. & Phil. 407ffGoogle Scholar; Klimchuk, supra note 23 at 345; and see Wright, supra note 128 at 285ff; Weinrib, supra note 24, Kremnitzer & Ghanayim, supra note 119 at 523; and Koriath, H., “Über Vereinigungstheorien als Rechtfertigung staatlicher Strafe” (1995) Jura 625 at 632ffGoogle Scholar, according to whom Kant’s theory of punishment does not reject deterrent aspects.

166. See Merle, J-C, “A Kantian Critique of Kant’s Theory of Punishment” (2000) 19 L. & Phil. 311 Google Scholar; Merle, J-C, “Eine kritische Alternative zu Generalprävention und Wiedervergeltung” in Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX Internationalen Kant-Kongress (Hrsg. von v. Gerhardt, R-P. Horstmann, R Schumacher, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001)Google Scholar, Band 4, 196ff in regard to the opinion that the justifications of punishment, according to Kant, are special deterrence and rehabilitation.

167. See, for example, Lesch, H.H., Der Verbrechensbegriff (Köln: Heymann, 1999) 23–40 Google Scholar, who argues that Kant recognized general deterrence as one of the purposes of punishment until rejecting it in Metaphysics of Morals. In other words, until Metaphysics of Morals, Kant was not a strict retributivist, and recognized general deterrence as one of the purposes of punishment. But with Metaphysics of Morals, Kant rejected general deterrence as part of the purpose of punishment, and became a strict retributivist.

168. Kant, supra note 138 at para. 286; see also Kant’s, Gesammelte Schriften, XXVII/2.2 (philosophische Moral, Mongovius) p. 1435f Google Scholar. The same in Kant, , Gesammelte Schriften XIX, S. 589 Google Scholar; Kant’s, Gesammelte Schriften, XXVII.2.2, p. 1391 (Naturrecht, Feyerabend)Google Scholar; Kant’s, Gesammelte Schriften, XXVII.1., p. 150 (Praktische Philosophie, Powalski)Google Scholar.

169. Finkelstein, supra note 51 at 281 n. 9.

170. As stated in note 151, according to Kant a criminal norm has the normal (reasonable) deterrence, except in life-endangering situation where the deterrence is zero. Kant did not divide the deterrence in percentages, such as 20% or 50%. The deterrence by Kant deals with the norm as an abstract prohibition. That is the reason why Kant adopts the pure retribution theory on imposing punishment. Kant will not accept a theory that allows high punishment (or any punishment) to achieve deterrence. Kant will not accept the theory that said: the punishment of murder must be death by torture in order to achieve deterrence and protecting the life. See also the text belonging to infra note 172.

171. Also see Weinrib, supra note 24 at 636; Mulholland, supra note 116 at 188f; Rosen, supra note 113 at 91 n. 28; Murphy, J.G., Retribution, Justice, and Therapy (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979) at 85 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hill, T.E., “Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution?” (1997) 5 Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 305 Google Scholar; Byrd, supra note 158 at 146f; Waldron, J., “Lex Talions” (1992) 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 25 at 40Google Scholar; Klimchuk, supra note 23 at 350; Ripstein, supra note 23 at 421-23.

172. Kant, supra note 14 at 332f.

173. Finkelstein, supra note 51 at 281 n. 9.

174. Chapman, B., “A Theory of Criminal Law Excuses” (1988) 1 Can. J. L. & Jur. 75 at 76 Google Scholar.

175. Ibid. at 76 n. 7.

176. Ibid. at 77.

177. See text belonging to supra note 165.

178. See text belonging to supra notes 123-24.

179. See text belonging to supra note 88, and see Byrd, supra note 127 at 190ff.

180. See Ghanayim, supra note 1.

181. For an in-depth examination of this subject, and on the argument that necessity is based, inter alia, upon significant, double mitigation of culpability, see Ghanayim, ibid.

182. See ibid.

183. Feuerbach, A., Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland gültigen peinlichen Strafrechts. Mit vielen Anmerkungen und Zusatzparagraphen und mit einer vergleichenden Darstellung der Fortbildung des Strafrechts, 13. Aufl. (Hrsg. von C. J. A. Mittermaier, Giessen: Heyer, 1840) sec. 90, 91.Google Scholar

184. Feuerbach’s approach was adopted in the Bavarian Criminal Code (1861), and the Prussian Criminal Code (1851), see Chmielewski, supra note 124 at 15. The German Criminal Code of 1871, which remains in force to this day, is built upon those two laws. See Roxin, C., Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Band I, 3. Aufl. (München: Beck, 1997) 72ffGoogle Scholar. Section 35, which defines excusing necessity, has not been significantly changed. Sec. 35. Excusing Necessity “(1) Whoever commits a wrongful act in order to avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger to his own life, limb or liberty, or to that of a relative or person close to him, acts without culpability. This rule does not apply in so far as under the prevailing circumstances the perpetrator could be expected to have assumed the risk, especially because he was himself the cause of the danger or because he found himself in a special legal relationship. If however, the perpetrator did not have to assume the risk with regard to a special legal relationship, the punishment may be reduced in accordance with the provisions of sec. 49 (1).(2) If in committing the act, the perpetrator assumes the existence of circumstances which under subparagraph (1) would excuse his conduct, he shall be punished only if he could have avoided the error. The punishment shall be reduced in accordance with the provisions of sec. 49 (1).”

185. See Kühl, K., “Zur rechtsphilosophischen Begründung des rechtfertigenden Notstandes” in Festschrift für Lenckner (München: Beck, 1998) 143 at 147.Google Scholar

186. See Bockelmann, supra note 130 at 16.

187. Feuerbach, supra note 183, sec. 90 at 91.

188. Feuerbach, ibid. sec. 84. Feuerbach is considered the father of the theory of general deterrence that underlies the Continental approach to criminal punishment exemplified in the legal systems of such countries as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Feuerbach’s theory of punishment is also based upon the theory of psychological coercion, see Roxin, supra note 184 at 48f; Stratenweth, G., Schweitzerisches Strafrecht—Allgemeiner Teil I, 2. Aufl. (Bern: Stämpfli, 1996) 21f Google Scholar; Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 34 at 72ff.

189. On Kant’ s approach, see supra note 88.

190. See also Janka, supra note 10 at 93.

191. An approach similar to that of Feuerbach was ex Pressed by Bacon, F., The Elements of the Common Lawes of England (London: 1630, Reprint Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, 1969) 29 Google Scholar. Also see See Glazebrook, P.R., “The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law” (1972) 30 Cambridge L. J. 110 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; R. v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 285 Google Scholar. Bacon took the view that the law cannot accuse and impose liability upon an actor who acts in coercive circumstances that force him to act as he does. In such circumstances, the actor does not act voluntarily. In a situation of necessity of conservation of life, the act is committed by reason of coercion and not by free choice. In the case of the Plank of Carneades, Bacon states: “So if divers be in danger of drowning by the casting away of some boat or barge, and one of them get to some plank, or on the boates side to keep himself above water, and another to save his life thrust him from it, whereby he is drowned; this is neither se defendendo nor by misadventure, but justifiable.”

192. See Bernsmann, supra note 11 at 178.

193. See Ghanayim, supra note 1.