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The Two Themes of Canadian Federalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2014

Donald V. Smiley*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
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Extract

Canadian federal experience has centred around two major themes. The first relates to cultural dualism, the desire and ability of French- and English-speaking Canadians to survive as such and to use the governmental institutions which they respectively dominate in order to ensure this outcome. The second involves public action to meet the material expectations of individuals and groups living within an economy where burdens and benefits have been determined largely by the economic policies of successive federal administrations. Those who have concerned themselves with Canadian federalism have usually believed, explicitly or implicitly, that either the cultural or the economic problem was the major challenge which the federal system faced. Thus there are two versions of what our constitutional arrangements are all about, and these are most strikingly illustrated by the divergent perspectives of the Rowell-Sirois and Tremblay Commission. The former was almost exclusively concerned with the reallocation of revenues, revenue sources, and functional responsibilities between the two levels of government and did not deal in any explicit way with the impact of existing or proposed arrangements on the survival of the two cultures. To the Tremblay Commission the great theme of our constitutional history since Confederation is the attempt of English-speaking Canada to subvert the original federal compact and the resistance of these attempts by French Canadians; its Report does deal in great detail with economic issues but its basic argument is that the essential and permanent value of Canadian federalism is to make possible the survival of the two cultural groups.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 1965

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References

1 Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa, 1940).Google Scholar

2 Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems (Quebec, 1956).Google Scholar

3 For an analysis of the general perspectives of this document, see the introductory essay to The Rowell-Sirois Report, I, abridged by Smiley, Donald V. (Toronto, 1963).Google Scholar

4 There are elements of an equilibrium analysis running throughout this essay. For an account of this method see Easton, David, The Political System, (New York, 1954)Google Scholar, chap. xi. The only study I know in which equilibrium analysis is applied explicitly to a federal system is Vile, M. J. C., The Structure of American Federalism (London, 1961)Google Scholar, particularly chap. x. However, Mallory's, J. R. excellent book, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (Toronto, 1954)Google Scholar, rests implicitly on such a notion.

5 See Report on the B.N.A. Act, Senate of Canada (Ottawa, 1939).Google Scholar

6 Trembiay Report, II, sec. 2.

7 Confederation Debates (reprinted Ottawa, 1951), 9.Google Scholar

8 Ibid., 55.

9 Ibid., 62.

10 Ibid., 96.

11 Conservatism and National Unity,” in Flenley, R., ed., Essays in Canadian History (Toronto, 1939), 167.Google Scholar

12 Vol. I, 37–8.

13 Among these were the de facto recognition of French as an official language, legislation which applied to only one of the sections, the bifurcation of several of the ministries, the double-majority rule, and the leadership of governments by a representative of each section.

14 “Act or Pact, Another Look at Confederation,” Stanley, George F. G., Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, 1956, p. 24.Google Scholar See also the opinion of Bissonnette, Justice: “… la loi de 1867 soit précisément l'expression du compromis qui s'était ébauche entre le Haut et le Bas-Canada, auquel adhèreront la Nouvelle-Ecosse et le Nouveau-Brunswick.” Essai sur la Constitution du Canada (Montreal, 1963), 44–5.Google Scholar

15 English was to have equal status with French in the Legislature and courts of Quebec, Senators from Quebec were to be chosen by districts, the rights of denominational schools were secured, divorce was to be a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction, etc.

16 Unlike most other federations the provinces have no explicit place in the workings of the federal government which has developed as a majoritarian instrument. To me the real significance of the BNA Act (no. 2) of 1949 permitting Parliament with certain exceptions to amend what was designated as the “Constitution of Canada” is that the cultural minority has little protection against the majority in the operation of our federal institutions. The Honourable Louis St. Laurent saw this clearly when as Minister of Justice in 1946 he asserted that Parliament might legally request, and presumably obtain, an amendment to the BNA Act in respect to any matter not explicitly within the jurisdiction of the provinces, including Section 133 relating to the rights of the two languages. House of Commons Debates, June 18, 1946, p. 2621.

17 There was a program of grants-in-aid of agricultural instruction and improvement under federal legislation enacted in 1912. However, this measure related to a field in which Parliament had concurrent jurisdiction, unlike the 1919 and most of the later shared-cost arrangements.

18 Vol. II, 222–3.

19 A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ont. (1937) AC 355, and Angers v. Minister of National Revenue (1957), ExCR 83. For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of the federal spending power see Smiley, Donald V., Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism, Canadian Tax Paper No. 32 (Toronto, 1963)Google Scholar, chap. 2. The general position has been asserted by Professor Bora Laskin in speaking of the Angers case: “… the rejection of an attack on the constitutionality of the Family Allowances Act lends emphasis to the view that the Courts have no concern with the disbursement of public funds which have been validly raised.” Canadian Constitutional Law (2nd ed., Toronto, 1960), 655.Google Scholar

20 Gouin, L. M. and Claxton, Brooke, Legislative Expedients and Devices Adopted by the Dominion and the Provinces (Ottawa, 1939), chap. 3.Google Scholar

21 The Constitutional Background of the Taxation Agreements,” McGill Law Journal, 1955, 6.Google Scholar

22 Proceedings of the Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1960 (Ottawa, 1961), 130.Google Scholar

23 Le Canada, expérience ratée … ou réussie?, 77.Google Scholar

24 “Canada, Two Nations or One?”, this Journal, Nov. 1962, 485–501, and “The Political Implications of die Canadian Economy,” 1962 (mimeo.).

25 Le Canada, experience ratée … ou réussi?, 71. A prominent Quebec politician is reported recently to have said the same thing less elegantly: “I love Quebec, but I have no ‘gutfeeling’ for Canada.”

26 0n the general subject of integration within polical boundaries see Deutsch, Karl et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957)Google Scholar, particularly chaps, II and III. There is a common argument that federalism is being attenuated in Canada because of the weakening of the emotional attachment of people to particular localities, economic integration on national lines, the development of transportation and communication facilities, and like factors. However, even a cursory observation indicates that the division of public responsibilities sustains, and is sustained by, a large number of vital associations at the provincial level—political parties, teachers' and trustees' organizations, labour federations, conservation groups, etc.

27 Proceedings, p. 79.

28 McGrath, W. T., “A New Look at Juvenile Delinquency,” Canadian Forum, 06 1962, 56.Google Scholar

29 Proceedings, 56–75.

30 The Historical Background and Development of Federal-Provincial Relations,” Canadian Public Administration, 03 1962, 26.Google Scholar

31 Bryce, R. B., “The 1957 Tax-Sharing Agreements: a Commentary,” reprinted in The Canadian Economy: Selected Readings, edited by Deutsch, John J., Keirstead, Burton S., Levitt, Kari, and Will, Robert M. (Toronto, 1961), 219–28.Google Scholar

32 For a more extended discussion of the relation between egalitarianism and grants-in-aid see Smiley, , Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism, 5560.Google Scholar

33 For analyses of the use of freight rates in regional equalization see Report of the Royal Commission on Transportation (Ottawa, 1951, chaps, IX, X, and XIGoogle Scholar, and Report of the Royal Commission on Transportation (Ottawa, 1961), II, part II.Google Scholar

34 Report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting (Ottawa, 1929).Google Scholar

35 Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Ottawa, 1951).Google Scholar

36 Report of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting (Ottawa, 1957).Google Scholar

37 Report on Arts, Letters and Sciences, 8.

38 Report on Broadcasting, 9.

39 See especially his opinions in Wenner v. S.M.T. (Eastern) Ltd. and A.-G. N.B. (1951) 4 DLR 529 and Switzman v. Waling and A.-G. Que, 7 DLR 2d. 337.

40 Switzman v. Elbling and A.-G. Que. 7 DLR 2d. 337.

41 See especially the symposium on human rights and freedoms in the Canadian Bar Review of March 1959 and Scott, F. R., Civil Liberties and Canadian Federalism (Toronto, 1959).Google Scholar

42 Le Canada, experience ratée … ou réussie?, 77.

43 It is significant that French Canadians do not appear to regard federal control over broadcasting as a significant challenge to their culture.

44 The text of the proposed amendment is printed in Fox, Paul, ed., Politics: Canada (Toronto, 1962), 92–4.Google Scholar

45 The abatement provisions are outlined in the annual publication of the Canadian Tax Foundation entitled The National Finances.

46 See Politics: Canada, 321–2.

47 Ibid., 307.

48 La Grève de l'amiante, en collaboration et sous la direction de Pierre-Elliott Trudeau (Montreal, 1956), 12.Google Scholar Trudeau's critical analysis of social thought in Quebec is especially valuable, 10–37.

49 For other statements and analyses of left-wing nationalism in Quebec see Michael Oliver, “Quebec and Canadian Democracy,” this Journal, Nov. 1957, 504-15; issues of the monthly publication Cité libre; Drapeau, Jean, Jean Drapeau Vous Parle (Montreal, 1959)Google Scholar; 1962 and 1963 Budget Speeches of Premier Jean Lesage.